"Through the National Lens": Nationality, Territory, and the Formation of "Crimean-Russian" Identity by Charron, Austin Luc
“THROUGH THE NATIONAL LENS”: NATIONALITY, TERRITORY, AND THE 
FORMATION OF “CRIMEAN-RUSSIAN” IDENTITY 
 
By 
 
Copyright 2012 
 
Austin Charron 
 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Geography and the Graduate Faculty of the 
University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
 
 
 
________________________________        
    Shannon O’Lear, Ph. D., Chair             
 
 
________________________________        
Barney Warf, Ph. D. 
 
 
________________________________        
Stephen Egbert, Ph. D. 
 
 
________________________________        
Alexander Tsiovkh, Ph. D. 
 
 
 
 
Date Defended:     12/07/2012 
 
 
 
 
  
 ii 
 
The Thesis Committee for Austin Charron 
certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: 
 
 
 
“THROUGH THE NATIONAL LENS”: NATIONALITY, TERRITORY, AND THE 
FORMATION OF “CRIMEAN-RUSSIAN” IDENTITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ________________________________ 
 Shannon O’Lear, Ph. D., Chair 
 
 
       
Date approved:      12/13/2012 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 iii 
Abstract 
 
Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea is a highly contested territory both culturally 
and politically. With an ethnic Russian majority and a sizeable population of indigenous Crimean 
Tatars living alongside ethnic Ukrainians within Ukrainian territory, national identities are 
particularly salient in Crimea. However, a strong sense of Crimean regional identity has also 
been shown to persist among members of all of Crimea’s ethno-national communities. Using 
survey data collected in the region, I demonstrate how the territory of Crimea itself figures 
prominently in competing narratives of national identity in the region and how Crimean regional 
identities are differentially negotiated and constructed through these narratives. I focus primarily 
on Crimea’s ethnic Russian population in order to define a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity 
as one that denotes an attachment to Crimea as viewed through a Russian “national lens” and 
understood through Russian national narratives. With this study I address the need to examine 
more critically the relationships between ethnic/national identities and the formation of 
territorially-based identities at scales below and across the nation-state.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
 This thesis takes a critical look at the dynamics between national and regional identity 
among residents of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea, with a particular focus on its 
ethnic Russian population. By examining the ways in which national and regional identities have 
been constructed in Crimea through competing national narratives about the region, I seek to 
elucidate and define a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity and ask the question: what roles do 
nationality and territory play in the formation of regional identities in Crimea and in similar 
regions around the world?  
The Autonomous Republic of Crimea, located within the Crimean Peninsula in southern 
Ukraine, is home to a unique and diverse blend of ethnic groups. While it is a part of Ukraine, a 
majority of the population is ethnically Russian following years of inclusion within the Russian 
Empire and the Russian portion of the Soviet Union. In addition, Crimea is home to the 
indigenous Crimean Tatars – a Muslim, Turkic-speaking group – as well as a myriad of small 
ethnic communities that have settled in the region over the course of centuries.  
While Crimea has rightly been celebrated for its diversity and multiculturalism, these 
ethnic and cultural divides have also served as regional centrifugal forces, particularly in the 
post-Soviet era. Due to a relatively minor bureaucratic decision made in the 1950s, Crimea 
emerged from the Soviet period as a part of Ukraine and not of Russia, much to the chagrin and 
consternation of its ethnic Russian majority. As such, Russians in Crimea have generally 
expressed a weak sense of Ukrainian civic identity, a strong sense of Russian national identity 
and, often, a strong nationalistic agenda in response to the geopolitical realities they have faced 
since the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991. For these reasons, in the aftermath of the Soviet 
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Union’s collapse many observers feared that Crimea was a potential “flashpoint” for the type of 
secessionist fervor and ethnic violence seen in other places around the region such as Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transdnistria. While such conflict has successfully been 
evaded in Crimea, it is still cited as a region with the potential for interethnic violence because of 
ongoing Russian nationalist sentiment there and the tension between Ukraine and Russia over the 
basing of Russia’s Black Sea Naval Fleet in the Crimean city of Sevastopol (Kuzio, 2010). 
 
Figure 1: Ukraine with Crimea Circled. Source: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/ukraine_pol91.jpg 
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On the other hand, residents of Crimea – Russian or otherwise – have consistently 
demonstrated a close sense of attachment to Crimea itself and a strong sense of regional identity. 
Many in the region, even the most ardent Russian nationalists, often speak of Crimea as their 
“homeland” even though it is no longer a part of Russian territory in a political sense. Initially it 
would appear that these two competing identities among Crimea’s Russian population – i.e., both 
a strong Russian national identity and a strong regional identity centered upon a region outside of 
Russia – are at odds with each other. How can a group whose members identify so strongly with 
their nationality simultaneously fixate upon this small region that is no longer a part of Russia 
and yet identify so strongly with it as their “homeland?” How can there be such a large 
incongruity between senses of national and territorial identity and the geographic scales at which 
they are most saliently inscribed?  
 
Figure 2: The Crimean Peninsula.  
Source: http://www.crimeahike.com/images/Crimea_Map_en.jpg 
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 To begin approaching this issue, it is important to consider the place of Crimea vis-à-vis 
various national territorial structures and what they mean for each of the region’s predominant 
ethnic communities and their “hierarch[ies] of geographically based identities” (Kaplan, 1999). 
Gradirovsky (1999) notes that in the former Soviet Union there is a tendency among many 
people to understand “homeland” within a two-tiered hierarchy. First, one’s rodina (motherland) 
is typically equated with the region in which a person lives and with which they have an 
intimate, personal connection through experience in and knowledge of the region. Second, one’s 
otechestvo (fatherland) is equated with the broader national territory that belongs to one’s 
national group at large and within which one’s rodina is “nested.” Considering such multiscalar 
processes through which senses of homeland are constructed is crucial to overcoming what 
Agnew (1994) has dubbed the “territorial trap” of focusing on the nation-state as the most salient 
scale of analysis for issues such as identity formation. 
Because Crimea is a region politically “nested” within the Ukrainian nation-state (i.e., the 
Ukrainian national homeland), senses of national, civic, and territorial identities for ethnic 
Ukrainians in Crimea are bounded and negotiated within a single territorial hierarchy. Ukrainians 
in Crimea are simultaneously residents of Crimea and citizens of Ukraine, and so to be Crimean 
is still to be Ukrainian in national and civic terms. Thus, a strong attachment to Crimea as one’s 
home region (rodina) within the broader homeland (otechestvo) should not be at odds with a 
strong sense of Ukrainian national identity. In other words, using a term such as “Crimean-
Ukrainian” to describe Crimean regional identity among Ukrainians would be redundant, as 
“Crimean” already implies “Ukrainian” by virtue of the fact that Crimea is part of Ukraine.  
 For Crimean Tatars the story is very different. As an indigenous people of Crimea whose 
very ethnogenesis is a product of Crimea’s history, the Crimean Tatars’ concept of homeland 
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(otechestvo) is fixed squarely upon the Crimean Peninsula only. Descended from numerous 
groups that settled in Crimea over the course of many centuries, the Crimean Tatars coalesced as 
a conscious ethnic community within Crimea and, as such, being from Crimea is an inextricable 
component of Crimean Tatar national identity. Their connection to Crimea was tested in the 
Soviet era through decades of forced exile from Crimea and proven through their unwavering 
and ultimately successful crusade for their right to return. Hence, a strong sense of Crimean 
Tatar national identity and a strong sense of Crimean regional identity are in no way at odds with 
one another. In fact it is quite the opposite: a sense of attachment to Crimea alone is part and 
parcel to Crimean Tatar national identity and is arguably the most important component thereof. 
In other words, the conception of national territory and a sense of territorial identity for Crimean 
Tatars are coterminous at the shores of the Crimean Peninsula. As with “Crimean-Ukrainian,” 
using a term like “Crimean-Crimean Tatar” would be redundant because “Crimean Tatar” 
already denotes identification with Crimea as homeland. 
 Russians in Crimea face an altogether different scenario. Crimea had been part of Russia 
since its annexation in 1783 and continued to be part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR) of the Soviet Union until its transfer to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. As such, 
Crimea had long been viewed both by its Russian residents and by the Russian people at large as 
an integral component of Russian national territory. Therefore, both Russian/Soviet national 
identity and a strong identity with Crimea as a region or rodina “nested” within the broader 
national territory (otechestvo) were not at odds with each other in the Russian or Soviet periods 
because they were both bounded within a structured territorial hierarchy.  
However, today Crimea is politically severed from the Russian Federation as a part of 
Ukrainian national territory, and for Crimean Russians this means that to live in their home 
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region is no longer to live within their national territory. The rodina has been separated from the 
otechestvo. In this way, a politico-territorial discontinuity exists for Russians between senses of 
regional and national identity that does not exist for Crimea’s other primary national groups. 
Regional and national identity are no longer bounded within a single territorial hierarchy for 
Russians in Crimea, but are instead fractured by post-Soviet political boundaries. “Crimean-
Russian” thus becomes a useful term when discussing identity, as it refers to two different 
aspects of identity which are no longer implicit to each other as would be the case with 
“Crimean-Ukrainian” or “Crimean-Crimean Tatar” identity. Hence, questions regarding the 
dynamics between nationality and territory in identity formation are particularly salient in 
regards to Crimea’s Russian population. 
 Because the term “Crimean” has different meanings for Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, and 
Russians, I argue that members of each of these groups relate to Crimea in different ways. While 
residents of Crimea may feel a strong sense of regional identity regardless of their nationality, I 
aim to demonstrate that national identity plays a critical role in why Crimean regional identity is 
so strong, and how it is constructed in different ways through competing national narratives. For 
Ukrainians, Crimea is an important symbol of national-territorial legitimacy and their on-going 
struggle to be disentwined from Russia and their Soviet past. For Crimean Tatars, Crimea is the 
very cornerstone of their sense of national identity and the homeland for which they yearned and 
to which they struggled to return during decades of Soviet-imposed exile. For Russians, Crimea 
is a powerful symbol of imperial glory, deep cultural roots, military victory, and ultimately the 
losses suffered following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I use the term “Crimean-
Russian” identity to define a particular sense of Crimean regional identity among ethnic Russians 
in Crimea who feel an attachment to the region largely because of its meaning and importance in 
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broader Russian national narratives. In other words, “Crimean Russian” identity implies that 
Russians view Crimea through their own national lens that emphasizes certain characteristics that 
make it an important place to Russians and Russia in general.  
 By examining how specific national narratives have been constructed in Crimea through 
the use of survey data collected in the region, I aim to contribute to a greater understanding of 
regional geography and of regional identity by critically considering the role of national identity 
in regional identity formation. While these issues are especially salient in Crimea, a deeper 
understanding of national-regional identity dynamics has implications for a broader 
understanding of regional identity in general. This work is particularly relevant and applicable to 
regions that have a multiethnic population or are politically contested between two or more 
national groups and in which a sense of regional identity is strong. The findings of this study 
may be particularly relevant to other regions in the former Soviet Union for two primary reasons: 
(1) the connection between nationality and territory here has been deeply institutionalized at 
many geographic scales since the Soviet era, and (2) the break-up of the once-unified Soviet 
territory has created a plethora of ethnic communities scattered throughout many different 
territories and fractured along political boundaries.  
Considering the ways in which national identity may shape and inform regional identity 
helps us better understand the nuanced meanings of and interactions among nationality, territory, 
regions, and place, and helps us overcome the “territorial trap” or common fixation upon the 
nation-state as the primary scale of analysis. By ignoring the multifaceted and multiscalar 
processes that shape identity and therefore reifying the primacy of the nation-state, we do 
injustice to the social heterogeneities found within nation-state boundaries and the social 
continuities spanning across them that the “territorial trap” masks. As the number of national 
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groups far exceeds the number of nation-states in the world, the role of nationality in identity 
formation is clearly a much more rich and dynamic area of study than the “territorial trap” could 
ever allow. Ignoring how nationality and territory influence identity formation at scales above or 
below the nation state not only deprives us of a more complete understanding of identity 
dynamics, but may render invisible those marginalized groups whose stories do not necessarily 
play out at the scale of the nation-state. In this way, there is something of a social responsibility 
underpinning the need to consider the multifaceted and multiscalar processes at play in identity 
formation. 
Chapter Two reviews the pertinent literature relating to issues of ethnicity, nationality, 
territory, region, identity, and their meanings within the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts. Chapter 
Three provides an overview of key events and developments in Crimea’s history relating to its 
changing demographics, political status, and place in larger territorial structures. Chapter Four 
examines the meaning of Crimea for its three primary national groups – Russians, Ukrainians, 
and Crimean Tatars – and discusses how these meanings have been socially and historically 
constructed through competing national narratives about Crimea. Chapter Five discusses the 
survey and statistical analytical methods used in this study as well the limitations of the study. 
Chapters Six through Nine discuss results from different components of the survey and 
interpretations of their meanings with respect to the questions at the heart of the study. The 
components of the survey discussed in these chapters relate to topics including: concepts of 
homeland (Chapter Six); distinguishing characteristics of Crimea (Chapter Seven); different 
factors of identity formation (Chapter Eight); and the roles of nationality and scale in group 
identity formation (Chapter Nine). Finally, the thesis concludes in Chapter Ten with a summary 
of arguments and a reiteration of key points. 
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Chapter II: Ethnicity, Nationality, Territory, and Identity, and their 
Soviet/Post-Soviet Contexts 
 
 Crimea’s storied history has made it the site of numerous interwoven narratives of 
identity constructed through the myriad ethnic, national, and territorial traditions that have 
shaped the region over millennia. The relationships among ethnicity, nationality, and territory – 
and the ways in which they shape and inform identity – are complex and nuanced, and Crimea 
provides an excellent example of a region where these factors are particularly salient in the 
construction of regional identity. Before discussing how these issues have played out specifically 
in Crimea, it is important to consider how the works of others have shaped general 
understandings of the meanings of and relationships between the concepts of ethnicity, 
nationality, and territory, both broadly and within Soviet and post-Soviet contexts. In this project 
I build upon the works of geographers and non-geographers alike who have explored these 
themes and critically considered how the complex interplay between them is instrumental in 
identity formation. However, I also identify ways in which previous works are lacking in their 
ability to provide a theoretical framework that sufficiently addresses such identity dynamics in 
Crimea. Specifically, I argue that greater attention should be paid to the ways in which regional 
identities are shaped by broader national identities in regions such as Crimea where so many 
ethnic, national, and territorial traditions are overlapping and intertwined. 
Ethnicity and Nationality 
The terms “ethnicity” and “nationality” are often used interchangeably to describe the 
unique assemblage of human characteristics around which common group identities are formed 
and by which the earth’s population can be organized and categorized. Although the two ideas 
are closely linked, the distinction between ethnicity and nationality and the ways in which they 
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inform identity are important. The term “ethnic” comes from the Greek word ethnikos and had 
been used in English since the 14th century, traditionally to mean “heathen, Pagan, or Gentile” 
(Williams, 1976, 119). By the 19th century “ethnic” had become nearly synonymous with the 
term “racial,” while the pejorative expression “ethnics” had become popular in the United States 
as “a polite term for Jews, Italians, and other lesser breeds” (119). In its popular usage today, 
“ethnicity” is still typically associated with the more contentious term “race” and often serves as 
its more politically correct substitute in everyday speech. 
“Nation” has been used in English since the late 13th century, initially as something akin 
to “race” in a way similar to the later usage of “ethnic” (213). By the 16th century “nation” had 
become a less-commonly used synonym for “kingdom” or “realm” used to describe a ruler’s 
sovereign territory, and in the early 17th century the term was applied to the people who lived 
within a given territory (213). Today a “nation” may refer to territory (i.e., the nation-state) or to 
its people, and “nationality” typically denotes identity with a given nation. However, these uses 
simply do not encapsulate the complexity with which “ethnicity” and “nationality” are 
constructed and the intricate ways in which they are enmeshed.  
Weber (1922) challenged the belief in “primordial” ethnic and/or national groups, 
according to which ethnicity and nationality are rooted in a deep mythical past and are therefore 
perceived to have existed since time immemorial. Instead, Weber argued that ethnicity and 
nationality are both socially constructed group affinities based upon perceptions of common 
cultural and historic traits and are used primarily to distinguish one’s own group from another. 
He defined “ethnic groups” as “those human groups that entertain subjective belief in their 
common descent because of similarities in physical type or of custom or both, or because of 
memories of colonization and migration” (Weber, 1922, 389). Weber emphasized the role of 
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customs and visible cultural traits in the construction of ethnicity, claiming that “the belief in 
ethnic affinity has at all times been affected by outward differences in clothes, in the style of 
housing, food and eating habits, the division of labor between the sexes and between the free and 
the unfree” (391). All of these characteristics, Weber argued, “concern one’s conception of what 
is correct and proper and, above all, of what affects the individual’s sense of honor and dignity,” 
and that this sense of “ethnic honor” is the crux of ethnicity as a rallying point for group identity 
formation (391). 
Weber viewed nationality as being similar to ethnicity in that, as forms of group identity, 
they both share “the vague connotation that whatever is felt to be distinctively common must 
derive from common descent” (395). What distinguishes nationality from ethnicity is that 
nationality implies an inherent political ideology as a component of a group’s common sense of 
identity. National political aspirations typically center on the protection or establishment of a 
nation-state, as “the more power is emphasized, the closer appears to be the link between nation 
and state” (398). Nationality, Weber explained, is “a specific kind of pathos which is linked to 
the idea of a powerful political community of people who share a common language, or religion, 
or common customs, or political memories,” adding that the political imperative implies that 
“such a state may already exist or it may be desired” (398). In Weber’s view, the foregrounding 
of political goals means that a sense of common nationality must not necessarily be derived from 
the same set of cultural attributes upon which ethnic identity is based, and that “feelings of 
identity subsumed under the term ‘national’ are not uniform but may derive from diverse 
sources” (397). Weber cited a number of examples – including Switzerland, Alsace-Loraine, and 
Quebec – where ethnic identity and nationality are not only incongruous but are often completely 
divergent. Weber challenged the prevailing understanding of his time that equated nationality 
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with the use of a common language, instead arguing that a sense of nationality may also be 
derived from “common political experiences” (396) or differences in social, economic, and 
power structures (397).  
Gellner (1983) emphasizes the link between ethnicity and the nation in the formation of 
nationalism. He defines nationalism as “a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that 
ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries 
within a given state… should not separate the power holders from the rest” (1). A nation, Gellner 
argues, implies two primary assumptions about the interaction if its members: 
Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where 
culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of 
behaving and communicating… [and] Two men are of the same nation if and only 
if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, 
nations maketh man; nations are the artifacts of men’s convictions and loyalties 
and solidarities. (6-7) 
Gellner describes the ubiquity with which the nation – insofar as it has been paired to ethnicity – 
has become a factor of human identity and existence. “Having a nation is not an inherent 
attribute of humanity,” Gellner maintains, “but it has now come to appear as such” (6). In this 
sense, Gellner argues that a sense of national identity has come to mean something discrete, 
exclusive, and obligatory for all people, for to not be a member of a nation would be tantamount 
to not being a person. 
Nationalism, Gellner argues, is also contingent upon the idea of the state – which he 
defines as “that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of 
order (4) – in that “[i]f there is no state, one obviously cannot ask whether or not its boundaries 
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are congruent with the limits of nation (4). However, he maintains that the nation and state are 
mutually contingent but have not necessarily been congruent historically: 
Neither nation nor state exist at all times and in all circumstances. Moreover, 
nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds that they were 
destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes 
a tragedy. But before they could become intended for each other, each of them 
had to emerge, and their emergence was independent and contingent. (6) 
Gellner argues that the emergence of the nation in particular is a condition of modernity and 
more specifically of industrial society, as in order for an industrial society to function its 
members “are and must be mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to another, and must 
possess the generic training which enables them to follow the manuals and instructions of a new 
activity or occupation” (35). In this endeavor, “they must constantly communicate with a large 
number of other men, with whom they frequently have no previous association, and with whom 
communication must consequently be explicit, rather than relying on context” (35). According to 
Gellner, a sense of national community, loyalty, and identity emerges from these productive 
activities and interactions and the culture it engenders. Furthermore, Gellner maintains that 
education is the primary institution through which nations are reproduced, as it instills and 
imparts the specific sets of cultural skills and knowledge that individuals need in order to 
function and participate within their national community. Gellner explains that 
The employability, dignity, security, and self-respect of individuals, typically, and 
for the majority of men now hinges on their education; and the limits of the 
culture within which they are educated are also the limits of the world within 
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which they can, morally and professionally, breathe. A man’s education is by far 
his most precious investment, and in fact confers his identity to him. (36) 
Gellner thus identifies nationalism as an inherently political project that equates the nation – as a 
product of industrial society and its educational institutions – with the state and seeks to bring the 
two into alignment, although he neglects to adequately account for the role that ethnicity plays in 
the construction of the nation and how the two concepts may differ.  
Anderson’s (1991) view of nationalism is similar to Gellner’s in that they both view it as 
a product of modernity. However, Anderson argues that Gellner, in attempting to “show that 
nationalism masquerades under false pretenses,” conceives of nationalism as something that is 
“fabricated” rather than “imagined” or “created” (6). Instead, Anderson argues, “[c]ommunities 
are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are 
imagined” (6). To this end, Anderson defines the nation as  
an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet 
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (6). 
Anderson argues that the emergence of such “imagined communities” has been contingent upon 
the erosion of three “fundamental cultural conceptions” within the past few centuries: (1) “the 
idea that a particular script-language offered privileged access to ontological truth, precisely 
because it was an inseparable part of that truth;” (2) “the belief that society was naturally 
organized around and under high centers – monarchs who are persons apart from other human 
beings and who ruled by some form of cosmological (divine) dispensation;” and (3) “a concept 
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of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world 
and of men essentially identical” (36).  
In Anderson’s view, the nation as an imagined community thus differs from these earlier 
concepts of society because “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail 
in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship,” rather than a vertical 
division as these prior societal models espoused (7). Anderson further contends that the 
proliferation of modern ideas of the nation was accelerated by the spread of print-capitalism, 
“which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to 
related themselves to others, in profound new ways” (36). 
Smith (1986) rejects the modernist view of the nation embraced by Gellner, Anderson, 
and others (e.g., Breuilly, 1982; Hobsbawm, 1990). Instead, he examines the historical 
emergence of ethnic groups – or ethnie – as the foundation of nationality. While conceding that 
“certainly, it was not until the early modern period in Europe (the late seventeenth century, to be 
precise) that the idea of populations being divided by ‘national character’ and possessing a 
common identity became widespread among the European educated class” (11), Smith points to 
a number of pre-modern and even ancient societies which possessed many of the trappings of 
what we would today call a nation. He argues that the social changes brought about in the 
modern era “have occurred within a pre-existing framework of collective loyalties and identities, 
which has conditioned the changes as much as they have influenced the framework” (13). The 
framework to which he refers is constructed through “the quartet of ‘myth, memories, values, 
and symbols” from which are derived “the characteristic forms or styles and genres of certain 
historical configurations of populations” encapsulated in the concept of ethnicity (15).  
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 Smith defines ethnie, or ethnic communities, as “named human populations with shared 
ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense 
of solidarity” (32). Smith contends that ethnicity “has remained as a socio-cultural ‘model’ for 
human organization and communication from the early third millennium BC until today, even if 
not every ‘society’ has followed this model of organization” (32). While also rejecting the so-
called “primordialist” understanding of the nation and its claims to the spatial and temporal 
universality of national identity, Smith does maintain that “[u]sually, there has been some ethnic 
basis for the construction of modern nations, be it only some dim memories and elements of 
culture and alleged ancestry” (17). “[W]hile making no claims to its universality,” Smith argues 
for “the widespread and chronic, if intermittent, appearance and persistence of this phenomenon 
[of ethnicity]” in the formation of nation and of national identity (32). Thus, in Smith’s view, the 
concept of nation is deeply rooted in the concept of ethnicity, although “nationalism” as a 
political project is a modern phenomenon. 
Eriksen (2002) further problematizes the relationship between the terms “nationalism” 
and “ethnicity” and the assumption that the two are more or less congruent. Although he 
concedes that the two are “kindred concepts” and that “the majority of nationalisms are ethnic in 
character,” Eriksen points to a number of ways in which the two concepts can be at odds if we 
are to assume the common definition of nationalism developed by Gellner as the political project 
which seeks to bring the state into alignment with the nation (or ethnic group) (119). For one, he 
argues, “nationalism may sometimes express a polytechnic or supra-ethnic ideology which 
stresses shared civil rights rather than shared cultural roots” (119). Furthermore, “certain 
categories of people may find themselves in a grey zone between nation and ethnic category” in 
that the political goals of certain members of an ethnic group may differ from those of others 
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(119). Also, Eriksen points out that one’s relationship to their ethnicity or nationality depends 
upon social, spatial, and temporal context, as in the example that “[a] Mexican in the United 
States belongs to an ethnic group, but belongs to a nation when he or she returns to Mexico” 
(119). Eriksen further highlights the potential for conflict “between a dominating and dominated 
ethnic group within the framework of a modern nation-state” (119-120). 
While there remain important distinctions between the concepts of ethnicity and 
nationalism/nationality, they can both be understood as a social framework in which groups are 
distinguished by some form of shared customs, beliefs, memory, language, identity, or other 
cultural traits through which members may recognize and acknowledge those with whom they 
share an ethnicity or nationality. The key difference between the two terms is that nationality – 
as expressed through nationalism – implies some form of political aspiration, typically (though 
not always) embodied by the concept of the independent nation-state. Implicit to the political 
goals of nationalism and the concept of the nation-state is the role of space and territory, to 
which we now turn. 
 
The Role of Territory in Nationalism and National Identity 
Because ethnic and/or national communities exist in space and have a certain spatial 
distribution, nationalism necessarily takes on certain spatial components. Since a nation implies 
some form of political aspirations, nations are inherently tied to the spatio-political concept of 
territory. Sack (1986) defines territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, 
influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control 
over a geographic area,” while the area in question is defined as the territory (19). Territories, 
according to Sack, differ from other spaces because they are instruments of power in that a 
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territory’s “boundaries are used to affect behavior by controlling access” (19). It is through this 
process of territorialization that power is expressed spatially at any given geographic scale – 
from the nation-state to the broom closet – and both people and things are defined as either 
belonging or not belonging to or within a given territory. Territoriality is part and parcel to the 
concept of nationalism regardless of the spatial scale or degree of national political goals. 
A number of geographers have emphasized the role of territory in the forming of nations 
and nationalisms. Gottman (1973) argues that “[n]ationalism, in its modern expression, has been 
built on territorial foundations, and it required a territorial base upon which the sovereignty of 
the nation could apply its jurisdiction” (95). According to Gottman, nationalism “implies a 
promise to promote the welfare of the people [who belong to the nation], which means a set of 
material resources at their disposal and, if they so decide, at their exclusive disposal. It is the 
right to exclude others that could not be implemented without territorial sovereignty” (95).  
Implicit in the territorial foundation of the nation-state is a reliance on and construction of 
borders, as effective territoriality cannot exist without a clear delimitation of the territory in 
question. Shapiro (2003) highlights the centrality of territory and borders to the contemporary 
concept of the nation-state in comparison to earlier forms of sovereignty: 
The contemporary nation-state’s departure from the pre-modern state consisted of 
both its establishment of clearly marked borders rather than ambiguous frontiers 
and its development as a political form that became increasingly associated with 
territorial rather than dynastic markers. (279) 
In this way, national identity as expressed through nationalism has been institutionalized 
territorially in the nation-state making territory an intrinsic component of nationalist goals and of 
national identity. 
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Others have explored the ways in which territory and the landscapes bound within it 
become important components of national identity. Burghardt (1973) argues that territory 
typically becomes institutionalized as an important marking of identity for those who occupy a 
given territory especially in the case of the nation-state: 
Territorial units are perceived to exist, and the members of the group [in a 
territory] come to identify themselves with these units. Man has fashioned space 
in his own image. The group learns to understand itself in terms of, and in 
conjunction with, the land it perceives as being its own. (243-244)  
In other words, while many territories are constructed for the sake of the (national) group that a 
territory’s boundaries are meant to contain, the territory itself – along with its boundaries – in 
turn gives definition to the nation and becomes an important aspect of national identity. 
Knight (1982) emphasizes the point that territories are socially constructed and not 
naturally pre-determined. As he explains, “territory is not; it becomes, for territory itself is 
passive, and it is human beliefs and actions that give territory meaning” (517). Knight recognizes 
the power of territory to appear as though it does have meaning independent of its social and 
political construction. He argues that “many people ‘see’ meaning in or ‘obtain’ meaning from 
territory and the landscape within it, fully believing in the territory and its landscape as living 
entities that are filled with meaning,” and that these “landscapes as perceived by the occupants 
[of a territory] can have powerful symbolic links to a group’s territorial identity” (517).  
Häkli (1999) further explores the link between territory and identity by employing the 
theoretical concept of discursive landscapes, wherein a “landscape” is understood as “a socially 
constructed relation of the natural and cultural environment,” while “discursive” refers to the fact 
that such landscapes are produced and reproduced socially through “textual or text-like 
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materials” (124). These texts – whether they are historical, rhetorical, or cultural, and expressed 
through any medium – serve to reify common conceptions of a shared territory and fix collective 
identity at that territorial scale. Häkli explains that at the scale of the nation-state, “the 
consciousness of ‘history’ and ‘region’ come together in the emergence of national discursive 
landscapes, giving them both legitimacy and territorial extension on different geographical 
scales” (145). Such “territorial imagery,” Häkli argues, “is, thus, part and parcel to the historical 
negotiations of national identity” (145). In this sense, consciousness of a given territory – its 
shape, borders, symbolic meaning, etc. – is constructed by its occupants through social 
discourses about territory and ultimately becomes an integral component of identity for those 
occupants. 
Others, such as Herb (1999) and Kaplan (1999), have emphasized the preeminence of the 
nation-state as the most salient territorial scale around which identities tend to form. Kaplan 
points out that: 
We are all part of the ‘global community,’ and we are all unique individuals. 
Between these two extremes lie several intermediary scales of identity, and, in our 
modern world, national identity has emerged as the single most significant of 
these; it is an identity both global and pervasive. (31). 
Herb has highlighted the role of territory in constructing national identity, arguing that imagery 
and descriptions of place form an essential part of national consciousness and even nationalism 
among most national groups. At the scale of the nation-state, national territory is usually equated 
with the concept of “homeland,” or the territory in which a given national group belongs and to 
which it is eternally linked. Herb explains that  
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There is something about the territory itself – composed of the actual space 
inhabited by members of a group, the particular terrain that helps define the 
group, the locational context vis-à-vis other powers, the historical legacy of a 
specific area, and the boundaries surrounding the national territory – that adds an 
essential component to national identity… As territory becomes reified, individual 
members of the nation become socialized within the territorial unit that exists. 
The space itself helps to weld together fragmented individual and group 
experiences into a common nation story. The territory creates a collective 
consciousness by reinventing itself as a homeland. (17). 
Insofar as it represents the spatial expression of nationality and is the most visible example of 
territoriality in the modern world, the nation-state is typically given the greatest consideration 
when discussing the relationship between territory and identity. 
Elsewhere, some geographers have been critical of the general tendency to focus the 
geographic scale of discussion and analysis solely at the nation-state. They have argued that this 
privileging of the nation-state is ultimately shortsighted and counterproductive for it ignores 
dynamic trends that occur above, within, or across the narrow confines of the nation-state. This 
criticism applies not only to the role of territory and identity but to geographic thought and 
analysis as a whole. Agnew (1994) has dubbed this tendency to favor the nation-state the 
“territorial trap,” in which basic assumptions about the nature of sovereign territory have been 
responsible for misguiding much scholarly analysis – particularly within the field of International 
Relations. Agnew identifies three geographic assumptions as the pitfalls of this “trap:” (1) the 
reification of state territories as spatially and temporarily static; (2) the false dichotomies of 
domestic/foreign and national/international that obfuscate many complex multi-scalar processes; 
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and (3) the antecedence of the territorial state to a society which it is supposedly meant to 
contain (59). According to Agnew, “Each of these assumptions is problematic, and increasingly 
so. Social, economic, and political life cannot be ontologically contained within the territorial 
boundaries of states through the methodological assumption of “timeless space”” (77). 
 Murphy (2010), speaking specifically about identity, reaffirms the need to think beyond 
the narrow confines of the nation-state but warns of the need to think critically about the basic 
concepts that underline the “territorial trap” in the first place. He points out that territorial 
identity at non-state scales is, in most cases, still expressed through the desire for sovereign 
statehood, and thus the basic assumptions of the “territorial trap” continue to shape 
understandings of space and societal aspirations even for those who do not identify at the scale of 
a given nation-state. Murphy explains that  
Despite some clear examples of a weakening of state-based territorial identities 
among some communities, there is much to suggest that the ideological is not 
keeping pace with the functional. Not only does territorial nationalism retain great 
significance in local and global affairs … many substate and extra-state identity 
communities seek to carve out their place in a world of nation-states, not to change 
the nature of the system itself. Thus, the ultimate objective of many movements for 
self-determination is to create independent states, not simply some variant of 
territorial autonomy. (771) 
Murphy contends that in order to truly escape the “territorial trap” there needs to be a broad 
reconsideration of the nation-state system that accounts for the multifaceted and overlapping 
processes that occur across many different geographic scales – most significantly, identity. 
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Place, Region, and Regional Identities 
One way in which geographers have overcome the “territorial trap” is to focus on the 
concept of region, which may be contained within or cut across nation-state boundaries. 
Traditional regional geography, which was popular in the early to mid-20th century, took a 
chorological view by focusing on the “association of diverse phenomena in sections of space, or 
areas” (Hartshorne, 1958, 97). This approach treated geography as being similar to history in that 
both were considered reducible to discrete units (of time or space) that feature their own unique 
assemblage of phenomena that distinguish them from one another. Thus, chorologists argued that 
the essence of geographic study lies in the study of those unique assemblages within specific 
spatial units, i.e., regions. While the popularity of this regional geography waned in the mid-20th 
century, the concept of region reemerged as a powerful analytical device towards the end of the 
century. 
Much more so than the nation-state, region and regional identities are closely related to 
the concept of place given its smaller and more “intimate” geographic scale. Lukermann (1964) 
offers a number of useful components of place as it is understood by geographers. He argues that 
(1) space is locational in its relationship to other spatial structures, i.e., there is a clear distinction 
of what is inside and what is outside of a given place; (2) that places are uniquely constructed 
around both natural and cultural elements; (3) that places are not static but rather in a constant 
process of becoming; and (4) that they become or emerge through the social meanings ascribed 
to them. Essentially, what distinguishes place from space are the particular meanings associated 
with place as perceived by individuals or groups either from within or outside of place.  
Relph (1976) discusses the idea of “the identity of places,” noting that differences 
between the related concepts of identity of place and identity with place. He states that “[t]he 
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identity of something refers to a persistent sameness and unity which allows that thing to be 
differentiated from others” (45). Furthermore, Relph argues that “while every individual may 
assign self-consciously or unselfconsciously an identity to particular places, these identities are 
nevertheless combined intersubjectively to form a common identity” (45). However, Relph also 
notes the importance of meaning ascribed to groups or individuals that derive from place, i.e., 
identity with place. He notes that “it is not just the identity of a place that is important, but also 
the identity that a person or a group has with that place, in particular whether they are 
experiencing it as an outsider or an insider” (45). Relph’s work illuminates the recursive process 
of identity formation between groups or individuals and places and the overall salience of place 
in identity formation. 
Tuan (1977) explores the ways in which humans form attachment to place at all different 
spatial scales. “At one extreme a favorite armchair is a place,” he explains, “at the other extreme 
the whole earth” (148). Tuan argues that, of all conceivable scales of place, the concept of the 
“homeland” is particularly salient in the formation of identity. “Homeland,” he argues, “is an 
important type of place at the medium scale. It is a region (city or countryside) large enough to 
support a people’s livelihood. Attachment to the homeland can be intense” (148). Tuan identifies 
two important ways in which attachment to homeland is formed. On the one hand, he argues that 
a homeland can have deep historical and symbolic meaning which tie groups to certain memories 
of place: 
A homeland has its landmarks, which may be features of high visibility and public 
significance, such as monuments, shrines, a hallowed battlefield or cemetery. 
These visible signs serve to enhance a people’s sense of identity; they encourage 
awareness of and loyalty to place. (159) 
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On the other hand, Tuan notes that attachment to homeland can emerge from personal 
experiences or sensuous perceptions: 
Attachment of a deep though subconscious sort may come simply with familiarity 
or ease, with the assurance of nurture or security, with the memory of sounds and 
smells, of common activities and homely pleasures accumulated over time. (159). 
Both meanings of homeland help engender a powerful bond between the homeland itself and 
those groups and individuals who live there and have an intimate experience of it. In this way, 
the meaning of place at the scale of the homeland differs from that of national territory. While 
both are places that have specific meaning and important implications for identity, the meaning 
of homeland is often tied to direct and intimate knowledge and experience of an individual or 
group’s immediate natural and social environment. 
 By the 1990s a “new regional geography” emerged that theorized regions and their 
meanings within broader spatial structures. Paasi (1996), a prominent figure within the “new 
regional geography” movement, provides a useful theoretical framework for examining the ways 
in which regions as territories are produced and perceived and the way identities are formed 
around them. He identifies the concept of the “institutionalization of regions,” defining it as “the 
process during which specific territorial units – on various spatial scales – emerge and become 
established as parts of the regional system in question and the socio-spatial consciousness 
prevailing in society” (32). Paasi’s argument holds that regions are socially constructed, as 
“[t]hrough the institutionalization process and the struggles inherent in it, the territorial units in 
question ‘receive’ their boundaries and their symbols which distinguish them from other regions” 
(33). Paasi further identifies four components of this institutionalization process: (1) the 
development of territorial shape, through which “specific symbols for expressing and 
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demarcating the territory [are] established” (34); (2) the development of symbolic shape, which 
includes “abstract expression of supposed group solidarity” meant to “[embody] the actions of 
political, economic, administrative and cultural institutions in the continual production and 
legitimation of the system of practices that constitute and demarcate the territorial unit 
concerned” (34); (3) the development of regional institutions “through which the perpetual 
production and reproduction of social consciousness takes place at territorial levels” (35); and (4) 
the establishment of a territorial unit as a distinct region within the societal consciousness and 
prevailing socio-spatial structures (33). These steps ultimately lead to what Paasi labeled 
“structures of expectations,” which “are constitutive of the story which expresses where the 
territorial unit has come from and where it is going” (35). Paasi effectively moves beyond the 
“territorial trap” by theorizing how regions and senses of regional distinctiveness are produced 
and reproduced at all scales, not only the nation-state. 
Agnew (2001) discusses the phenomenon of regionally-based movements of secession of 
autonomy. He notes that most scholarly attention given to these movements has focused 
primarily on ethnic dimensions insofar as regions are often constructed as the territorial 
homelands for ethnic minorities within or across nation-state boundaries. He therefore argues 
that more attention should be paid to the explicitly spatial dimensions of such regional political 
movements. Agnew notes a number of ways in which geographers have adequately considered 
space in their study of these movements, such as by examining “the emergence of regional and 
local identities in response to the pressures of globalization” (104); by viewing the emergence of 
regions as a symptom of “the unfinished character of many nation-states” (104); by considering 
the role of “[c]ultural division of labor within states” (104); and by considering how 
“government territorial arrangements can … encourage regional identities by partitioning the 
 27 
national space into units that can generate degrees of loyalty/disloyalty” (105).  
However, Agnew argues that a number of key concepts in the study of regions have been 
insufficiently examined. One is the “’nesting’ of regional identities and movements based on the 
larger framework of political identities such as those of existing states and alternative 
nonterritorial identities and supranational ones” (105). He also maintains that the “symbolic as 
opposed to the economic aspects of regionalism” have been inadequately considered, arguing 
that “there is a dearth of information about how movements recruit members and create popular 
support by deploying symbolic constructions drawing on highly selective and often not well-
known stories about the pasts of their regions and how the stories live on into the present” (106). 
Agnew thus recognizes the important role that regions play in the formation not only of ethnic 
identities but of explicitly spatial or territorial identities.  
To Agnew’s argument for the need for a wider study of regional identity dynamics, I add 
that the relationship between regional and broader national identities has not received adequate 
attention. While a great deal of literature has explored the roles of ethnicity, nationality, territory, 
place, and region in identity formation, little has been written about how senses of national or 
ethnic identity among minority or nonminority groups alike (vis-à-vis the nation-state) may 
influence identity with or attachment to substate, trans-state, or extra-state regions. What role 
does a sense of identity with one’s national group or nation-state play in forming a sense of 
substate regional identity? How does national identity among members of diaspora communities 
influence identity with a region located outside of the nation-state? What role do individual 
regions play in the construction of broader national identities? The present study attempts to 
address these questions with regards to the Ukrainian region of Crimea. In order to understand 
the ways in which ethnic, national, and regional identities have developed in Crimea, I turn now 
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to a discussion of these concepts as they have played out in Soviet and post-Soviet contexts. 
 
Nationality, Territory, and Identity in the Soviet Union 
Nationality and territory have been particularly salient issues of identity formation in the 
Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet historical contexts. As the tsarist state began building its 
enormous empire through the colonization of much of northern and central Eurasia, it 
encountered and incorporated into the state polity a staggering diversity of ethno-linguistic and 
religious groups (see Kappeler, 2001; Khodorkovsky, 2004; Sunderland, 2004). By the time of 
the Russian Revolution in 1917, the empire’s ethnic diversity was seen as potentially 
destabilizing to the Bolsheviks’ vision of the Soviet Union as a united, proletarian state. As 
Commissar of Nationalities (head of the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities, or Narkomnats 
in its Russian abbreviation) during the Bolshevik revolution and the initial years of the Soviet 
Union, Joseph Stalin was tasked with solving this so called “national question” and designing a 
federal structure that would incorporate the young republic’s far-flung national groups into a 
cohesive socialist state. It should be noted for the sake of understanding that the meaning of 
“nationality” in its Russian parlance (natsional’nost’) is closer to the English usage of 
“ethnicity” then of “nationality.” 
Stalin was critical of the Austro-Hungarian model of national cultural autonomy in which 
members of the empire’s various nationalities were granted the same autonomous rights 
regardless of where they lived within the empire. Instead, Stalin insisted upon the need for 
territorially-based regional autonomy wherein autonomous rights would be tied to the geographic 
area inhabited by a specific national community. He believed that “regional autonomy for border 
regions marked by specific social customs and national composition [is] the only expedient form 
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of alliance between the center and the border regions,” and that this form of autonomy would 
“connect the border regions with the center by federal ties” (Stalin, 1942, 78-79).  
Thus, Stalin and the Narkomnats created and instituted a complex federal system based 
upon a hierarchy of nested territorial units, many of them the “homelands” for various national 
minority groups. At the highest federal level were the 15 Union Republics (SSRs) representing 
the homelands of the Soviet Union’s largest ethnic groups. These would ultimately be the same 
territories to emerge as independent states following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
One of these Union Republics, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), was 
itself defined as a separate federation within the USSR. Below the SSRs were a number of 
smaller territorial units, many of which were autonomous based upon the presence of a large 
ethnic minority group. These included the Autonomous Republics (ASSRs), Autonomous 
Oblasts (AOs), and Autonomous Okrugs. The degree of de jure autonomy that these units 
wielded varied among each type of unit and generally weakened as the scale grew smaller, 
although de facto political power always rested in Moscow as the Soviet Union was highly 
centralized. As Kagedan (1990) notes, “[t]he republics’ importance rest[ed] less in their capacity 
to wield political power than in their ability to serve as areas licensed for ethnic cultural life and 
ethnic educational and occupational advantage” (165). 
Scholars debate whether the calculations behind Stalin’s policies on national territorial 
autonomy were more political or economic in nature (see Pipes, 1968; Iroshnikov et al, 1982; 
D’Encausse, 1992; Suny and Martin, 2001). Martin (2001) asserts that among other policies, the 
creation of nationally-informed internal territorial units of the Soviet Union represented an early 
form of “affirmative action” in which ethnic minorities were propped up and granted autonomy 
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in various political and social matters. Martin contends that this was done largely to appease 
nationalist sentiments and foster integration of all national groups into the Soviet socialist polity.  
Hirsch (2005), on the other hand, maintains that the creation of national autonomous 
territories in the Soviet Union was done according to interpretations of “ethnographic 
knowledge” of the Russian empire collected by ethnographers in the imperialist and Soviet 
periods. Challenging Martin, Hirsch insists that the policies of ethnic territorialization based 
upon this knowledge were not aimed at appeasement but rather at accelerating the processes of 
economic development in under-developed regions in order to bring socialism to the entire 
empire. Indeed, the amalgamation of individual ethnic territories was ultimately the long-term 
goal. 
Regardless of the logic behind these policies, national autonomy in the Soviet Union 
became defined in spatial terms. Autonomy was assigned to territories in order to create 
territorial “homelands” for various national groups, and in contrast to the Austro-Hungarian 
model these autonomous rights did not follow members of these groups outside of their titular 
homelands.  
While autonomous regions were generally meant to enclose one national group inside a 
cohesive territorially unit in principle, in practice, territorial autonomy was often used as a tool to 
create or impose national identities. In fact, clear senses of national identity remained largely 
undeveloped in many regions during the early years of Soviet rule and emerged only after 
national territories had been established. Hirsch explains that the 1926 All-Union Census 
reported a large number of people living in nonurban areas across the Soviet Union who 
“identif[ied] themselves primarily in terms of clan, tribe, religion, or place of origin” (Hirsch, 
2005, 145). In many cases this trend was reversed after only a few short years of national 
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development, and by the early 1930s these same groups “were describing themselves as 
members of nationalities –and were using the language of nationality to argue for economic, 
administrative, and political rights” (145).  
Though the push to create national identities may seem contradictory to the basic 
principles of socialism and proletariat solidarity, national consciousness was viewed as necessary 
in many regions to eradicate localized or “backwards” identities and was ultimately a crucial step 
towards an integrative Soviet identity (43). Megoran (2010) contends that the development of 
national consciousness among non-Russian minorities despite contradictory socialist ideology 
was justified as a temporary measure that “would eventually weld a common sense of identity 
but which, in the meantime, worked with existing realities” (38). However, Hirsch (2000) 
maintains that 
the Soviet regime was not interested in making nations for their own sake. The 
regime’s administrators and experts delineated and manipulated nationality 
categories and territories with the aim of consolidating the Soviet state. They 
frequently denied ‘national-rights’ to groups that they deemed were not 
‘ethnographically distinct.’ And they placed limits upon nation-making in order to 
ensure that long-term, all-union concerns took precedence over the diverse and 
often competing interests of the component parts. In practice, the Soviet effort to 
“make nations” became an important mechanism for assimilating a diverse 
population into a rapidly modernizing state preparing for the transition to 
socialism. (209) 
Thus, according to Hirsch, nations were proactively created through Soviet nationalities policies 
in order to provide greater social cohesion for the Soviet state. This vision was achieved by 
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establishing national territorial autonomy at the level of Union Republic and Autonomous 
Republic alike. In cases where fostering national consciousness was the objective, establishing 
an autonomous territory became a means to an end. Borders were drawn to create territories in 
places where they had not previously existed in order to give physical form to “homelands” of 
“nationalities” whose prior existence was often tenuous at best. And while several of the groups 
to receive autonomy had certainly developed some form of national consciousness prior to these 
policies, discrete boundaries of their national territory had not previously been “institutionalized” 
in the formation of a distinct region. In other words, these were not territories in search of 
autonomy, but rather the territorial manifestations of autonomous rights granted for the sake of 
national identities – whether or not they had existed previously. 
The early decades of the Soviet Union saw a state-led program aimed at fostering 
national consciousness among the country’s many national groups within their established 
territorial homelands. This program, known as korenizatsiya (literally “putting down roots”), was 
viewed by Soviet authorities as a crucial step in the social equalization of the Soviet Union’s 
widespread and developmentally disparate ethnic communities required for the building of 
communism and an integrative Soviet identity. According to Kaiser (1994), the goal of building 
national consciousness was generally pursued through “the promotion of indigenous cultural 
forms (especially language), and affirmative action-type programs providing easier access to 
higher education and elite positions in the socioeconomic and political institutions for the 
indigene in his or her own republic” (125). However, Kaiser notes that despite the official goal of 
korenizatsiya to draw the many peoples of the Soviet Union into a cohesive socialist polity, and 
despite later programs of Russification, korenizatsiya was perhaps too successful in its methods 
of establishing national consciousness: 
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[N]ationality policies designed to promote international equalization in the USSR 
served not to “draw together” the national communities in the state as their 
members became more socially and geographically mobilized, but on the contrary 
encouraged both a rising national self-consciousness among upwardly mobile 
indigenes and the continued geographic segregation of national communities, 
each in its own respective homeland with its own national territorial agenda. (125) 
Because korenizatsiya programs aimed at specific national groups were carried out only within 
their territorial homelands, Kaiser argues that one of the most important legacies of korenizatsiya 
was “to ensure that the territorial dimension of national self-consciousness would become of 
paramount importance” (125). Kaiser also notes that Russians, as the Soviet majority national 
group and de facto leaders of the Soviet peoples, accordingly did not experience any form of 
korenizatsiya that would foster a sense of national identity within any sub-state territorial unit. 
Rather, he argues, most Russians in the Soviet period tended to view the entire Soviet Union as 
their homeland (169-170). This conflation of the Soviet Union with Russian national territory has 
been noted by others as well (Smith, 1999; Kolstø, 2000). 
 The Soviet Union would reap what it had sown with korenizatsiya when, in 1991, the 
socialist regime collapsed and fractured along the boundaries of its constituent Union Republics 
(SSRs) into 15 newly independent states. Although they were effectively meaningless during the 
Soviet period, it was specific provisions within the Soviet constitution giving the Union 
Republics the right to secede from the USSR that enabled the Union Republics to become 
independent and not the smaller autonomous territorial units (ASSRs, etc.). However, national 
consciousness among many of the myriad Soviet peoples had grown rather strong by the end of 
the Soviet period, and a number of nationalist movements had begun to emerge at this time. 
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Moreover, a number of territorial and boundary disputes erupted all across the post-Soviet space 
in the wake of the collapse as many of the boundaries drawn in the Soviet period had bisected 
many national groups or otherwise isolated them from their established national homeland. The 
breadth and depth of work published on the problems of post-Soviet national identity, ethnic 
conflict, borders, territory, and state-building is extensive (Smith, 1990; Bremmer and Taras, 
1993; Suny, 1993; Khazanov, 1995; Barkey and Von Hagen, 1997; Smith et al., 1998; Smith, 
1999; Kolstø, 2000; Hughes and Sasse, 2002; O’Lear and Whiting, 2008, to name only a few). 
For the sake of this study, a few key themes from this body of literature are important to address. 
 
Russians in the Post-Soviet States 
 One of the major unforeseen consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union has been 
the separation of over 25 million Russians from the Russian Federation (their ostensible post-
Soviet homeland) due to Soviet-era internal border-making policies and large-scale migration 
both before and during the Soviet period. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Estonia in particular 
have large ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking diaspora populations, and each has met the 
challenge of dealing with these communities in different ways. While much of this literature 
considers each of these unique cases individually, attention is also paid to common themes 
among them. 
 Kolstoe (1995) focuses on the historical conditions that gave rise to the Russian diaspora 
communities, namely the patterns of ethnic Russian migration from the core to the periphery 
both during the Tsarist period and the Soviet period. He compares the Russian Empire to other 
colonial empires, noting that a key difference lies in the fact that others stretched and expanded 
across oceans, meaning colonial settlers became scattered and isolated. The Russian Empire, on 
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the other hand, was land-based, meaning that Russian settlers “did not lose contact with the core 
group in this way” (18). Kolstoe traces the historical expansion and contraction of Russian 
migration to the periphery, emphasizing the role of both “socio-economic” and “ethno-political” 
factors. The latter category Kolstoe links to the idea that “a wellnigh omnipotent center had a 
considerable influence on social processes, including migration, in the Soviet Union” (52), and 
may have included concerted efforts at stabilizing peripheral regions or diluting peripheral ethnic 
communities. 
 Melvin (1995) examines the way in which the Russian Federation has identified and 
defined the Russian diaspora community towards which it feels some social or political 
responsibility. He explains that Moscow does not simply view ethnic Russians as part of this 
diaspora, but that it also includes “Russified groups across the former USSR – Koreans in 
Kazakhstan, Ukrainians in Tallinn, and Jews in Ukraine” (22). Addressing the issues surrounding 
all these groups, Melvin argues, “has helped to consolidate a new political elite around a self-
image of Russia as the historic ‘homeland’ for the Russian-speaking communities outside Russia 
(the diaspora) with Russia directly responsible for their well-being” (23). 
 Chinn and Kaiser (1996) examine the political dynamics of post-Soviet states with large 
Russian populations using the theoretical model of interactive nationalism. This model, rather 
than relying on either primordial or reactionary theories of nationalism, “contends that inter-
national tensions and conflicts are less the result of ancient, tribal hatreds than the consequence 
of an interactive process initiated by the majority, titular or dominant nation seeking hegemony 
in the state” (33). In other words, nationalist sentiments are recursively stimulated between 
majority and minority groups in the struggle for hegemony and counter-hegemony within a given 
state or territory. Chinn and Kaiser note that while Russians served as the hegemonic group 
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broadly at the state scale during the Soviet period, the relationship has been reversed in a number 
of post-Soviet states where they have become a prominent minority: 
The titular nationalist elites have attempted to restructure the national 
stratification system in their homelands to secure the hegemony of the titular 
nation, which they view as its “rightful” position in its homeland. Russians – the 
formerly hegemonic group in the USSR as a whole – has sought to reduce their 
loss of status by developing counter-hegemonic strategies or by emigrating to 
Russia or abroad. (271) 
Chinn and Kaiser further argue that “accommodation and inclusion should dampen counter-
hegemonic reaction on the part of national minorities” (33). 
 Laitin (1998) considers the emergence of a new national category within a few key post-
Soviet states that he calls the “Russian-speaking population.” He argues that language has been 
the most salient point around which minority identities have developed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Estonia, and Latvia, and he includes in the category of “Russian-speakers” “Russians, 
Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews, all of whom speak Russian as their first language in 
republics outside their putative national homelands” (x). Laitin notes that “[i]dentification as a 
member of this population is in some way an alternative to assimilation (as titulars), and 
mobilization (as Russians)” (263). While conceding that “Russian-speaking” is a more salient 
notion of identity in Estonia and Latvia, Laitin argues that it is likely to emerge in Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan as “a fulcrum of intratitular conflict” (264). Each of these authors gives considerable 
attention to Ukraine in their examination of the issues surrounding post-Soviet Russian and 
Russian-speaking diasporas. As the Russian-dominated region of Crimea plays a central role in 
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these questions with regards to Ukraine, a brief discussion of the literature on post-Soviet 
Ukraine is useful. 
 
Ukraine as a Divided Post-Soviet State 
 A recurring and seemingly inescapable theme throughout much of Ukrainian studies has 
been the relationships between Ukraine and Russia and between Ukrainians and Russians. While 
significant works have examined these relationships “in their historical encounters” (see 
Potichnyj et al., 1992; Szporluk, 2000; Kappeler et al., 2003), the dynamics of nationality, 
culture, language, and regionalism with regards to post-Soviet Ukraine’s ethnic Ukrainian and 
Russian populations has received a great deal of attention. A common cliché of post-Soviet 
Ukrainian studies has been a focus on the east-west divide representing separate and monolithic 
“Russian” and “Ukrainian” portions of the country. A brief discussion of the ways in which this 
trope has been reified or challenged – and the extent to which Crimea has been explicitly 
considered – is of great relevance to the study of Crimea and to the present study in particular. 
 Pirie (1996), echoing Agnew’s (1994) critique of the assumptions that underline the 
“territorial trap,” argues that the reduction of group identities in Ukraine to one national category 
or the other (Ukrainian or Russian) is generally misguided because “such categorization impedes 
the study of national identity, as many individuals in these regions have multiple ethnic 
identifications, or are undergoing a transition from one identification to another” (1079). He 
further argues that “inter-ethnic marriage, language usage, and urbanization are all factors which 
contribute to mixed self-identification” (1079). In this way, Pirie not only moves beyond the 
typical Ukrainian east-west dichotomization, but also problematizes the entire Russian-Ukrainian 
ethnic dichotomization as well. However, while Pirie argues that it would generally be 
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“misguided to assume the existence of a strong Russian identity” (1099) in the more Russophone 
regions of southern and eastern Ukraine, he notes that “Crimea is a special case in this regard” as 
it is “the only area with a large portion of individuals with a strictly Russian national identity” 
(1099-1100). Hence, Pirie accordingly treats Crimea as a unique case among regions of Ukraine 
that have traditionally been more “Russian” in character. 
 Shulman (1998) also examines Russian and Ukrainian identity dynamics within Ukraine, 
and in particular how ties between Ukraine and Russia impact the identity of ethnic Russians in 
Ukraine. He argues that “[m]ost Ukrainian nationalists, especially in western Ukraine, favor a 
unitary territorial-administrative structure” for the Ukrainian state, while “a federal structure is 
more popular in eastern Ukraine” where there are more ethnic Russians (630). Shulman’s 
analysis is based upon survey results taken in the western Ukrainian city of L’viv and the eastern 
Ukrainian city of Donetsk that are meant to represent the two broad, ethnically-defined regions 
into which Ukraine has typically been conceptually divided. In this regard, Shulman falls into the 
trap of treating Ukraine as composed of two separate monolithic regions with two separate 
senses of identity. Furthermore, he fails to consider how Crimea in particular may differ from the 
rest of the “Russian” portion of Ukraine.  
 O’Loughlin (2001) examines a handful of studies conducted on regional differences in 
Ukraine as viewed through voting patterns, noting that “the most regionally-diverse issue is the 
so-called Russian question that involves both relations with the neighboring state as well as the 
relative acceptance of Russian language and culture within Ukrainian society” (36). Ultimately, 
however, O’Loughlin argues that an explicitly regional model for examining Ukraine is not 
useful and suggests that a more nuanced understanding of scale should instead inform the study 
of political differences observed across Ukraine. Although he makes no explicit argument that 
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Crimea should be treated separately from the rest of the country for these purposes, O’Loughlin 
does remark that one possibly more nuanced approach to understanding Ukrainian regional 
differences would at least separate Crimea from the rest of southern Ukraine. 
 Barrington and Herron (2004) challenge O’Loughlin’s dismissal of a regional approach 
to studying Ukraine and instead argue for a specific division of Ukrainian territory into eight 
distinct regions. Such a model, they argue, “underscores that regional divisions in Ukraine are 
not as simple as an ‘east versus west” divide – or even a continuum from west to east” (78). 
Crimea by itself constitutes one of the regions in this model, and the authors argue that “[c]ertain 
regions of the country (the southwest and [Crimea], for example) differ greatly not only from 
each other but also from regions next to them” (78). Barrington and Herron, to some degree, 
certainly account for crucial differences among regions of Ukraine that the “east-west divide” 
model masks particularly in respect to Crimea and its unique circumstances.  
Finally, Malanchuk (2005) plays into traditional understanding of Ukraine’s “east-west” 
divide by noting simply that “[b]ecause of the historic separation of western and eastern Ukraine 
under Polish and Russian spheres of influence, respectively, regional subpopulations have been 
seen as an important factor in Ukrainian politics” (345). This historical divide, she argues, has 
meant that “[t]here is no question but that there are clear distinctions in the attitudinal makeup of 
eastern and western Ukraine” (364). Such an approach ignores important cultural, historical, 
economic, and political differences observed among Ukraine regions and in particular between 
Crimea and the rest of eastern (i.e., “Russian”) Ukraine. 
While only some studies of regional differences within Ukraine have treated Crimea as a 
separate region unto itself, there are a number of historical, cultural, political, and demographic 
circumstances in Crimea that demand that it not be regarded as simply one section of a broadly 
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monolithic regional bloc of “Russian” Ukraine, however it may be defined. Accordingly, a 
number of scholars have examined issues of identity specifically within Crimea, and their works 
clearly merit a discussion here. 
 
Identity Dynamics in Crimea 
  Much has been made of the potential ethnic conflict in Crimea (see Drohobycky, 1995; 
Chase, 1996; Dawson, 1997; Mal’gin, 2000; Sasse, 2002; Wydra, 2004; Kuzio, 2007; Sasse, 
2007; Korostelina, 2008a) as well as the specific challenges accompanying the return of the 
indigenous Crimean Tatars from their Soviet-imposed exile (see Williams, 1997; Allworth, 
1998; Williams, 2001; Uehling, 2004; Aydingun and Aydingun, 2007; Pohl, 2010). Meanwhile, 
others have studied the dynamics of national and regional identity among residents of this 
diverse and contested region. Kiseleva (1999) found that a majority of those who live in Crimea 
exhibit a strong regional identity. In response to the her survey question, “who do you consider 
yourself to be?”, 40% of 16-20 year-olds and 24% of 21-30 year-olds answered “resident of 
Crimea” rather than “Russian,” “Ukrainian,” “Crimean Tatar,” “Soviet Person,” or any other 
nationality. In response to the question, “what do you consider your homeland?”, 67% of 16-20 
year-olds and 47% of 21-30 year-olds answered “Crimea” rather than “Russia,” “Ukraine,” “the 
Soviet Union,” or “the whole world.” 
Korostelina (2008b) reveals through her study that regional identity tends to be the most 
salient type of social identity among those who live in a number of autonomous republics in the 
Russian Federation and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in contrast to those who live in 
non-autonomous regions. Korostelina shows that in Crimea – along with the Russian republics of 
Bashkortostan, Karelia, Komi, Yakutia, and Tatarstan – survey results indicate that regional 
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identity among respondents was more salient than their ethnic or national (state) identity by a 
wide margin, while respondents to the same survey in non-autonomous regions of Russia 
indicated that ethnicity is their strongest identity factor (85). These results corroborate Kaiser’s 
(1994) argument that territory has played a crucial role in identity formation within national 
“homelands” in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. 
 Similarly, in a survey conducted by Efimov (2008), participants in Crimea are shown to 
consider themselves “Crimeans” above any other sense of territorially-based identity by a wide 
margin. In this survey 41.5% of Crimean Tatars, 52.3% of Russians, and 35% of Ukrainians 
indicated that they “consider themselves above all else” to be Crimean. Only Ukrainians chose 
another option (citizen of Ukraine) at a higher rate than “Crimean.”  
While these studies reveal a strong sense of regional identity among residents of Crimea 
regardless of nationality, they do not reveal much about how a different sense of national identity 
may differentially impact a sense of regional identity. I have argued for the need to examine 
more thoroughly the relationship between national identity and regional identity, and in the 
present study I approach these questions using Crimea as a case study. How do Russians, 
Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars understand and relate to Crimea? What meanings does Crimea 
hold for each of these national groups, and how might they be different? In what way might 
one’s national identity specifically shape their sense of regional identity within Crimea? These 
are questions that the present study attempts to address. In order to understand the various sets of 
meanings that have been applied to Crimea within different national contexts, I turn now to the 
competing national narratives of Crimea. 
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Chapter III: Crimea in Historical Context 
 
Crimea stands out among the many post-Soviet regions that have a history of autonomy 
for its unique historic, demographic, and geographic circumstances. The Crimean Peninsula’s 
position at the crossroads of numerous empires, states, and civilizations has made it into a 
complex, cultural palimpsest and a region of both great ethno-cultural hybridity and cleavage 
since long before it passed into Russian hands. Due to the fact that it is an isolated and narrowly-
attached peninsula, Crimea has been conceived of as a distinct region for thousands of years. In 
this way, Crimea has existed as a territorial construct since long before there was ever any notion 
of a Russia, a Ukraine, or virtually any other territory as we now know them within the post-
Soviet space. This historical understanding of Crimea has been reified throughout the Russian, 
Soviet, and post-Soviet periods. During the Russian and Soviet periods between 1783 and 1991, 
Crimea underwent a series of drastic ethno-demographic and politico-administrative changes that 
have resulted in a complex and contested legacy of ethno-national and territorial identities and 
affinities. These conditions make issues of ethnicity, nationality, and territory in identity 
formation in Crimea particularly salient compared to other regions across the former Soviet 
Union and beyond.  
 
Early Origins of Crimea’s Ethnic Diversity 
 Throughout its long and complex history, Crimea has been settled, conquered, colonized, 
or otherwise inhabited by myriad ethno-cultural communities, most of which left their mark upon 
Crimean culture and society in one way or another. Crimea’s physical geography – divided 
among its northern steppe, its southern mountains, and the narrow strip of coastline south of the 
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mountains – has had a tremendous influence on its history of conquest and in the development of 
its ethnic diversity. A brief overview of early Crimean history and of the groups that shaped its 
ethnic demographics throughout the centuries is useful in understanding the historical perception 
of Crimea as a region of ethno-cultural diversity and pluralism.  
 While some point to evidence of earlier inhabitants (Vozgrin, 1992), the first two groups 
believed to have settled in the Crimean mountains and along its southern coast were the 
Cimmerian and Tauri people as early as the 10th century BC. Scholars debate the precise 
chronology of their appearance in Crimea and whether or not the two groups were related or 
became mixed in Crimea, though the Tauri are thought to descend from the Caucasus while the 
Cimmerians are believed to be an Indo-European tribe originating in the Eastern European 
steppe (Vozgrin, 1992; Kogonashvili, 1995). Both groups were known to the Ancient Greeks; 
there are references to the Cimmerians in Homer’s Odyssey, and the Greek name for the Crimean 
Peninsula, “Tauris,” comes from its Tauri inhabitants. In the 20th century, some primordialist 
Ukrainian national narratives identified the Tauri people as proto-Ukrainians in order to bolster 
Ukraine’s claims to Crimea (Mindiuk, 2000). Cimmerians and Tauris were largely driven from 
Crimea by the Indo-Iranian Scythian tribes arriving from the steppes of central Eurasian during 
the 7th century, though many pockets of Cimmerians and Tauris remained in the Crimean 
mountains while some likely assimilated into Scythian culture (Vozgrin, 1992, 42). 
Around the same period that the Scythians established a kingdom in the steppe region of 
Crimea, colonists from various Greek city-states began to arrive in order to establish trading 
colonies along the northern coast of the Black Sea, mainly in search of wheat, metals, and slaves 
(Burov et al., 2007). Many Greek settlements in eastern Crimea were eventually united under the 
Bosporus Kingdom in the 5th century BC, which later fell under the rule of the Pontus Kingdom 
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and the Roman Empire until it passed to the Byzantine Empire in the 6th century AD. Throughout 
much of this period, the Bosporus Kingdom was at war with the Scythians in central and western 
Crimea.  
Many of the settlements founded by the Greeks became some of Crimea’s largest cities – 
including Feodoisa, Evpatoria, and Kerch – and this early Greek presence in Crimea later took 
on great significance for Russian national narratives about Crimea. According to Russian 
mythology, the history of Crimea’s eventual drift towards the Slavic realm began in the year 988, 
when the armies of Kievan Rus led by Prince Vladimir the Great seized the Greek colony of 
Chersoneses. It was here that Prince Vladimir accepted the Orthodox faith and was baptized in 
the church, officially turning Kievan Rus from a Pagan to a Christian kingdom. From Kievan 
Rus’ Christianity would eventually diffuse to Muscovy, where it became enshrined as the official 
religion of eastern Slavdom. 
Between the 3rd and 8th centuries AD, Crimea saw numerous waves of invasion and 
settlement from several different nomadic peoples: from the east came Indo-Iranian tribes such 
as the Sarmatians and the Alans, the Altaic Huns, and the Turkic Bulgars, and from the 
northwest came Germanic Goths (Burov et al., 2007). As numerous kingdoms continually 
displaced one another during this period, small numbers of most occupying groups were driven 
into the Crimean mountains, where they sought refuge and mixed with the descendants of 
Cimmerians and Tauris who had been there for centuries. Although the Crimean mountains are 
not especially lofty or rugged, they are characterized by a series of steep bluffs that are difficult 
to access and therefore easy to defend, and thus remnants of numerous groups who inhabited 
Crimea over the centuries have been isolated, protected, preserved, and integrated in the 
mountains far past their Crimean heydays. A series of cave cities carved from these rocky bluffs 
 45 
began to appear between the 6th and 10th centuries, providing further refuge to successive groups 
of inhabitants.  
By the 8th century the Turkic Khazar Khaganate absorbed most of Crimea north of the 
mountains, while the southern shore remained in the hands of the Byzantine Empire and was 
populated mainly by the descendants of Greek colonists but also included sizeable numbers of 
Jews and Armenians by this time. The Khazar Khaganate adopted Judaism sometime in the 8th 
century before being ousted from the northern Crimean steppe by Turkic Kipchak nomads and 
from eastern Crimea by the Kievan Rus affiliated principality of Tmutarkan in the 10th century. 
Like so many groups before them, small numbers of Jewish Khazars remained after the fall of 
the Khaganate in the Crimean mountains, where most likely with some influence from Jews 
living along the coast in Byzantine communities (Kozlov and Chizhlova, 2003), they became 
known as the Karaims and Krymchaks. These groups continue to exist in small numbers in the 
mountainous regions of Crimea, where they still practice a form of Talmudic Judaism 
(Kogonashvili, 1995).  
Byzantine influence began to decline on Crimea’s southern coast in the 13th century, 
leaving an opening for colonists and merchants from the Italian city states of Venice and Genoa 
to establish trading outposts in settlements such as Balaklava and Sudak, with the Genoese 
ultimately prevailing as the regional economic power (Burov et al., 2007). Around this time the 
northern Crimean steppe fell under the control of the Golden Horde of the Mongol Empire, and 
Mongol nomads quickly integrated with the Turkic Kipchaks already inhabiting this region. By 
the early 14th century the Crimean steppe along with the rest of the Golden Horde adopted Islam 
following the conversion of the Horde’s supreme leader Khan Uzbek (Williams, 2001).  
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The Crimean steppe remained under the control of the Golden Horde until 1443, when, as 
the Horde began to fracture and fragment, an independent Crimean Khanate was declared under 
Khan Haci Giray covering the territory of the northern Crimean steppe along with large portions 
of modern southern Ukraine. Seeking to expand its influence over the entire Crimean Peninsula, 
in 1475 the Crimean Khanate enlisted the help of the Ottoman Empire to conquer the Genoese 
colonists along the south coast, after which the Ottomans annexed both the coast and the 
Crimean mountains. The peninsula became united under Islam for the first time, and despite the 
Crimean Khanate’s ostensible independence, it largely remained under the aegis of the Ottoman 
Sultan for the next three centuries. However, as Uehling (2004) argues, the Crimean Khanate 
“possessed all the characteristics of a fully developed, premodern state” (32). It was during this 
period that the Crimean Tatar ethnic group first began to coalesce in Crimea under Islam and the 
Turkic language of the Golden Horde, incorporating the myriad groups left over from centuries 
of conquest and settlement into a common Crimean ethnic community.  
Although the Crimean Khanates’ relationship with the Cossack Hetmanate to the north 
was marked during most of its history more by mutual aggression than by cooperation, Ukrainian 
historians point to critical periods where Crimean Tatars and Cossacks – seen as the forbearers of 
the modern Ukrainian state – entered into strategic and mutually beneficial alliances against 
common enemies. These historical narratives have been used in the post-Soviet period to further 
strengthen Ukrainian claims to Crimea. The Crimean Khanate ruled over Crimea and parts of the 
Ukrainian steppe to the north until the region was conquered and annexed by the Russian Empire 
in 1783 (Burov et al., 2007). 
 
 
 47 
Crimea in the Russian Imperialist Period 
The 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between the Ottoman and Russian Empires at the 
end of the Russo-Turkish war placed the Crimean Khanate under Russian protection, and in 1783 
it was formally annexed into the Russian Empire and became part of the Tauride Governorate in 
1784 (Fisher, 1978). To Russian Empress Catherine the Great and her court, Crimea exuded an 
air of exoticness largely because its landscape and climate differed so greatly from that of the 
Russian core or any of its hitherto conquered territories along its periphery. As Seymour (1855) 
notes in his travelogue, “after a weary journey over the flat steppe from Petersburg or Moscow, 
the total change which [Crimea] presents to the gloomy and monotonous aspect of their own 
country must make it seem to them like a land of enchantment” (198). 
More importantly, Crimea represented Russia’s first conquest of the “Orient” at a time 
when Orientalist themes were popular in the art and literature of Western European imperial 
powers (Dickinson, 2002, 3). Russia’s colonization of Crimea was largely meant as a display of 
its own growing prowess as an imperial power and its rightful place among Europe's great 
empires. Russian perceptions of Crimea as an exotic and substantively different place stem 
largely from this early period of acquisition and subsequent “discovery” of Crimea and its exotic 
wonders. Indeed, following its annexation, much of the Russian discourse about Crimea even 
presented it as Russia’s own Garden of Eden (Zorin, 1998; Schonle, 2003). However, Dickinson 
(2002) argues that Russian Orientalism in Crimea did not follow the more “academic” model of 
“modern Orientalism” already common by the late 18th century (Said, 1979, 22, 119). Instead, 
Dickinson (2002) suggests that this period is better understood as a “preliminary process of 
‘otherization,’” which was characterized by “the production and circulation of images and 
stereotypes that expressed the region’s ‘otherness’ or ontological difference from the norms of 
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the dominant culture, in this case those of Western Europe” (4). Schonle (2003) also points out 
that Crimean orientalist tropes were less a reflection of Russian perceptions of Crimea’s natural 
state of being and more an expression of what Catherine and those close to her saw as Crimea’s 
symbolic potential under the proper stewardship. In this sense, the early Russian perception of 
Crimea was that of a place of exotic beauty and wonder, but only within the Russian Empire 
itself was it believed that Crimea could realize this potential and flourish as a true Garden of 
Eden. 
As Crimea became an integral part of the Russian Empire it also became a destination for 
numerous poets, authors, painters, and other artists and creative members of the Russian 
intelligentsia. Upon discovering its superlative beauty, exotic flair, rich history and diverse 
cultural heritage, Crimea inevitably became the muse of countless artists who wished to capture 
the peninsula’s unique spirit in their chosen media. Sasse (2007) notes that “[t]he literary 
symbols and myths about Crimea share an emphasis on the geography of the peninsula, the 
beauty of its landscape, its diversity, its special atmosphere, its distance from the mainland, and 
its distinct path of development” (53). Alexander Pushkin, arguably Russia’s most beloved poet, 
wrote a number of poems about his travels in Crimea, most famously “The Fountain of Tears,” 
which was inspired by a tragic tale of the Crimean Khan and two members of his harem. 
Hokanson (1998) notes the way in which Pushkin exoticizes and feminizes the Crimean 
landscape in this poem, depicting it as being “there for the pleasure of the male traveler … to 
shelter him, cool him, beckon to him” (147). Sasse (2007) argues that Crimea-themed poetry in 
the Russian tradition tended to be largely “self-replicating” in its styles and themes as poets have 
“deliberately evoked symbols and myths, recycled them, and embedded their works firmly in a 
common cultural tradition” (57). Hence, from the early Russian period Crimea has been 
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presented through the arts and through cultural texts as being substantively unique in its wild, 
exotic, yet submissive character. 
Orientalist discourses aside, Crimea did present Russia with a crucial geopolitical 
advantage, namely a prominent presence in the Black Sea region and access to strategic ports. A 
location was chosen to build the port city of Sevastopol adjacent to the ruins of the Greek colony 
of Chersoneses along a well-protected deep-water bay near the far southwestern tip of the 
Crimean peninsula. In Sevastopol the Russian Empire based its Black Sea Naval Fleet. Its 
location and military significance made Sevastopol the focal point of the Crimean War from 
1853 to 1856 that pitted Russia against an alliance of Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and 
the Republic of Sardinia for influence in the Black Sea region as the Ottomans’ power in the 
region began to wane (Burov et al., 2007). Although the theater of war extended to the Caucasus, 
the Baltic region, and even the North Pacific, the vast majority of warfare took place on the 
territory of the Crimean Peninsula – lending the war its name – and Sevastopol became the 
setting of the most intense battles. The city came under siege for 349 days beginning in 
September, 1854 as the Russian army staved off invading forces while undergoing massive 
bombardment, leaving Sevastopol in utter ruin and devastation by the time enemy forces broke 
through the city’s defenses in September, 1855. The capture of Sevastopol ultimately heralded 
the end of the war five months later. Despite Russia’s defeat, the defense of Sevastopol quickly 
became the stuff of legends among the Russian elite and public alike. The events surrounding the 
defense of Sevastopol first spawned the “Sevastopol Myth,” which became a critical component 
of Russian national identity (see Chapter Four). 
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Crimean Ethnic Demographic Changes in the 19th Century 
While small numbers of Slavs began settling in Crimea following its annexation by 
Russia, it was not until after the Crimean War that they began to constitute a large portion of the 
region’s population. Before the war, Crimean land had been largely confiscated from Crimean 
Tatars and distributed among the Russian nobility, who in turn enlisted small numbers of 
agricultural landlords or pomeshchiks to oversee the Crimean Tatars tending to the land. Those 
Crimean Tatars who suddenly found themselves living on land that was now claimed by the 
recently-arrived Slavs were either forced to pay exorbitant rents to their new landlords or forced 
to leave the land they once owned and occupied (Kirimli, 1996). Furthermore, the Crimean 
Tatars felt that the occupying Russians and Ukrainians had little respect or tolerance for their 
religion and customs and for their very connection to Crimea itself. Crimean Tatar political 
leader Mustafa Jemilev (1995) argues that Russian authorities purposely and aggressively drove 
the Tatars out of Crimea in order for Slavic immigrants to settle and more affectively colonize 
the region. He argues that  
To meet this objective, Russia applied a broad arsenal of well-developed methods: 
terrorism and systematic plundering of the civilian population; seizure of the most 
fertile lands by high tsarist officials; the displacement of Crimean Tatars to 
territories unsuitable for farming, thus depriving them of their means of existence; 
and the harsh violation of the Crimean Tatars’ religious beliefs, which was painful 
for this deeply religious people (Cemiloglu, 1995, 88). 
This harsh treatment and disrespect shown towards the Crimean Tatars precipitated a drastic 
reduction in their numbers within Crimea as many began to emigrate to Anatolia or other regions 
still under Ottoman control, thus forming the Crimean Tatar diaspora. An accurate number of 
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Crimean Tatars who fled Crimea during the Tsarist period is difficult to determine, though 
Karpat (1985, 66) estimates the number of emigrants between 1783 and 1922 to be at least 
1,800,000 (quoted in Kirimli, 1996, 7). While such figures remain highly controversial, Kirimli 
(1996) maintains that the number of Crimean Tatars who left Crimea during the 19th century “far 
exceeds the number of those who stayed” (7). 
The largest wave of emigration from Crimea came in 1860 following Russia’s 
deportation and genocide of the Circassian community in the North Caucasus and the subsequent 
fear it caused as rumors spread to other Muslim groups throughout the Russian Empire 
(Williams, 2001). This mass exodus left a gaping hole in the Crimean labor force, and thus 
ethnic Russians and Ukrainians soon settled in the region to fill the void left by the diminishing 
Crimean Tatar population. In 1858 Crimean Tatars accounted for 73% of Crimea’s population, 
with Russians accounting for 12.6% and Ukrainians accounting for 4%, but by 1864 the Crimean 
Tatar population had dropped to 50.3% with Russians and Ukrainians together comprising 28.5% 
(Vodarskyi et al., 2003). By 1897 Crimea’s population was only 35.6% Crimean Tatar, with 
Russians making up 33.1% and Ukrainians 11.8% (ibid.). Furthermore, as Fisher (1978) 
contends, “throughout the nineteenth century, the [Crimean] Tatars experienced one of the most 
heavy-handed policies of Russification anywhere in the Empire” (81). The Russification of 
Crimea ultimately helped foster and buttress Russian claims to the region while also diluting and 
delegitimizing the presence of the Crimean Tatars. This period of shifting ethnic demographics 
thus brought deep social and cultural integration between Russia and Crimea at the expense of 
Crimea’s indigenous peoples and cultures. 
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Crimea in the Early Soviet Period 
Like most regions of the former Russian Empire, Crimea was thrown into chaos during 
the Russian Civil War following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. A series of temporary 
governments and territorial claims were declared in Crimea between 1917 and 1921. Crimea 
became the site where the last units of the Tsarist White Army under General Wrangel made 
their final stand against the Red Army before fleeing by ship to Istanbul in 1920. Following the 
Bolshevik policy of establishing autonomous homelands for the country’s ethnic minority 
groups, Crimea became the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the RSFSR in 
1921 as the homeland of the Crimean Tatars. The peninsula experienced a short famine from 
1921 to 1923 due to drought and the new Soviet regime’s ineffectual policies, which resulted in 
over 100,000 deaths (Sokolov, 2010). 
The events and aftermath of World War II had a devastating and transformative effect 
upon Crimea. The Germans occupied Crimea from 1941 to 1944, and the fact that Crimea had 
once been home to a branch of the Germanic Goths made it of particular interest to Hitler, who 
hoped to repopulate the peninsula with Germans after the war and remake it into the Republic of 
Gotenland after its Gothic heritage (Roman’ko, 2009). Intense fighting between the German and 
the Soviet Armies commenced throughout Crimea, although the most significant battle again 
happened in Sevastopol. The Nazi air campaign against Sevastopol lasted from October, 1941 to 
July, 1942 and was carefully orchestrated to take out all of the city’s military instillations, social 
services, and infrastructure (Qualls, 2009, 13-18). Sevastopol resisted capture long after the rest 
of the Crimean Peninsula had fallen to the Nazis. Once it had been completely annihilated after 
eight months of bombing, the German army managed to seize the city and the scant few 
inhabitants who had not fled or already been killed. When the Red Army recaptured the city in 
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1944, they found it in almost complete ruin. Sevastopol thus became the site of a heroic defense 
of the Russian/Soviet motherland twice over, taking the “Sevastopol Myth” to new heights in the 
Soviet popular imagination. As a side note, the Crimean resort city of Yalta famously became the 
site of the 1945 post-war summit between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, which shaped global 
geopolitics for the next half century. 
 
The Deportation of the Crimean Tatars 
The most tragic outcome of the war came after it had been liberated by the Soviet army. 
On May 18, 1944, shortly after Crimea had been liberated from German forces, all the Crimean 
Tatars in Crimea were systematically rounded up and deported en masse to the far corners of the 
Soviet Union – most of them to Uzbekistan – to be resettled and forever forbidden from 
returning to their native Crimea (Williams, 2001). Some have suggested that Stalin’s decision to 
have the Crimean Tatars removed from Crimea and settled in distant Central Asia was made out 
of fear of a potential war with Turkey following the fight against Germany, in which the 
Crimean Tatars would have been a likely Turkish alley and fifth column just across the Black 
Sea (Williams, 1997, 237). However, the decision was officially made by Stalin to punish the 
Crimean Tatars collectively for supposedly collaborating and conspiring with the German 
occupying forces against the Soviet regime – accusations that Crimean Tatars have emphatically 
denied. Although exact figures do not exist, it is believed that roughly 46% (110,000 out of 
238,500) of the Crimean Tatar population died in transit during their deportation due to disease, 
starvation, dehydration, and trauma in the unsafe and unsanitary conditions of the packed cattle 
cars used to transport them (Williams, 1997, 238). Along with the Crimean Tatars small numbers 
of Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians were deported from Crimea following the war as well. 
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Exiled from their homeland and scattered throughout the Soviet Union, it appeared in the 
decades following their deportation that the Crimean Tatars were all but doomed to obscurity. As 
one contemporary source (Quelquejay, 1968, 25) articulated it, "the Crimean Tatars are doomed 
to be assimilated by the peoples among whom they are now living. Thus a people with a long, 
glorious and tragic past will disappear from history" (quoted in Williams, 1997, 239). However, 
the Crimean Tatar community proved resolute in their efforts to maintain their national identity 
and in their fight to return to their homeland throughout the Soviet period (see Chapter Four). 
 
Changes to Crimea’s Political Status 
With the Crimean Tatars removed from the region, Crimea was no longer home to a 
significant ethnic minority group and thus no longer met the requirements for the status of an 
autonomous republic. Hence, on June 30, 1945, Crimea’s status was downgraded to that of an 
oblast – essentially a non-autonomous province – of the RSFSR as its population was now 
predominantly Russian by nationality. A second change to Crimea’s political status came nine 
years later on January 25, 1954 when, under the directives of new Soviet leader Nikita 
Khrushchev, the Crimean Oblast was transferred administratively from the RSFSR to the 
Ukrainian SSR.  
Justifications for the transfer were rather nebulous and poorly presented to the Soviet 
public at the time, adding to the speculation and debate over its meaning and significance in the 
post-Soviet era. Most accounts of the transfer emphasize that it was meant as a symbolic gesture 
of “friendship” between the Soviet Union’s two largest ethnic communities. Crucially, the 
transfer of Crimea happened to coincide with the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, 
which in 1654 brought the Hetmanate of the Zaporozhian Cossacks under the allegiance of the 
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Russian Tsar. It is often cited as the moment Russian and Ukrainian lands became historically 
linked. Despite the fact that at the time of the treaty Crimea was an Ottoman vassal state ruled by 
a khan who was hostile towards both Russia the Cossacks, the transfer of Crimea was treated 
through public discourse as a meaningful commemoration of the glorious unification of Russia 
and Ukraine.  
However, Ukrainian narratives of the transfer instead tend to highlight the abundant 
evidence that the transfer was based in large part upon sound and thoughtful economic 
considerations (Sergiychuk, 2001). Official deliberations over the transfer did in fact emphasize 
economic development as a primary motivation though they were often expressed in vague and 
simplistic terms. In the official proceedings that initiated the transfer, many representatives 
emphasized the territorial continuity between Ukraine and Crimea as a facilitating factor of the 
peninsula’s economic development. One representative of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the RSFSR involved with the transfer commented at the time that  
the Crimean Oblast … is territorially adjoined to the Ukrainian Republic, forming 
in some way a natural continuation of the southern Ukrainian steppe. The 
economy of the Crimean Oblast is closely linked with the economy of the 
Ukrainian SSR. For geographic and economic reasons the transfer of the Crimean 
Oblast to the brotherly Ukrainian Republic is practical for the general interests of 
the Soviet Union (Burov, et al., 2007, 372). 
Economic considerations, however, were still typically couched within the standard rhetoric of 
brotherhood and friendship, as exemplified in another representative's comments that ”the 
unbreakable and eternal friendship between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples will be key to the 
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further economic strengthening of the Soviet Union on its path towards communism” 
(“Iskliuchitel’no…”, 2004). 
At that time the transfer meant very little for the people of Crimea. It simply meant that 
the chain of command and administration now went through Kyiv rather than directly from 
Moscow to Simferopol, and Crimea was still part of the highly centralized Soviet state no matter 
which republic to which it was attached (Sasse, 2007, 124). However, today many Russians 
living in Crimea and beyond curse the name of Khrushchev for his role in splitting Crimea from 
the Russian homeland, while many Ukrainians celebrate this decision and praise Khrushchev – 
himself an ethnic Ukrainian – for his shrewd judgment in uniting Crimea with Ukraine.  
 
Development under the Ukrainian SSR 
Sizeable numbers of Ukrainians were already living in Crimea long before it was 
transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. Ethnic Ukrainian migration to Crimea had gradually increased 
since its annexation by Russia in 1783, accounting for 64,510 people or 11.8% of the regional 
population by 1897 (Vodarskyi et al., 2003). However, the growth of the Ukrainian population in 
Crimea was outpaced by that of Russians throughout this period. Following the deportation of 
Crimean Tatars in 1944, Soviet authorities began forcibly resettling Slavs in Crimea to make up 
for the sudden labor shortage. Most of the resettled population was ethnically Russian, although 
many Ukrainians from parts of the central and northern Ukrainian SSR were moved to Crimea as 
well (Sasse, 2007, 117). In terms of overall numbers the repopulation of Crimea by resettlement 
progressed slowly, with only 74,000 more people in 1959 than before the outbreak of World War 
II (121). 
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Efforts to bring in more Ukrainian settlers continued following the 1954 transfer, 
although the ratio of Ukrainian to Russian settlers remained approximately the same as it had 
been a decade earlier. Thus between 1959 and 1989 the relative proportions of Russians to 
Ukrainians in the Crimean Oblast remained more or less the same, i.e., approximately 68% and 
25%, respectively (Sasse, 121, 275). However, Sergiychuk (2001) points out that in 1970 there 
were 361,500 Ukrainians living in the Crimean Oblast, which represented an increase of 113,000 
since 1959 – a difference of only 11 years (239).  
More importantly, Sergiychuk notes that rural settlers accounted for a majority of the 
increase in Crimea’s Ukrainian population. In fact, with the exception of the Transcarpathian 
Oblast in western Ukraine, the Crimean Oblast was the only one in the Ukrainian SSR to see an 
increase in its rural population in the decades following World War II while the rural population 
of the entire republic fell by 2 million (239). Sergiychuk explains that one of the main reasons 
for this increase in Crimea’s rural population is the fact that entire villages that were flooded by 
the construction of the Kiev Reservoir during the 1960s were relocated specifically to Crimea 
(239). In Ukrainian narratives the fact that ethnic Ukrainians bolstered Crimea’s rural population 
in the post-war decades is significant because it shows that ethnic Ukrainians and the Ukrainian 
SSR “took on the burden of recovery for the war-devastated peninsula” by rebuilding its 
agricultural and industrial infrastructure (238).  
Another critical project that further strengthened economic, infrastructural, and social ties 
between Crimea and the Ukrainian SSR was the construction of the Northern Crimean Canal 
(Sergiychuk, 2001). Built through the Perekop Isthmus connecting Crimea to mainland Ukraine 
between 1961 and 1971, the canal brought much-needed water from the Dnieper River to 
Crimea’s northern steppe, as well as an influx of state investment to the oblast (Sasse, 2007). 
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Furthermore, the construction of the canal meant that Crimea was now reliant upon Ukraine for 
much of its water supply, and the fact that Crimea’s water now came from the Dnieper – the very 
river that flows through the heart of Ukraine and which has been so central to Ukrainian history 
and culture – has had great symbolic as well as practical meaning for the construction of 
Ukrainian national narratives about Crimea.  
Crimea’s cultural integration into Ukraine during the Soviet period was not nearly as 
strong as its economic and infrastructural integration. As Crimea’s population remained 
predominantly Russian and the processes of Russian/Soviet cultural homogenization continued 
to prevail throughout the Soviet Union, the institutionalization of Ukrainian culture in Crimea 
proved meager at best. This is especially true in regards to Ukrainian language usage and 
education. Initially following the transfer, it appeared that the language was making inroads as 
the number of Ukrainian language teachers in Crimean high schools increased rapidly from only 
two in 1950 to 345 by 1955 (Sasse, 121). By 1958 Ukrainian language classes had become 
standard in all second, third, and fifth grade classes, with a total of 19,766 students studying it 
that year (Sergiychuk, 250). However, by the early 1970s Ukrainian language education in 
Crimea had all but disappeared (256). As virtually everybody in both Crimea and the rest of 
Ukraine already spoke the Soviet lingua franca (i.e., Russian), the drive to promote Ukrainian 
language education eventually fizzled out.  
 
Crimea’s Status as a Soviet and post-Soviet Vacation Destination  
Due to its warm climate, extensive coastline, recreational opportunities, and supposed 
health-restoring properties, Crimea became the vacation destination of choice for millions of 
Soviet holidaymakers (Bagrova, Bokov and Bagrov, 2001). Crimea continues in the post-Soviet 
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era to attract millions of vacationers every year, primarily from Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. To 
most people who grew up in the Soviet Union or its successor states, Crimea means family 
vacations, relaxing on the beach, hiking in the mountains, rejuvenating in a sanatorium, and 
happy childhood memories. For the millions who have been able to spend their vacations there, 
Crimea represents a place of retreat from the hardships of everyday life and a place that is 
separate from their day-to-day realities both physical and psychological. For example, the 
introduction to one Crimean guidebook published in 1989 begins: 
You are in Crimea. Here you may forget about your workaday concerns and 
replace the rhythm of business with relaxation and contemplation, or with exciting 
travel filled with vivid impressions ... Rejoice in the sun and sea breeze, wander 
through exotic parks, enjoy “one of the most celebrated seas on planet Earth” – 
the Black Sea. While relaxing and regaining your health and strength, all that is 
amazing, wonderful, and new to you is just around the corner. (Kryukova, 1989, 
3) 
As the playground for the entire Soviet Union, narratives of Crimea have largely been shaped by 
the collective experiences and memories of the Soviet people who came to cherish it, and this 
process continues in the post-Soviet era. 
As most citizens were prohibited from traveling abroad, Crimea was transformed into a 
workers’ paradise within Soviet borders, a giant “workshop, the product of which is the health 
and happiness of millions of people” (Sirota, 1980, 3). Crimean tourism numbers grew steadily 
throughout the Soviet period from 4 million annual visitors in 1968, to 5.7 million in 1978, to 
over 8 million in 1988 (Bagrova, Bokov and Bagrov, 2001, 206). The economic turmoil of the 
1990s meant a severe drop in tourist numbers, and even by 1999 the number of yearly visitors 
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only reached 3.3 million (208). In recent years Crimea has finally seen tourism numbers 
comparable to its Soviet heyday with over 5.7 million visitors in 2007 (“V Krymu s nachala…”, 
2007, Dec 10). With so many annual visitors, vacationing in Crimea has long been something of 
a cliché of Soviet and post-Soviet society. Even in 1980, as Sirota writes, “to be sure, it would be 
difficult to find a person who has not been [to Crimea] at least once” (5).  
One important aspect of the Crimean tourist industry has been its numerous children's 
health resorts and summer camps. The city of Evpatoria in particular has become synonymous 
with resorts catering to ill and disabled children. However, the most popular and famous 
destination for children in Crimea has long been the summer camp “Artek.” Located near Yalta 
on Crimea’s south coast, Artek was a camp for Soviet “Pioneers”1 and the premier destination 
for children from around the Soviet Union and from numerous Soviet-aligned countries around 
the world. Artek was founded in 1925 as part of Lenin’s effort to create a workers’ paradise in 
Crimea, and as Kondrashenko (1977) states, “The motherland gave to the children the biggest 
piece of bread and the last bit of sugar. They needed sun, a lot of sun, and they received a 
fairytale-like spot on the shores of the Black Sea” (7).  
The objective of camps like Artek was to bring together children from all corners of the 
Soviet Union and the socialist world at large to expose them to the broad ethnic and cultural 
diversity of their fellow citizens and their socialist brethren abroad and to promote the Soviet 
values through which they were all united. This theme is evident, for example, in the lyrics of a 
typical song sung by children at Artek: “Buryats, Negros, Russians / all in a single crowd. / Here 
we strengthen our muscles / for our unitary fight!” (Kondrashenko, 1977, 6). In this way, camps 
like Artek and Crimea itself have become sites of intercultural exchange and exposure for 
millions of Soviet youths. These activities have helped shape and reinforce perceptions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Pioneers, or “Pionery” in Russian, were the Soviet equivalent of Boy Scouts. 
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Crimea in Soviet and post-Soviet society both as a place of retreat and relaxation and as a 
sanctuary of diversity and exotic multiculturalism. Artek and several other children’s camps 
remain open in Crimea today, and while they are no longer used as tools of Soviet indoctrination 
they remain a vital component of Crimea’s tourism industry. 
As millions were experiencing and consuming narratives of Crimea’s regional 
distinctiveness as tourists during the Soviet period, expressions of this distinctiveness persisted 
in Soviet literature as well. Undoubtedly the most prominent work to emerge about Crimea in 
this period is Vasily Aksyonov’s 1981 novel, The Island of Crimea. Though initially banned in 
the Soviet Union, it has since become a popular depiction of a world – and of a Crimea – that 
could have existed under different geographical and historical conditions. Somewhere between 
historical and science fiction, the novel imagines Crimea as an island rather than a peninsula, a 
fact that enabled the White Army to successfully defend Crimea from the Bolsheviks during the 
Russian Civil War and establish Crimea as an independent capitalist haven just off the shores of 
the Soviet Union – something of a Taiwan to the Soviet Union’s China. The novel is ripe with 
narratives related to Crimea’s unique qualities and clearly distinguishes it from the rest of the 
Soviet Union through its intriguing portrayal of an alternate reality. The plot revolves around a 
prominent Crimean newspaper publisher’s attempts to reconcile his love for what Crimea has 
become with his love for mother Russia despite its present Soviet “occupation.” In an 
impassioned quote one character describes his feelings towards Crimea: 
I love this island; I love its memory of the old Russia and the dream of a new one; 
I love its rich and dissolute democracy, the ports of its rocky south open to the 
entire world, the energy of historically doomed but eternally resilient Russian 
capitalism; I love the girls of Yalta and its bohemian atmosphere; I love 
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[Simferopol’s] architectural turbulence; I love the well-fed flocks in the eastern 
pastureland and the sweeping wheat fields in the west; I love even its supple seal-
like contour. (Aksyonov, 1984, 310). 
Although this is obviously a description of a fictitious version of Crimea, it nevertheless reifies 
common perceptions of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness even in the shape of the territory itself. 
Despite its radical diversion in many ways from the standard Russian Crimean literary tradition, 
the novel does provide a crucial element of continuity with those older works in that it treats 
Crimea as a place that is separate from the rest of Russia. In Sasse’s words, throughout The 
Island of Crimea “[t]he enduring image is of Crimea as a place set apart from Russia, a place that 
is different, that needs to take a distinct path, and that demands special treatment” (58). 
Aksyonov merely expands upon these common narratives by imagining how Crimea’s distinct 
characteristics might have found political and social expression if circumstances had been 
different. 
 
Crimea at the End of the Soviet Period 
The end of the Soviet period brought great social and political turbulence to Crimea. In 
the rapidly changing atmosphere of glasnost and perestroika, many across the Soviet Union grew 
weary of the uncertain direction the country was heading. In Crimea this was of particular 
concern to ethnic Russians who constituted a majority of the regional population. With major 
shifts happening within the Soviet political structure, Crimea’s Russians began to understand the 
potential consequences of Khrushchev’s 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine. Many grew 
concerned over the possibility of the Soviet Union fracturing along the lines of the Union 
Republics and potentially placing Crimea within an independent Ukraine. Alarmed by the 
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thought of being politically severed from Russian territory, many began to push for a 
reinstitution of Crimea’s autonomous status, which “would provide an exit from Ukraine, should 
it secede from the USSR” (Sasse, 2007, 134). Sasse also argues that autonomy in Crimea was 
viewed as “an inherent part of the democratization process” (135) in such times of change, but 
that it was also a preemptive measure taken against “exclusivist ethno-territorial demands” (134) 
by Crimean Tatars who had recently began to return to Crimea in small numbers. 
In November, 1990, the Crimean Supreme Soviet approved the proposal to hold an 
oblast-wide referendum on the reinstitution of autonomy in Crimea (Sasse, 2007). Such a 
referendum was unprecedented in Soviet history, as the establishment of all autonomous 
territories had been decided by the central government. In the midst of the Soviet collapse, 
Crimea was permitted to move forward with the referendum. Held on January 21, 1991, the 
referendum resulted in massive support for the reestablishment of the Crimean ASSR as well as 
for Crimea’s inclusion in the Union Treaty that was currently under negotiation – a document 
that aimed to preserve the Soviet Union as it faced the increasing threat of disintegration. With a 
turnout of 81.4% of eligible voters, the referendum passed with 93.3% of the vote (138). With 
such a booming mandate for autonomy, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet confirmed the referendum 
results on February 12, and Crimea once again became an autonomous republic, only this time 
within the Ukrainian SSR and according to the will of its own people. 
 
Crimea after Ukrainian Independence 
Upon the Soviet collapse in December, 1991, Ukraine – including the newly re-
established Autonomous Republic of Crimea – became an independent state. Feeling 
disillusioned by their sudden exclusion from their Russian “motherland,” many Russians in 
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Crimea scrambled for a solution to their woebegone political fate. So began nearly a decade of 
difficult political negotiations that subsequently saw a Crimean separatist movement, the brief 
institution of a Crimean presidency, and numerous political parties struggling to maintain 
Crimea’s Russian cultural and political heritage. This was compounded by the return of 
thousands of Crimean Tatars to their estranged homeland and caused serious disputes over 
property rights as many returnees sought to reclaim the land they had once owned but now found 
occupied by Russians or Ukrainians (Uehling, 2004). While this period of political uncertainty 
inspired many observers to proclaim Crimea the next hotspot of ethnic or geopolitical conflict, 
serious conflict was ultimately averted through a protracted and often painful process of 
cooperation between Kiev, Simferopol, and Crimean Tatar leadership to negotiate the terms of 
the autonomous republic’s constitution that was finally enacted in 1998 (see Sasse, 2007).  
With the fall of the Soviet Union also came the complete abolition of the restriction on 
Crimean Tatars’ return to Crimea, although many had already started trickling back. Those 
Crimean Tatars who chose to return to Crimea and had the means to do so were met with the 
grim reality that their homeland was no longer the place it had been before they were deported 
(Williams, 2001). The region had been thoroughly Russified in their absence and what little 
remained of their once flourishing society in Crimea had been largely sterilized and co-opted as a 
tourist attraction depicting some forgotten, backwards culture. More troubling, the homes and 
lands once belonging to Crimean Tatars were now occupied by Russians and Ukrainians who 
had little sympathy for the returning people’s plight, either viewing them as invasive outsiders or 
continuing to begrudge them for their supposed treason against the Soviet people during World 
War II. Discrimination by locals and harassment by officials were rampant. Furthermore, 
returning to Crimea became more difficult and weighted with bureaucracy as emigrating no 
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longer meant moving between two regions of the Soviet Union but rather between two newly 
independent countries, both of which were struggling to get on their feet. Despite the difficulties 
they faced (see Chapter Four), hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars chose to return to their 
homeland, with roughly half of the 500,000 Crimean Tatars scattered throughout the Soviet 
Union returning to Crimea by the mid-1990s (Williams, 2004, 40). 
Deciding what should be done with the Black Sea Fleet following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was another exceedingly difficult task, and indeed became one of the dominant 
issues during the negotiations of power transfer and the terms of sovereignty between Ukraine 
and the Russian Federation. By 1997, a complicated series of negotiations concluded between 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk over the future of the 
fleet, which ultimately awarded Russia the majority of its ships, armaments, and facilities, and a 
20-year lease of the port of Sevastopol, while Ukraine retained a small portion of the original 
fleet (Simonson, 2000). The decision over who among the fleet’s personnel would serve in which 
navy was largely left to the individual officers and servicemen themselves. In 1994 the city of 
Sevastopol was severed from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and given the status of 
Federal City within Ukraine – a distinction deemed necessary because of its status as both a 
Russian and Ukrainian naval base. Although initially set to expire in 2017, in 2010 Russia’s 
lease on Sevastopol’s naval facilities was extended another 25 years with the option of an 
additional five in exchange for lower prices on Russian gas, meaning that the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet is set to stay in Crimea at least through 2042. 
Today Crimea remains an autonomous republic within Ukraine according to the division 
of power established by the constitutions of both Ukraine and the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea. Crimea maintains its own unicameral parliament similar to that of the Ukrainian state 
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parliament (both named Verkhovna Rada in Ukrainian). As of the last Ukrainian census in 2001, 
Russian account for 58.5% of Crimea’s population, Ukrainians account for 26.7%, and Crimean 
Tatars account for 12.1% (State Statistical Agency of Ukraine, 2004). While the political 
situation has largely stabilized since the late 1990s, there remain a number of pro-Russian 
political and activist groups – both at the regional (Crimean) and state (Ukrainian) scales – which 
advocate for the reunification of Crimea with Russia. Such groups include the Russian 
Community of Crimea, Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia, and the Bloc of Yulia Vitrenko, which is a 
Ukraine-wide pro-Russian party with strong support in Crimea. Along with the rest of eastern 
and southern Ukraine, Crimea has consistently voted for more mainstream pro-Russian political 
parties in every national election by a wide margin.  
Crimean Tatars, on the other hand, have been largely loyal to the Ukrainian state and 
supportive of national political parties that are less conciliatory towards Russia, as they tend to 
view a strong Ukrainian state as a guarantor of their rights as the indigenous people of Crimea 
and as a bulwark against Russian chauvinism both regionally and state-wide (Sasse, 2007). 
Additionally, since 1991 the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars – along with its parliamentary 
assembly the Qurultay – has been the primary representative body for the Crimean Tatars both at 
the regional and state level where it has advocated for Crimean Tatars’ rights and fought to 
rehabilitate their status as the indigenous people of Crimea. Mustafa Jemilev, the chair of the 
Mejlis and de facto leader of the Crimean Tatar national movement, is also a deputy of the 
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada.  
 
Territorial Imagery and the Crimean “Logo-Map” 
 Worth noting is the fact that the image of the Crimean peninsula itself has played an 
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important role within the Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet popular imaginations. Because of its 
narrow and tenuous attachment to the Ukrainian mainland and projection southward into the 
Black Sea, it has been noted that the Crimean peninsula appears to be “suspended” or “dangling” 
from Ukraine. As such, the expression “a medal upon the chest of the earth,” supposedly coined 
by Chilean poet Pablo Neruda, has become a popular trope used by Crimeans to describe the 
peninsula’s appearance while simultaneously expressing their attachment to the region by 
conceiving of Crimea as some kind of “prize.” Meanwhile, Glazkova and Landa (2007) claim 
that Crimea's outline resembles “a giant bird or dragon, flying to the east” (4). Clearly, the 
unmistakable outline of the Crimean Peninsula has captured the imagination of many. Because 
its boundaries are defined by its coastline rather than arbitrary borders drawn in the Soviet era 
like virtually every other post-Soviet territory, the shape of Crimea has become an attribute of its 
regional distinctiveness both for those within the region and outside of it, and it is used to 
embody and symbolize the perception of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness in countless ways. 
 Anderson (1991) defines the basic and simplified outline of a territory as a “logo-map,” 
and argues that they serve a crucial role in developing a national or territorial consciousness. 
“Instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, the logo-map penetrate[s] deep into the popular 
imagination,” explains Anderson (175). The “logo-map” of Crimea can be seen throughout the 
peninsula and used in a number of capacities. It can be found emblazoned upon a wide variety of 
souvenirs – including postcards, magnets, mugs, towels, t-shirts, and bags – typically adorned 
with images of popular tourist destinations around the peninsula or scenes of popular recreational 
activities. These images are meant primarily for consumption by tourists and serve to reinforce 
the connection between Crimea as a territory and the qualities that make it regionally distinct 
from a tourist’s perspective.  
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 Beyond the tourism industry, the Crimea “logo-map” appears on countless signs, 
advertisements, newspapers, and other forms of media, whether or not the message is directly 
related to Crimea itself. While the outline of Crimea may be found on signs for regional political 
or social organizations, it is seen just as commonly on signs for stores or restaurants or 
incorporated into a company’s logo. The ubiquity of this “logo-map” throughout Crimea serves 
to reinforce collective consciousness of the region itself among Crimean residents, helps to 
mentally distinguish and isolate Crimea from surrounding territories, and ultimately plays an 
important role in fostering senses of regional identity.  
 
Unique Factors of Crimea’s Political Status 
Compared to other autonomous regions of the former Soviet Union, Crimea’s autonomy 
is unique in a number of important ways which are worth noting in order to understand how 
Crimea has been perceived and treated as a unique region in the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts. 
Soviet nationality policies established a number of territorial “homelands” for many of the Soviet 
Union’s ethnic minorities, and these groups were nominally guaranteed varying degrees of 
autonomy over the use of their native language and expression of their national culture in these 
territories. In most cases, borders were drawn to create these autonomous territories in places 
where such political organization of space had not previously existed in order to give physical 
form to the “homelands” of various national groups. While several of the groups to receive 
autonomy had certainly developed some form of national consciousness prior to these policies, 
discrete boundaries of their national territory had not previously been “institutionalized” in the 
formation of a distinct region. In other words, these were territories established around groups of 
people in order to serve and facilitate their national autonomy rather than the political 
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institutionalization of territorial units previously acknowledged to be distinct or cohesive. In 
most cases the borders of these autonomous regions appear to have been delimited erratically as 
they were drawn to accommodate population distributions and according to the whims of Soviet 
central planners.  
Crimea was unique within the Soviet Union both as an autonomous region whose borders 
conformed to physical geography and as the political institutionalization of a territory previously 
acknowledged to be distinct. Crimea had been acknowledged as a distinct region since before it 
was first annexed into the Russian Empire, as this chapter has demonstrated. Meanwhile, 
Crimea’s political boundaries have always been congruent with the shores of the Crimean 
Peninsula itself2 as a landmass that is nearly detached from the Soviet/Ukrainian mainland. 
While the fact alone that it is a separate landmass does not make Crimea a “territory” or “region” 
– as such distinctions are socially constructed – it has provided a conveniently bounded and 
discrete space within which “territorial shape” can be produced. According to Paasi (1996), the 
process of constructing territorial shape “refers to the localization of social practices through 
which regional transformation takes place and a territorial unit achieves its boundaries and 
becomes identified as a distinct unit on some scale of the spatial structure” (34). In this sense, I 
argue that the political expression of Crimea’s uniqueness in the form of autonomy has been 
applied evenly across the Crimean Peninsula despite the fact that, in terms of physical location, 
much of the characteristics that are typically thought of as distinguishing of Crimea (beaches, 
mountains, exotic cultures, etc.) are confined mainly to the southern and eastern portions of the 
peninsula. The Crimean Peninsula has proved to be a convenient territorial “container” for the 
political expression of Crimea’s unique character.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 With the current exception of Sevastopol being a separately-administered Federal City of Ukraine 
 70 
In its original incarnation Crimea’s autonomous status did fit the Soviet model in that it 
was established as a homeland for a distinct ethnic minority, i.e., the Crimean Tatars. However, 
there is evidence to suggest that, if the general rule of Soviet national territorial autonomy had 
been strictly applied, the boundaries of a Crimean Tatar autonomous territory would not have 
necessarily conformed to the outline of the Crimean Peninsula. Conducted five years after the 
establishment of the Crimean ASSR, the 1926 All-Union Census of the Soviet Union indicates 
that Crimean Tatars constituted a minority of the population in many regions of Crimea, 
particularly in the northern and eastern regions around the cities of Dzhankoi, Feodosia, and 
Kerch (Krymskyi Etnograficheskyi Muzej). In these regions, Russians and Ukrainians 
constituted the majority after nearly 150 years of Slavic settlement in Crimea. Moreover, census 
data from the same year indicates that 22,281 Tatars3 lived outside of Crimea within the 
Ukrainian SSR indicating that the population of Crimean Tatars was not strictly territorially 
confined to the Crimean Peninsula (Demoskop Weekly, 2011). This information indicates that the 
boundaries of the Crimean ASSR were fairly incongruent with the spatial distribution of 
Crimean Tatars – the national group for whom the autonomous republic had been established. 
This pattern lends further credence to the notion that the perception of Crimea’s regional 
distinctiveness – in this case characterized as the homeland of Crimean Tatars – has been broadly 
applied to the Crimean Peninsula as a whole. The establishment of autonomy across the entirety 
of the peninsula represents, according to Paasi, another element of the institutionalization of 
Crimea as a region through the establishment of a crucial regional institution, furthering the 
perception of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The 1926 census did not include a separate category for Crimean Tatars, and thus they would have been counted 
only as “Tatar.” 
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The institutionalization of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness can also be observed in the 
various names that the region, as a politically-defined territory, has adapted during the Soviet and 
post-Soviet periods. In the first place, during the Soviet era the Crimean ASSR was the only 
autonomous region not to derive its name from the national group for which it was created. In 
fact, unlike other national groups in the Soviet Union who lent their name to the autonomous 
territories constructed around them (Tatarstan from the Tatars, Abkhazia from the Abkhaz, etc.), 
Crimean Tatars have conversely derived their ethnonym from their native region. In other words, 
Crimean Tatars are named for the territory that they inhabit while virtually every other minority 
national group in the Soviet Union has instead been used to define the territories constructed 
around them. That Crimean Tatars have long been distinguished in name by their native territory 
speaks to the notion of regional distinctiveness and the institutionalization of Crimea as a distinct 
region from a very early period. The fact that the Crimean ASSR was not named the Crimean 
Tatar ASSR instead also reinforces the idea that Crimea’s autonomous status is derived more 
from a sense of regional distinctiveness than from the presence of a minority national group.  
When Crimea’s status was downgraded from an autonomous republic to an oblast in 
1945 following the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the subsequent name change of this 
territorial unit continued to reflect a sense of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness. While nearly all 
oblasts in the Soviet Union were named after their primary city and/or seat of territorial 
government, the Crimean ASSR did not become the “Simferopolskaia Oblast4” as this trend 
would dictate. Instead it simply became the Crimean Oblast, thereby preserving the name 
“Crimea” and retaining this marking of regional distinction despite the loss of autonomy. Today, 
as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the name of this political-territorial unit continues to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 After the Crimean capital of Simferopol. 
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synonymous with the physically-defined and socially-constructed region with which it is 
equated.  
In its current incarnation Crimea continues to be unique among the autonomous regions 
of the former Soviet Union due to the circumstances surrounding the reinstitution of its 
autonomous status. Crimea became autonomous again following an oblast-wide referendum in 
February, 1991, the first of its kind, just months before the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Crucially, this referendum was held at a time before the Crimean Tatars had begun to return to 
the region in any significant numbers. Thus, while every other autonomous region had been 
established on the pretext of being a homeland for a national minority, the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea lacked such a “titular” nationality at the time of its re-establishment. While Crimean 
Tatars began to return soon thereafter, the fact remains that Crimea’s current autonomous status 
was predicated not upon the presence of a national minority, but rather upon the will of its people 
for the political expression of their regional distinctiveness. In contrast, nearly every other 
autonomous region in the former Soviet Union is the successor of its Soviet-era equivalent, 
ostensibly still predicated upon the presence of a national minority during Soviet times. 
Some may argue that because Russians are a minority within Ukraine as a whole, 
autonomy in Crimea represents a measure of protection of Russians’ minority rights much as 
other autonomous regions are intended to be for other minorities. This argument does not 
account for the fact that Crimea’s Russians make up a small percentage of Ukraine’s total ethnic 
Russian population despite the fact that Crimea is the only region where they constitute a 
majority. According to the last Ukrainian census in 2001, Russians in Crimea account for only 
14.2% of the entire Russian population of Ukraine (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2004). 
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Furthermore, Crimea stands as the only autonomous territory in any region with a large Russian 
population outside of the Russian Federation.  
Crimea has proved a political-territorial anomaly among the various territorial units – 
both autonomous and non-autonomous – within the Soviet Union and in the post-Soviet space. It 
is the only region where autonomous borders are defined by physical geography; it is the only 
autonomous region not to derive its name from a “titular” national group; it is the only region to 
have its autonomy decided by a popular vote rather than a central mandate; and in its current 
form it is the only autonomous region not established as a homeland for a distinct national 
minority group. Fundamentally, Crimea is distinct from other post-Soviet autonomous regions in 
that it is not a territory born from the need for autonomy of a particular group. Rather, it is a 
region that had already been recognized as a distinct territory – physically and culturally – to 
which autonomy has been accorded in symbolic acknowledgement of this distinct character. 
“Crimea” as a region is not only a political construct created by Soviet authorities; it is a discrete 
territory distinguished by its physical boundaries and perceived as being regionally distinct since 
long before it became an autonomous republic. 
 
Summary 
 Crimea’s history has been shaped by numerous groups over time that have called it home 
and made it into a region of great ethnic and cultural diversity. In addition to this diversity, 
perceptions of Crimea’s exotic landscape, climate, and natural beauty have lent it a certain 
mystique in the eyes of its Russian conquerors, who view it as a unique and distinctive region, 
and this perception has subsequently shaped the trajectory of Crimea’s history in the Russian, 
Soviet, and post-Soviet periods. Crimean history has also been quite turbulent as numerous 
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conflicts have brought successive regime changes and shifts in Crimea’s political status. For over 
200 years Crimean history was shaped by the Russian and Soviet regimes that fundamentally 
altered the cultural and demographic character of the region, sometimes to tragic ends in the case 
of the Crimean Tatars and the struggles they have endured as a result of their deportation. In 
1991 Crimea entered a new phase in its history as it became a part of an independent Ukraine 
and faced a number of new challenges due to the complications of the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. Today the story of Crimea continues to be shaped by its three predominant groups – 
Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars – and historical circumstances have meant that each of 
these groups possess their own unique perspective of Crimea. In Chapter Four I explore the ways 
in which each of these groups have constructed their own national narratives of Crimea, and in 
subsequent chapters I demonstrate how these competing narratives and perspectives shape 
identity dynamics among Crimea’s three main ethnic communities.  
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Chapter IV: Constructing Competing National Narratives about 
Crimea 
  
In the post-Soviet era, Crimea has become the subject of three major narratives that 
construct it within different ethno-cultural and ethno-territorial contexts: the Crimean Tatar 
narrative, the Russian narrative, and the Ukrainian narrative. Each of these perspectives borrow 
from and rely upon different aspects of Crimea’s history and culture to lend credence to its 
particular claims to the region.  
 
The Crimean Tatar Narrative 
Of the three groups actively constructing their own narratives of modern Crimea, the 
Crimean Tatars claim the deepest roots and arguably maintain the most intimate connection to 
the region itself. Although their recent history and relationship with Crimea have been 
complicated by their 1944 deportation and nearly fifty-year absence from the region, the territory 
of Crimea itself has unquestionably remained central to Crimean Tatar identity. The concept of 
homeland among Crimean Tatars is overwhelmingly and inextricably tied to Crimea, and 
reclaiming this homeland has been the lynchpin of the Crimean Tatar national movement since 
the Soviet period.  
 
The Role of Crimean Geography in Crimean Tatar Ethnogenesis  
The story of the Crimean Tatars’ ethnogenesis and appearance in Crimea is rather 
controversial, as concerted attempts have been made by Soviet and Russian authorities to 
diminish their role in the region’s history and undermine their claims to the title of indigenous 
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people of Crimea following their deportation and subsequent return to Crimea (Sasse, 2007, 74). 
Crimean Tatars have sought to demonstrate their deep roots in Crimea that they believe afford 
them a special claim and right to the territory. As Crimean Tatar political leader Mustafa Jemilev 
(1997, 3) explains, “in the formation of the Turkish base of our Crimean Tatar nation there are 
definite waves of all races and ethnic groups who settled in the Crimea from ancient times” 
(quoted in Williams, 2001, 9). According to this view, the Crimean Tatar nation itself was born 
of Crimea’s diversity, and their connection to the region is a testament to the fact that they could 
not have come from anywhere else.  
While they are in part the descendants of Mongol invaders and Turkic nomads much like 
other Tatar groups spread throughout the Eurasian steppe, Crimean Tatars have argued that this 
Mongol heritage makes up only a small part of their diverse lineage. While those who seek to 
diminish and delegitimize the Crimean Tatars’ claims to the region identify them as merely the 
decedents of Mongol invaders, Crimean Tatars and their supporters argue that their roots in 
Crimea go much deeper. As Voitovich (2009) explains, the arrival of Mongol invaders and the 
establishment of the Golden Horde’s dominion over Crimea served primarily to “accelerate the 
process of symbiosis” between various groups already present in Crimea, ultimately leading to 
the integration of these groups into a common Crimean Tatar ethnic group (3).  
According to Crimean Tatar narrative, the region’s diverse cultural heritage and 
geography play vital roles in the formation of Crimean Tatar ethnicity and culture. Williams 
(2001) accounts for the fact that the Crimean peninsula’s three distinct landscape zones provided 
the setting for the formation of three distinct groups who formed the Crimean Tatar ethnic group, 
known as the Nogais, Tats, and Yaliboyus, respectively. The Nogais appeared in the northern 
steppe through the interbreeding of Mongols and Kipchaks. The Tats formed within the Crimean 
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mountains from the remnants of various diverse Crimean civilizations that had sought refuge 
there over the centuries. The Yaliboyus formed along the southern coast from Greek, Italian 
(Genoese and Venetian), and Armenian communities. It was only under the hegemony of Islam 
within the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire, Crimean Tatars argue, that these groups 
were first “Tatarized,” or united under the ethnonym of Crimean Tatars. Williams explains that 
as these groups began to adopt the religion, language, and culture of the Crimean ruling elites 
The subsequent amalgamation of the ancient mountain and costal populations 
with the Kipchak-Tatars of the plains led to the formation of a uniquely Crimean 
version of the “Tatar” ethnic group. The mixed “Tatars” who came into being on 
the Crimean Peninsula differed in many ways from the Tatar populations of the 
Khanates of Kazan, and Astrakhan and the ‘pure’ Tatar nomads of the steppes of 
the Desti-i Kipchak, known as Nogais. (27) 
Although even today the three Crimean Tatar sub-groups are distinguishable from one another in 
appearance, together they have “formed the foundation of a new people who gradually 
internalized a vague sense of ‘Kırım Tatarlık’ (‘Crimean Tatarness’) in spite of their variegated 
ethno-linguistic backgrounds” (29). 
Thus, Crimean Tatars have come to understand themselves as much more than simply the 
descendants of the unruly Mongols, as others would have them believe. They see themselves, in 
a sense, as an expression of Crimea-ness itself. Nowhere else on earth could their specific blend 
of ethno-cultural heritage be combined into a modern ethnic group but in Crimea, where history 
and physical geography created the conditions necessary to make the Crimean Tatars what they 
are today. In this way, Crimean Tatars believe that they are the true indigenous people of Crimea 
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and nowhere else. In describing the unique role that Crimean territory has played in the 
formation of its own distinct ethnic group, Kuftin (1992) writes that  
All these myriad cultural influences left their trace in the present population of the 
Crimea. Bringing to its soil characteristics that were reshaped here in a unique 
mutual relationship with one another and, adapting to the local natural conditions 
and native forms of living, they long survived in other, superseding ethnic waves. 
(quoted in Williams, 2001, 31). 
Although it was Islam that ultimately united the different groups of Crimea into a single ethnic 
community as the Crimean Tatars, Williams contends that “[t]here are grounds for believing … 
that the Crimeans of this [early] period did have a vague identification with the Crimean 
Peninsula in a larger sense, identifying themselves with the Tatar term Kırımlı (Crimean)” (29). 
In other words, a sense of territorial identity was beginning to prevail alongside religious and 
cultural identity among Crimean Tatars early on. Furthermore, many Crimean Tatars have 
argued for the removal of “Tatar” from their ethnonym, stating that it disproportionately aligns 
them with their Mongol heritage and its sometimes negative connotations (35). Those who take 
issue with the “Tatar” element in the Crimean Tatar ethnonym have advocated for the simple use 
of “Crimean” to distinguish their ethnic group, claiming that it more appropriately conveys the 
fact that it was formed on Crimean soil and is therefore intrinsically Crimean (35). 
Thus, since their very appearance as an ethnic community, Crimean Tatars have retained 
an unbreakable connection to the territory of Crimea. Crimean Tatars believe and are proud of 
the fact that they are the product of no one ethnic or cultural tradition, but rather a product of 
Crimea itself and the diverse conditions that history and geography have created there. While 
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other groups may lay claim to the region, Crimea Tatars maintain that theirs is the most 
legitimate due to the fact that, if it were not for Crimea, they would not even exist as a people. 
 
The Glory of the Crimean Khanate 
  The Crimean Khanate and its first ruler Haci Giray symbolize to Crimean Tatars not only 
their realization as a cohesive national group, but their identity as the rightful rulers of Crimea 
(Williams, 2001). The Giray dynasty’s hegemony over Crimea became complicated and 
controversial following Haci Giray’s death in 1466 and the subsequent involvement of the 
Ottoman Empire in Crimean affairs, though Crimean Tatars maintain that the Crimean Khanate 
remained independent throughout this period until its dissolution following Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea. This period remains a source of pride for Crimean Tatars, and is an important 
component of their identity as a people belonging to Crimea.  
 Despite its complicated relationship with the Ottoman Empire, Crimean Tatars choose to 
remember that “even if it relied on the Ottomans, the Crimean Khanate possessed all the 
characteristics of a fully developed, premodern state” (Uehling 2004, 32). According to Fisher 
(1978), the Crimean Khanate maintained its own diplomatic relations with Poland and Muscovy, 
collected tribute from them and from regions that were under Ottoman rule, and for much of its 
history minted its own coins bearing the symbol of the Giray dynasty rather than that of the 
Ottomans (13-14). Fisher maintains that “[s]ince the conduct of diplomacy is one of the 
prerogatives of a sovereign state, one must conclude that here … is evidence of an incomplete 
Crimean dependence upon the Ottomans” (14).  
 Although a detailed picture of this period and the specific relationship between the 
Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate remains incomplete, Crimean Tatars choose to 
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remember it as a halcyon period when their own people ruled over the Crimean Peninsula 
unopposed and unencumbered. Then, Crimean Tatar culture was allowed to flourish. In 
Williams’ (2001) words, “[i]n the popular Crimean Tatar imagination, the epoch of the Crimean 
Khanate was a glorious time when the Crimean Khan ruled a ‘national’ state inhabited by 
‘millions’ of unified, free Tatars” (39-40). In the subsequent Russian and Tsarist periods, and 
especially following the Crimean Tatars’ deportation, the Crimean Khanate was yearned for and 
romanticized as the political expression of a Crimean Tatar national movement and as a 
legitimization of Crimean Tatar claims to the region itself. While Russian and Soviet authorities 
have attempted to disprove their claims, Crimean Tatars still cling to this period as their lost 
glory days.  
 
The Deportation of Crimean Tatars and the Loss of Homeland 
The Crimean Tatars’ mass deportation from Crimea in 1944 remains the single most 
significant event in their national history. Not only did it result in the death of nearly half the 
population of all Crimean Tatars (Williams, 1997, 238), but it removed them from the homeland 
around which their entire sense of national identity revolved. The official pretense for this 
decision – as ordered by Stalin – was the accusation that the Crimean Tatars had collectively 
acted as traitors to the Soviet Union by collaborating with the Germans during their occupation 
of Crimea and the charge that they must be collectively punished for these treasons.  
Crimean Tatars of course remember the occupation differently and vehemently deny the 
accusation that they acted collectively against the Soviet Union. As Jemilev5 explains, most 
Crimean Tatars at that time “viewed the ‘Great Patriotic War’ as no more than a skirmish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 While Jemilev is the Russified version of his name, he has published using the Tatarized Cemiloglu.  
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between two villains, neither of which promised any kindness or relief” (Cemiloglu, 1995, 93). 
In this view, many Crimean Tatars simply acted in their own best interests during the war, siding 
with whichever side appeared most tolerable, which inevitably meant that “[d]oubtless, some 
Crimean Tatars who were not sufficiently informed about the essence of German fascism 
entertained hopes, for a time, of deliverance from the hated Bolshevik regime which had 
succeeded in bringing so much suffering to their people within a short period of time” 
(Cemiloglu, 1995, 92).  
Largely ignored by Soviet sources but touted by Crimean Tatars is the fact that great 
numbers of Crimean Tatars fought and died defending the Soviet Union during the war. One 
source (Bugai, 1992) argues that as many as 20,000 Crimean Tatars served in the Soviet military 
during the war, a number equivalent to approximately 10% of the entire Crimean Tatar 
population at that time (131, cited in Uehling, 2004, 52). Furthermore, among the Crimean 
Tatars who served in the war, six were decorated with the highly prestigious title of “Hero of the 
Soviet Union,” a very high number considering they made up a very small percentage of the 
entire Soviet Army (Uehling, 2004, 53). One prominent Crimean Tatar to receive this honor was 
Amet Khan Sultan, a fighter pilot who earned the title of “hero” for completing over 500 flights 
and destroying over 20 enemy planes (53), and who is now a beloved figure among Crimean 
Tatars. Moreover, some have pointed out that scores of Crimean Tatars fought alongside 
Russians and Ukrainians in the Crimean partisan (guerilla) armies against the Germans during 
their occupation of Crimea. While Soviet and Russian historical accounts of the war have 
emphasized their supposed treason, Crimean Tatars choose to emphasize their contributions to 
the Soviet war effort and the patriotism that they displayed. In Jemilev’s words, “with the 
exception of an insignificant number of ‘traitors to their people,’ almost all Crimean Tatars 
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remained faithful to the ‘Soviet motherland’ and the Communist Party during the years of 
occupation and bravely fought against the Nazis on the fronts and in partisan groups” 
(Cemiloglu, 1995, 92). 
Crimean Tatars now understand the deportation as a Soviet attempt to deny them their 
national identity by denying them their national territory, and to erase any notion of a distinct 
Crimean Tatar nationality from the pages of history. Virtually the entire Crimean Tatar 
community in exile during the remainder of the Soviet period denied the allegations for which 
they have suffered and demonstrated their contributions to the war effort, but most importantly 
they came to fight for the right to return to their native Crimea. Narratives of loss and longing 
caused by the deportation from Crimea have come to dominate the Crimean Tatar national 
movement since 1944 (Uehling, 2004). 
 
Keeping the Memory of Crimea while in Exile 
Throughout their period of exile the territory of Crimea itself remained the central focus 
of the Crimean Tatars’ culture and social lives and political activism. The phrase “homeland or 
death” became a common slogan during their decades-long campaign for the right to return to 
Crimea (Uehling, 2004, 200). In the words of one Crimean Tatar recalling the period of exile in 
Central Asia, “not a single action, great or small, took place during visits to houses among 
friends and acquaintances, during the entire deportation period, without recollections of the 
Crimea, of the land on which our parents, grandfathers and great grandfathers lived and worked” 
(Finogeev et al., 1994, 15, 19 [quoted in Williams, 2004, 38]). Another Crimean Tatar who lived 
through the period of deportation explains that “every Crimean Tatar child had it drummed into 
his head that he had a homeland … Most children say ‘mama’ or ‘papa’ as their first word. Our 
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children said ‘Krym’ [Crimea]” (Popeski, 1994). A number of Crimean Tatars attempted to 
simply move back to Crimea once they were allowed to move about the Soviet Union in 1967, 
but the vast majority of them were quickly expelled as this freedom of movement implicitly 
excluded Crimea (Uehling, 2004, 208). Though Crimean Tatars were permitted to live anywhere 
in the Soviet Union except Crimea, a large number chose to settle in the regions just north and 
east of the peninsula either after being re-deported from Crimea or “having moved there 
deliberately, positioning themselves to repatriate at the first opportunity” (208). 
More than in any other period in their history, during the period of exile the Crimean 
Tatars’ connection to the territory of Crimea became the single most salient and galvanizing 
component of their national identity. Rather than completely assimilating ethnically and 
culturally into their surrounding communities the Crimean Tatars clung tenaciously to their own 
“Crimean Tatarness.” Because they typically shared many cultural, linguistic, and culinary traits 
with the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Siberia among whom they had been placed, the most 
important aspect of their national identity remained their attachment to and memories of their 
Crimean homeland. Through tight-knit networks of family and friends the memory of Crimea 
was kept alive and passed along to younger generations of Crimean Tatars who had never even 
seen Crimea for themselves, creating a trans-generational narrative of homeland and of the 
injustice they suffered by being removed from it. Unlike other groups who had been settled in 
Soviet Central Asia and quickly acculturated, such as the Uyghurs and Koreans (Williams, 1997, 
244), the Crimean Tatars remained steadfast in their assertion that they belonged only in Crimea 
and refused to give up their crusade to return to their homeland. 
The Crimean Tatar national movement remained non-violent throughout this period, 
although there were a number of well-documented cases of self-immolation by its members. One 
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famous instance happened in 1978 when 47-year-old Musa Mahmud, who had illegally returned 
to Crimea along with his family, set himself on fire when approached by police officers 
attempting to have him arrested and expelled from Crimea, making him an instant martyr of the 
Crimean Tatar national movement (Uehling, 2004, 169-170). It was during this time that the 
Crimean Tatars’ most influential political leader, Mustafa Jemilev, first rose to prominence for 
his activism, for which he spent years in prison. The Kremlin finally conceded the Crimean 
Tatars’ demands in late 1989 during the period of reforms under glasnost, officially allowed 
them to return to Crimea for the first time since their deportation 45 years earlier (Uehling, 
2004). Crimean Tatars rejoiced, and thousands began flocking to their long-lost homeland.  
 
Rebuilding and Reestablishing Their Lives in Crimea 
Despite the harassment, discrimination, and lack of resources waiting for them upon 
returning to Crimea, the draw of homeland proved too strong as scores of Crimean Tatars chose 
to return to Crimea. By the mid-1990s, nearly 250,000 out of their total population of 
approximately 500,000 had already arrived (Williams, 2004, 40). From the very beginning of 
this period of repatriation Crimean Tatars were extremely well-mobilized and organized both 
socially and politically. It was typical for entire villages, collective farms, or extended familial 
networks to migrate in convoys from Central Asia to Crimea, where others who had already 
arrived were waiting to help place them into temporary settlements (Williams, 2001, 440). Under 
the leadership of Mustafa Jemilev the Crimean Tatar parliamentary assembly known as the 
Mejlis was founded in 1991, comprised of representatives elected from various Crimean Tatar 
settlements around the peninsula. Through their assemblies, known as Qurultays, members have 
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shaped the Crimean Tatar national agenda moving forward after returning to Crimea. According 
to their website,:  
The main goal of Mejlis is [the] elimination of the consequences of the genocide, 
committed by the Soviet state against Crimean Tatars, restoration of the national 
and political rights of the Crimean Tatar people and implementation of its right to 
free national self-determination in its national territory. (“General information 
about Mejlis,” 2011) 
The Mejlis along with other informal organizations proved vital in asserting Crimean Tatars’ 
rights in Crimea by mobilizing protests and campaigns against violence and harassment suffered 
at the hands of local police, government officials, and mafia groups during the early 1990s 
(Williams, 2004, 442). 
 The Crimean Tatars returned to find their former homes and land occupied by Russians 
and Ukrainians, and were faced with few options for housing. They quickly began a campaign of 
samozakhvat’ (self-seizure) of unused lands belonging to the state, typically on communal farms 
(kolkhozy). Entire neighborhoods of squatters quickly sprang up in the outskirts of cities and 
larger towns with homes made from crude building material and constructed quickly in order to 
lay claim to the territory. These squatter districts have sprawled and become integrated into the 
transportation infrastructures of many of Crimean’s larger cities, however few of these roads are 
paved even today and can become extremely muddy and difficult to navigate in the winter. As of 
1999 only 20% of the 290 such Crimean Tatar settlements in Crimea were supplied with 
electricity, 30% with running water, and 4% with gas, while none of them had a sewer system 
(Uehling, 2004, 44).  
 86 
Because the extremely powerful attachment to Crimea as their one true homeland had 
persevered through their period of exile and become the driving force behind their national 
movement, returning to Crimea at any cost became the goal of so many Crimean Tatars despite 
the difficulties that they would encounter. Williams (2001) recalls a common mantra used in the 
Crimean Tatar National Movement: “the Crimean Tatars have only one homeland, the Crimea, 
and, unlike other nationalities, they have nowhere else to emigrate to avoid endless 
discrimination and violence” (447). This belief is exemplified in the following report by Kaplan 
(1992), after speaking with newly arrived Crimean Tatar repatriates: 
Saniye, now 65, and her husband, Seidjalil Asanov, 71, left behind a six-room 
house in Tajikistan. "There was a garden, an orchard with grapes and figs, an aisle 
of flowers -- it was so beautiful," she recalled. Now they live in a flimsy shack 
made of sheet metal, burlap and wood, surrounded by dust, mud and weeds. They 
couldn't be happier. "We're living in our motherland," she beamed. (1) 
Since their return the Crimean Tatars have asserted that they are not merely a minority group of 
Crimea, but are in fact the region’s true indigenous people and are therefore entitled to the rights 
afforded to indigenous people according to the United Nations (Williams, 2001, 445). This claim 
has been supported by the Ukrainian government, which recognized the Crimean Tatars as an 
indigenous people in 1996. Along with their affirmation of indigenous status, the Crimean Tatars 
continue to strive for equality and improvement of the quality of their lives in Crimea. The fact 
that they have been able to return to their homeland after nearly a half century of exile and to 
reestablish their roots in their native soil has been a tremendous victory for them. Their 
connection to the territory of Crimea remains paramount to Crimean Tatar identity as it is, in 
their view, the only thing that distinguishes them from other groups in Crimea or elsewhere. 
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Islam in Modern Crimean Tatar National Narratives 
Whereas Islam had once been the primary marking of identity for Crimean Tatars, their 
current national identity has been couched primarily in more secular discourses of ethnicity and 
homeland. Islam does remain an important component of Crimean Tatar life, however, and there 
has been a large-scale revival and rediscovery of Islam among Crimean Tatars since the collapse 
of the Soviet regime and its restrictions on religious practice. Muratova (2009) proclaims that 
“clearly, Islam is one of the most important factors of ethnic self-identification of Crimean 
Tatars” (4). Furthermore, Crimean Tatars are engaged in many ongoing disputes with Crimean 
political and religious figures over the siting and construction of mosques throughout the region.  
Regardless of a revival in Islamic belief and practice among Crimean Tatars, their 
concept of homeland appears to be largely detached from their religious identity. Williams 
(2004) notes that “for the newly-repatriated Crimean Tatars, the Crimea is defined in purely 
secular terms that combine Western nationalism with a uniquely Soviet version of territoriality” 
(41). Muratova’s (2008) argument that the Mejlis – a secular political organization – has had a 
“significant influence” (193) on the development of Islamic revival in Crimea further supports 
Williams’ assertions. While Islam is certainly a vital component of Crimean Tatar identity, the 
Crimean Tatar National Movement should not be understood as a religious one. 
For Crimean Tatars, Crimea clearly has a very special significance. They believe that 
unlike the region’s Russians, Ukrainians, and other small minority groups, only Crimean Tatars 
can claim Crimea as their own. It is from Crimea that they have originated, from which they 
were forcibly removed, to which they fought and struggled to return, and in which they can once 
again feel at peace. The territory of Crimea is in every sense intrinsic to Crimean Tatar identity, 
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for to be a Crimean Tatar is to be from Crimea. Even those who were born and raised in exile, 
never having set foot in Crimea, were raised with the narratives and memories of Crimea that 
taught them to cherish it, yearn for it, and fight to return to it. Uehling (2004) gives an example 
of the spiritual connection that Crimean Tatars felt with their homeland while in exile: 
Some members of the second generation had a metaphysical theory that the 
molecules of the Crimean fruits and vegetables their parents ate became part of 
their bodies. Those molecules, composed of atoms, then exerted a magnetic pull. 
This was their metaphysical explanation for how the second and third generations 
of Crimean Tatars were not only figuratively, but literally drawn back to the 
peninsula. (115) 
While members of other nationalities living in Crimea certainly do maintain a strong connection 
to the region, only the Crimean Tatars, as a national group, feel they have the right to claim it as 
their own. 
	  
The Russian/Soviet Narrative 
Unlike the Crimean Tatars, Russians can make no reasonable claims of indigeneity in 
Crimea. Crimean Tatars first coalesced as a singular national group within the Crimean peninsula 
while the presence of ethnic Russians there today is wholly the result of the annexation, 
colonization, and settlement of Crimea by the Russian state beginning in the late 18th century. 
Despite the fact that the Russian epoch of Crimea is a relatively recent development in the 
region’s long and diverse history, Russian national narratives speak of Crimea’s deep Slavic and 
Orthodox roots that place it squarely within Russia’s orbit for millennia. This historical 
interpretation has been common since the era of Catherine the Great and the Russian conquest of 
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Crimea, when it was used to bolster the Empress’s imperialist claims to the region. Since then, 
Crimea has become thoroughly Russified both culturally and demographically. More 
importantly, however, Crimea has achieved an almost mythical preeminence within the Russian 
popular imagination as constructed through tales of its heroic role in major international 
conflicts; through the collective memories of the millions who spent their summers vacationing 
on its shores and in its mountains; through narrative of loss following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the territorial exclusion of Crimea from the Russian Federation; and through the post-
Soviet struggle with Ukraine over Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet and their symbolic 
meaning for Russians both within and outside of Crimea. 
 
Constructing Crimea’s Early Slavic and Orthodox Heritage  
The first Russian claims to Crimea were tied to its colonization by Ancient Greeks 
beginning as early as the 7th century BC (Kozelsky, 2010). Such claims emerged during the 
period of Enlightenment in the 18th century when the popularity of Greek culture was 
experiencing a renaissance among the European elite. Engaging with this trend, many within the 
Russian aristocracy began actively linking Russian culture and civilization via Byzantine 
Orthodoxy to ancient Greece and thus to the very hearth of Western civilization. Crimea’s Greek 
heritage and the desire to incorporate it into Russia’s cultural lineage served as a driving 
ideological force behind early Russian claims to the Crimean Peninsula. 
The fact that all of Russian Orthodoxy began in Crimea – when Prince Vladimir of 
Kievan Rus was baptized in Chersoneses in 988 – in many ways became the lynchpin of Russia’s 
imperial claim to the peninsula and the northern Black Sea littoral (Kozelsky, 2010). As a 
distinct brand of religious nationalism began to predominate in Russia under Catherine the Great, 
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Chersoneses’ and Crimea’s significance in Russian history became a critical narrative in the era 
of Russian imperialism (Kozelsky, 49). As Schonle (2001) suggests, Catherine and those close to 
her believed that given Chersoneses’ legacy as the birthplace of Russian Orthodoxy, “restoring 
Christian rule over the Tauric region … would confer a fitting closure to historical evolution” 
(2).  
Kozelsky (2010) argues that the legend of Prince Vladimir’s reception of Orthodox 
Christianity at Chersoneses conveniently appealed to proponents of two distinct brands of 
philhellenism within the Russian aristocracy of the late 18th century that helped build support for 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. To Graecophiles in the Western European model of the 
Enlightenment – for whom ancient Greece represented the very pinnacle of democracy, artistic 
expression, scientific achievement, and sophistication to which they aspired – absorbing Crimea 
and its Hellenistic roots into the empire helped reify the genealogical bond between Russian and 
Greek civilization that they wished to promote (Kozelsky, 2010, 43, 45). To adherents of the so-
called “phil-Orthodox” movement – who looked to the Byzantine period of Greek history and the 
birth of Eastern Orthodoxy as the true forbearer of Russian civilization – Crimea, as the very 
grounds upon which Orthodoxy was first transmitted into eastern Slavdom, was considered 
sacred territory.  
Throughout the 19th century the Russian fascination with Crimea’s Greek and Christian 
roots only intensified. Much of the interest in further bolstering the link between Russian and 
Greek/Byzantine civilizations was driven by a growing interest in archaeology among the 
Russian intelligentsia. The Odessa Society for History and Antiquities – a “hodge-podge 
collection of archaeologists, amateur historians, ethnographers, and philologists” founded in 
1839 (Kozelsky, 50) – sponsored numerous excavations and ethnographic studies in Crimea over 
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the course of the next several decades. Meanwhile, the Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of 
Moscow Macarius I published his book The History of Christianity in Russia before Prince 
Vladimir, as an Introduction to the History of the Church in 1846, in which Crimea was featured 
prominently. The work focuses heavily upon Crimea’s early Scythian occupiers, whom Macarius 
identifies as Russia’s proto-Slavic ancestors and to whom he claims the Apostle St. Andrew had 
proselytized in the first century AD (55, 56). “In a few deft rhetorical movements,” Kozelsky 
notes, Macarius “gave Russia a first-century Christian pedigree, provided imperialists with a 
claim to [Crimea], further alienated Tatars from their homeland, and eroded Crimea’s Greek 
heritage” (56). 
Driven and enabled both by scholars and religious figures in a period of rising Russian 
nationalism rooted in the Orthodox Church, Kozelsky thus argues that the early Russification of 
Crimea was first and foremost a “Christianization” of the region through historical re-
interpretation. She suggests that “[i]ntentionally or not, scholars … slowly began to shape 
Crimean history in the image of its Russian conquerors. This Muslim territory acquired a 
Christian past” (51). Moreover, leaning upon Vladimir’s acceptance of Christianity at 
Chersoneses and the supposed evidence of the region’s early exposure to Christianity, Russian 
nationalist narratives identified Crimea as the holy grounds upon which the Russian nation was 
first imbued with Orthodox Christianity. Crimea, as the narrative goes, is thus part and parcel to 
Russian national identity.  
 
The “Sevastopol Myth” 
The “Sevastopol Myth” that was born of the events surrounding the 349-day siege of the 
eponymous city from 1854 to 1855 during the Crimean War became a tool of national 
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propaganda both in the Tsarist and Soviet periods, and would later become further entrenched in 
the Russian and Soviet psyche following the events of World War II when Sevastopol and the 
rest of Crimea came under siege once again. Sevastopol’s wartime exploits and their significance 
for the Russian people and state have become heavily mythologized, creating “some of the 
inmost mental shrines of Russia,” and the feeling among Russians that “Sevastopol can never be 
cut out of Russia” (Ascherson, 1995, 42).  
The valorization and glorification of Sevastopol became important Russian nationalist 
themes in what Smith (1996) refers to as the “territorialization of memory,” through which 
“certain kinds of shared memories are attached to particular territories so that the former become 
ethnic landscapes (or ethnoscapes) and the latter become historic homelands” (453-454). Smith 
argues that “perhaps the most important of the sites of territorialized memory are the various 
fields of battle which [mark] critical turning-points in the fortunes of the community” (454), in 
which case Sevastopol and Crimea have indeed become hallowed ground in Russian nation-
building narratives. 
Despite a defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856), Russian elites and subjects alike 
quickly latched onto the stories of bravery and heroism of the defenders of Sevastopol that, 
despite the losses suffered, they believed demonstrated the Russian spirit of honor and courage. 
The siege was even viewed as something of a minor victory, for if the city had fallen early the 
consequences for Russia might have been much graver. Plokhy (2000) explains that “[t]he 
Russian public at large viewed the siege of Sevastopol as a symbol of the heroism of the Russian 
people, which saved Russia from foreign invasion, despite the inefficiency and corruption of the 
tsarist administration” (375).  
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Epic tales from the battlefield became popularized through such works as Leo Tolstoy’s 
Sevastopol Sketches, which compiled three short stories based upon the author’s experiences as a 
second lieutenant during the siege of the city and which he would later incorporate into his novel 
War and Peace. Tolstoy’s work displayed a certain populism in the celebration of the 
achievements in Sevastopol, “[presenting] the defense of Sevastopol as a story of the suffering, 
sacrifice and heroism of the common people – rank-and-file sailors, soldiers, and civilians” 
(376). According to Plokhy, Sevastopol Sketches retained its popularity well into the Soviet era, 
even remaining a part of school curricula (376). Nearly 60 years after the war, the Siege of 
Sevastopol also became the subject of the first feature film ever produced in the Russian Empire, 
1911’s Defense of Sevastopol. 
By all accounts, the Sevastopol Myth grew as much from a public discourse as it did 
from a state-sponsored campaign. Much of the early commemoration and memorialization of the 
war was initiated by veterans of the defense themselves, who privately raised funds to erect the 
first monuments to the admirals who led during the siege and to establish a Sevastopol military 
museum in St. Petersburg (375). Chief among the figures memorialized was Admiral Pavel 
Nakhimov, who was shot and killed by a sniper towards the end of the siege. The name 
Nakhimov remains synonymous with Russian naval might and glory; the Nakhimov Medal was 
later introduced during the Soviet Era to honor distinction among Soviet sailors and naval 
commanders, and the Nakhimov monument still stands at the center of Sevastopol’s main square 
to this day. 
Following the war, Sevastopol was rebuilt into something of a living monument to the 
defense of the city in a process that Sasse (2007) relates to Anderson’s (1991) notion of 
“museumization” of memory and imagination. Numerous monuments commemorating various 
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achievements and losses suffered during the siege were erected around the city. Among the most 
prominent became the aforementioned Nakhimov monument and the Sunken Ship Monument – 
commemorating the Russian Navy’s sinking of their own ships to block enemy ships from 
entering the bay – which sits atop a rock in Sevastopol Bay and has become the de facto symbol 
of the city. However, the grandest of all the monuments commemorating the Defense of 
Sevastopol is the Panorama of the Great Defense, built in 1905 at one of the city’s highest points 
amidst a memorial park. Adorned around the outside with busts of the defense’s heroes, the 
interior is an enormous life-sized panoramic fusion of mural and tableau depicting the siege and 
defense of Sevastopol in all its tragic glory. Receiving over 40 million visitors since it was first 
erected (Qualls, 2009, 164), the Panorama provides “a vital link in the city’s heritage and 
traditions as a city of glory” (137) and a bold testament to the fact that “the Crimean defense 
became a defining moment for Russian military and political power [and] identification” (165). 
The Sevastopol Myth was revived anew and fundamentally altered when, during the 
German invasion of World War II, the city again fell under siege and became a crucial site of 
Russian – and now Soviet – defense of their homeland. Although Sevastopol’s legendary status 
as a symbol of the country’s strength and glory had long been entrenched in Russian and Soviet 
lore, the events of World War II served to amplify the Sevastopol myth to an unprecedented 
degree. Even before the war had ended, the parallels between the events in Sevastopol during the 
Crimean War and World War II were lost neither on Soviet leadership nor the public. As Qualls 
notes, “[c]onnections between the second great defense (World War II) and the first (Crimean 
War) emerged from the pens of journalists, writers, and military and political officers in the days 
of the siege” (31). Sasse remarks that following World War II, “Sevastopol became a ‘double’ 
myth, a Tsarist and a Soviet one that was unified in the Russian consciousness” (70).  
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In 1945, Sevastopol became one of the first cities to be given the title of “Hero City” for 
its role in the defense of the Motherland during the war, a prestigious distinction that was 
eventually granted only to 13 cities across the Soviet Union, and which later included the eastern 
Crimean city of Kerch as well. Twice decimated in heroic defense of the Russian/Soviet 
Motherland, Sevastopol emerged from World War II as one of the most potent and enduring 
symbols of Soviet national identity.  
In reconstructing the devastated city, both recreating the original monuments to the first 
siege of Sevastopol and erecting new ones to memorialize the second siege became important 
projects. Much of Sevastopol’s original character was recreated and its many monuments to the 
first siege reconstructed. The Panorama, which had been completely leveled during the German 
bombardment and occupation, was meticulously restored to its original state and symbolically 
complemented by the new Diorama Museum. That museum similarly depicted the second 
defense of Sevastopol, although it was constructed at a site just outside of the city. Of course the 
new urban model also reflected its World War II-era tribulations and now includes numerous 
imposing monuments to the second siege of the city. The urban landscape of Sevastopol is now 
punctuated by monuments to the city’s two great moments of triumph in defense of the 
Russian/Soviet Motherland creating a continuity between these events that serves to reify the 
“Sevastopol Myth” and the place the city holds in Russian and Soviet national narratives. 
The Sevastopol Myth has undergone numerous revivals and reinventions since its birth 
over 150 years ago. Sasse aptly summarizes its evolution: 
[T]he siege of Sevastopol originated as an imperial myth of the Russian people, 
was appropriated by the Tsarist state, was revived in its Soviet-Russian variant 
during World War II, and was gradually transformed by the Soviet state back into 
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a myth of the whole “people.” The steady development of the myth over time 
allowed its powerful grip on the Russian imagination to tighten (73). 
The myth has become an important part of post-Soviet Russian nationalist narratives about 
Crimea not only because of the significant role that the city played in the defense of the Russian 
homeland, but also because it conveniently blends two periods of history that each form an 
important piece of these narratives. As Sasse notes, “post-Soviet Russian nationalism has been 
quick to endorse a blend of the imperial Russian and Soviet-Russian myths of Sevastopol in 
order to assert the ‘Russianness” of Crimea” (73).  
The post-World War II reincarnation of the Sevastopol Myth – while labeled a triumph 
for the entire Soviet people during the Soviet period – further legitimized in the eyes of Russian 
nationalists the superiority of the Soviet state with which many still identified. This event 
followed the post-Soviet Russian nationalist trend of reclaiming Soviet-era achievements as 
those of the Russian people since they viewed themselves as the leaders of Soviet society. In this 
way, the Sevastopol myth was incorporated into and made indistinguishable from broader 
narratives about the Crimean wartime experience, making the Sevastopol Myth the “cornerstone 
of all Russian claims to the Crimea and Sevastopol” (Plokhy, 2000, 372).  
 
Sevastopol and the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Post-Soviet Period 
Inseparable from the Sevastopol Myth are the narratives pertaining to the city’s naval 
history and more specifically its hosting of the Black Sea Fleet (Sasse, 2007). Founded as a base 
for Russia’s newly established position of power in the Black Sea region immediately following 
the annexation of Crimea in 1783, Sevastopol has served as one of the most important naval base 
of the tsarist, Soviet, and Russian navies. The fleet itself serves as an active and tangible 
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reminder of the city’s glorious and turbulent history and a powerful symbol of both Sevastopol 
and Crimea’s significance in the Russian national psyche. 
The sense of uncertainty surrounding the future of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, and 
indeed Crimea itself after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 offered new fodder for Russian 
nationalist narratives, and in particular new opportunities to invoke the Sevastopol Myth in 
laying claim to the now-contested region. In many regards Sevastopol became a synecdochical 
symbol for all of Crimea in post-Soviet Russian nationalist narratives, as the majority of the most 
impassioned claims to the region pivoted upon the history and symbolic importance of the city 
for Russia’s past, present, and future. As Sasse (2007) notes, “[i]n Russian and Russian-Soviet 
historiography, Sevastopol had even more salience than Crimea as a whole” (70). Beyond any 
discussion of a Russian spiritual or emotional connection to Crimea, the contested status of the 
Black Sea Fleet and the city of Sevastopol presented Russian nationalists with a real issue of 
urgent geopolitical importance. Thus, the most virulent Russian nationalist rhetoric about Crimea 
focused squarely upon Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet and upon fears of them being lost to 
“Ukrainization” or what was even dubbed by some as the “third siege of Sevastopol” (74). 
Much of the post-Soviet Russian nationalist rhetoric has sought to exploit and further 
obfuscate the seemingly tenuous legal precedents that placed Sevastopol in Ukraine rather than 
the Russian Federation. While many have challenged the legality of the 1954 proceedings over 
the transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR (Fedorov, 1999), others have 
focused specifically on Sevastopol and advocated for its return to Russian control in lieu of the 
entire Crimean Peninsula. Leading the charge of Russian revanchism in Crimea while invoking 
the Sevastopol myth were prominent Russian nationalist politicians such Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 
Gennady Zuyganov, and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov as well as prominent nationalist cultural 
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figures such as author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Luzhkov famously spent a great deal of money 
from the Moscow city budget to support the families of Russian soldiers in Sevastopol by 
building apartment complexes and establishing a “Black Sea” branch of Moscow State 
University in the city (Mochalov, 2007, 214-215). A number of Russian social and political 
movements concerned primarily with the status of Sevastopol appeared within Crimea as well, 
including the prominent group Sevastopol’–Krym–Rossiia (Crimea–Sevastopol–Russia), which 
has adopted as one of its slogans the phrase “Crimea is not just the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy, 
but a symbol of the completeness of Russia itself!” (“Narodny Front,” 2007). Expressions of 
Sevastopol and Crimea’s intrinsically Russian character permeate popular and literary culture, as 
exemplified by the following poem by Liudmila Gusel’nikova: 
We know what they won’t speak 
In circles large or small 
As it has emerged historically 
That Sevastopol is a Russian city 
(Quoted in Mochalov, 2007, 215) 
 The Black Sea Fleet has served a double purpose in galvanizing Russian national 
narratives around Sevastopol and Crimea in the post-Soviet era. On the one hand, it has given the 
Russian state a strategically important toehold in Crimea; the naval facilities in Sevastopol 
remain the only territory in Crimea over which the Russian Federation retains sovereignty, and 
the navy’s continuing presence in Crimea means that Russia has been able to maintain an active 
role in regional political discourses. On the other hand, to Russian nationalists and those who 
identify strongly with the Russian state, the Black Sea Fleet is a powerful living symbol of 
Russian and Soviet military strength and national pride, and of the heroic sacrifices made in 
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Sevastopol and Crimea in defense of the motherland on multiple occasions. For both those in the 
Russian Federation and many ethnic Russians living in Crimea, the fact that a region so deeply 
embedded within the Russian national psyche – and crucial to the continuing security of the 
Russian state – is no longer Russian sovereign territory has proven one of the most difficult pills 
to swallow following the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
 
Crimea in Soviet Nostalgia 
A phenomenon seen across the former Soviet Union in general and among Russians in 
particular in the post-Soviet era has been a powerful feeling of nostalgia for the Soviet period. 
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union and the social, economic, and political transitions 
experienced in the former Soviet republics have brought some positive changes, many still long 
for the stability, security, and way of life they associate with the Soviet regime, even among 
younger generations with little or no first-hand experience of Soviet life (Nikolayenko, 2008). 
Among Russians in particular, the feeling of nostalgia for the Soviet Union is not derived only 
from a sense of loss of their culture or way of life, but often of territory that they consider part of 
their homeland as well whether or not they identified strongly with Soviet political or economic 
ideology. In the post-Soviet context, Kolstø (2000) notes that “[e]ven if the Soviet Union was 
gone, identification with the former state entity remained strong among much of the Russian 
populace” (203).  
Of the many ways this sense of territorial loss has been expressed and entrenched in 
national discourses is through Russian popular cultural narratives, as best exemplified in the song 
“Made in the USSR” by popular Russian rock musician Oleg Gazmanov. The song is a bold 
proclamation of identification with Soviet society expressed through a laundry list of its 
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achievements and cultural benchmarks, but it is also a lament for all that was perceived to have 
been lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union, not least of which was the Soviet territory itself. In 
the opening lines of the song, Gazmanov (2005) declares: 
 
Ukraine and Crimea, Belarus and Moldova – This is my country! 
Sakhalin and Kamchatka, the Ural Mountains – This is my country! 
Krasnodar Krai, Siberia, and the Volga Region; 
Kazakhstan and the Caucasus and the Baltic Region too; 
I was born in the Soviet Union! I was made in the USSR! 
It is telling that Crimea features so prominently among this list of places that together comprise 
the “lost” Soviet homeland – and that it is listed separately from the rest of Ukraine. Crimea 
indeed figures quite prominently among the places and regions of the Soviet Union that were 
particularly salient in the production of Soviet popular cultural narratives. Crimea holds a 
preeminent place in the hearts and minds of people from across the post-Soviet space chiefly 
because of its status as the vacation destination of choice and thus as an important geographic 
location in the selective memorialization and production of narratives related to the happiness 
and quality of life afforded under the Soviet regime. Hence, for many Russians both in the 
Russian Federation and in Crimea who closely associate Russian national identity with their 
Soviet pasts, the fact that Crimea is no longer a part of Russian/Soviet sovereign territory is 
doubly emblematic of nostalgia for the Soviet Union; it represents a loss both culturally and 
territorially. For this reason, Russia’s loss of Crimea has proven to be one of the more difficult 
consequences of the Soviet collapse for many Russians to accept.  
For many within Russia who identified strongly with the Soviet territory as their 
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homeland, the loss of Crimea more so than any other territory has been perceived in a way 
comparable to the severing of a vital appendage. Zorin (1998, 123) ruminates that 
Among the most sudden and unpredictable phenomena of the past years 
[following the Soviet collapse], we must include the relative ease with which a 
large portion of the [Russian] population has accepted the break up of the empire. 
However, in the long list of regions that have fallen away, it would seem the loss 
of one in particular continues to strike a raw nerve in our social consciousness. 
Without a doubt, it is clear to everyone that the region in question is Crimea. 
The break up of the Soviet Union and the inclusion of Crimea in an independent Ukrainian state 
has had virtually no adverse effect on the region’s accessibility or popularity among Russians as 
a tourist destination. However, many of those in Russia who feel a nostalgic attachment to their 
Soviet pasts still see the separation of Crimea from Russia as powerfully symbolic of the loss of 
their former way of life. 
Accordingly, Soviet nostalgia plays an important role in nationalist narratives among 
Russians in Crimea itself. For those in Crimea who identify weakly with the Ukrainian state and 
resent its exclusion from the Russian Federation, the Soviet period represents a time when 
Crimea was still united with the broader Russian/Soviet homeland within a single territory even 
after 1954, when Crimea was attached administratively to the Ukrainian SSR. Soviet nostalgia 
has been expressed in Crimean public discourses through numerous media, including the 
publication of regional magazines and book series that discuss Crimean history and culture form 
an unabashedly Russo- and Soviet-centric perspective. One example is the magazine Ostrov 
Krym (The Island of Crimea), a short-lived magazine published in Crimea in 1999 devoted 
primarily to regional political and social commentary and which regularly featured articles and 
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photographs related to Crimean popular history from the Russian and Soviet eras.  
Although Soviet nostalgia has grown in popularity throughout the post-Soviet space, it 
holds a particularly significant place in Russian narratives about Crimea. Many Russians in 
Crimea look to the Soviet period as a time when they felt included within their broader national 
homeland and before they felt that their language and culture were threatened by a state with 
which they weakly identified. Despite the problems experienced under the Soviet regime, it 
represents a simpler period of stability and certainty for which many now yearn. Because of its 
role as the Soviet vacation destination of choice, Crimea figures prominently in broader Russian 
narratives of Soviet nostalgia as well. In this way, nostalgia drives Russian Crimean narratives 
both internally and externally.  
Russian nationalist narratives about Crimea incorporate deep religious, nationalistic, and 
cultural elements that portray the region as inseparable both from Russian national territory and 
from the Russian national psyche. While it is true that Crimea has a large ethnic and 
linguistically Russian population and therefore represents a portion of the Russian nation 
“severed” from its eponymous nation-state, Russians in Crimea account for a very small portion 
of the total Russian diaspora community in Ukraine, let alone all the post-Soviet republics. Thus, 
narratives related to Crimea go beyond broad Russian nationalist/revanchist narratives 
concerning the ethnic Russian enclaves “beached” outside of the Russian Federation. To those 
whose national identity is Russian or Soviet, Crimea represents the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy, 
the heroism demonstrated by their compatriots in two major conflicts, and the mythical memory 
of happier times experienced in the Soviet period. Crimea’s Russian character, according to these 
narratives, is not simply due to its large ethnic Russian population; Crimea is deeply entrenched 
in Russian history, mythology, legend, culture, and national identity. 
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The Ukrainian Narrative 
As Jaworsky (1995) notes, “[i]n historical terms, Crimea does not have the same 
symbolic importance for Ukraine that it has for Russia” (138). Because Crimea’s historical and 
cultural connections with Ukraine have been more difficult to establish and mythologize than 
those with Russia and the Crimean Tatars, Ukrainian narratives about Crimea and its importance 
to the Ukrainian state have been couched more within the post-Soviet context and 
institutionalized through national and state rhetoric. Despite (or maybe because of) the ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic, and demographic differences between it and the rest of Ukraine, Crimea has 
become an important symbol and cause of Ukrainian nationalism in its struggle to assert 
Ukraine’s political and cultural sovereignty and territorial integrity in the shadow of Russian 
regional hegemony and potential revanchism. While much of eastern and southern Ukraine is 
Russian-speaking and seen as susceptible to potentially destabilizing influences from Russia, 
Crimea is viewed as the most vulnerable region due to its legacy as a place of great historical and 
cultural significance for Russia, its short-lived experience of political integration with Ukraine, 
its ethnic Russian majority, and the fact that Russia still maintains a powerfully tangible and 
symbolic presence in the region with its Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian narratives have thus stressed 
the importance of Crimea in terms of its meaning to the stability and legitimacy of the Ukrainian 
state as it struggles to shake its Soviet, Russian-dominated past. 
 
Institutionalizing Crimea’s Place in the Ukrainian State 
One need look no further than to the Ukrainian constitution to see the extent to which 
Crimea has been rhetorically enshrined within state doctrine as a crucial region while also 
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reflecting the concern for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As the only autonomous 
territory in Ukraine, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is also the only region to which an 
entire chapter of the state constitution is devoted. The chapter outlines the division of power 
between Kyiv and Simferopol and the autonomous republic’s place within the larger federal 
structure of the state. The first article of the chapter states that “[t]he Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea shall be an integral constituent part of Ukraine and shall resolve issues relegated to its 
authority within the frame of its reference, determined by the Constitution of Ukraine” 
(Constitution of Ukraine, Ch. 10, Art. 134). This statement also appears verbatim at the 
beginning of the first article of the first chapter of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea itself. Both constitutions are the products of a long and arduous process of bargaining 
and conciliation between Kyiv and Simferopol during the 1990s through which the current 
balance of power was struck (Sasse, 2007). The assertive language used in both constitutions to 
establish and institutionalize the place of Crimea within Ukraine perfectly embodies Ukrainian 
national narratives about the state’s territorial integrity vis-à-vis Crimea.  
This process of carefully establishing the place of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
within the Ukrainian state polity is reflective of the broader idea that Ukraine must be treated as 
a “state of regions,” which has been pervasive since independence. Although more nationalist 
groups have rejected the regionalist approach to state-building in favor of more universalizing 
and centralizing tactics, the fact that Crimea did not devolve into ethnic or separatist violence in 
the 1990s as many at the time had predicted is a testament to the success of more measured 
approaches to statecraft that recognize the need to accommodate regional differences and which 
have characterized Ukrainian mainstream politics since independence. Sasse (2007) notes, 
however, that regional accommodation has not translated to outright federalism for Ukraine, as 
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the strengthening of a unitary state has been the most important political goal at least since the 
1990s (25). Because of its unique circumstances, Ukrainian political leaders recognized early 
that Crimea was a special case among Ukraine’s regions and that certain accommodations 
needed to be made to promote political stability in Ukraine. Specifically on the importance of 
Crimea’s autonomy for Ukrainian state stability, Sasse suggests that “it is not the inherent power 
of the Crimean autonomy per se that has been stabilizing, but the process of deliberation by 
which the autonomy was created” (33). 
Many of the more nationalist Ukrainian political parties such as Svoboda have advocated 
for the abolition of Crimea’s autonomous status, while more radically pro-Russian parties’ 
platforms have called for everything from greater autonomy in Crimea to the complete 
reunification of Crimea, eastern Ukraine, or all of Ukraine with Russia. Yet Ukrainian politics 
have been dominated by parties that support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while 
recognizing its regional differences including the currently-ruling and aptly-named Party of the 
Regions. It should be noted, however, that many Ukrainians view the Party of the Regions and 
its leader – Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich – as being too acquiescent towards both 
Russia and ethnic Russians in Ukraine and negligent of the demands of ethnic Ukrainians. These 
accusations are best exemplified by the highly controversial 2012 law establishing the official 
use of Russian and other minority languages of Ukraine in regions where speakers constitute at 
least 10% of the population. Nevertheless, as this recent law demonstrates, the Party of the 
Regions continues in the general tradition of successful Ukrainian political parties that have 
acknowledged Ukraine’s inherently “regional” character. 
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Celebrating Ukraine as a “State of Regions” 
An important example of how a regionalist understanding of Ukraine – and the 
importance of reigning in its regions – has been institutionalized is the state holiday known as 
Day of Sobornost’. “Sobornost’” is a word in both Russian and Ukrainian that has no real direct 
translation in English, but which implies unification and collaboration of individuals for the sake 
of a common goal at the expense of the individual. Celebrated on January 22, the holiday was 
officially established in 1999 to commemorate the 1919 unification of the short-lived Ukrainian 
Peoples Republic and the Western-Ukrainian Peoples Republic in the midst of the Russian Civil 
War. Day of Sobornost’ is a celebration of Ukraine as a country cobbled from separate regions to 
form something greater than the sum of its parts. Although Crimea was never a part of the 
territorial unification that the holiday commemorates, it stands today as a crucial component of 
Ukraine’s modern-day project of “Sobornost’.” As Sasse (2007) comments, “Crimea [has been] 
Ukraine’s most immediate and most serious center-periphery challenge” (2).  
In his address to the people of Ukraine commemorating the Day of Sobornost’ in 2012, 
President Yanukovich exemplified the rhetoric of regional unity in Ukrainian national narratives:  
Our combined efforts and our devotion to the great goal of building a strong 
Ukraine are guarantors of the fact that a unified (sobornaia) independent Ukraine 
will forever belong to the circle of the world’s developed, advanced, and powerful 
states. (“Yanukovich pozdravil…”, 2012)  
Similarly, Anatoliy Mogilev, a representative of the Soviet of Ministers of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea, commented during the 2012 celebration of the Day of Sobornost’ in 
Simferopol that  
on the coat of arms of Crimea are written the truthful words, “prosperity is in 
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unity.” When all are united we see a prosperous region and state, therefore we 
need to make every effort to make Ukraine into one large developed state. (“V 
Krymu po sluchayu…”, 2012) 
Such comments highlight the role of Crimea in Ukrainian state-building projects such as the Day 
of Sobornost’ and the important role Crimea’s autonomy has played in facilitating Ukrainian 
state stability through regional compromises. Mal’gin (2005) further notes the symbolism in the 
fact that Day of Sobornost’ falls just two days after the anniversary of the 1991 referendum to 
reestablish Crimea’s autonomy. 
Crimea has been so crucial to Ukrainian state-building processes as expressed through the 
idea of regional sobornost’ precisely because it has posed the greatest potential threat to 
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the post-Soviet political disarray of the 1990s – 
with Crimean separatist groups threatening to consolidate power and Russia breathing down 
Ukraine’s neck as it struggled to come to terms with the loss of Ukraine and Crimea in particular 
– effective diplomacy was required on the part of Ukraine if it hoped to avoid conflict while 
retaining the territory with which the Soviet Union had endowed it. Thus, narratives of Ukraine’s 
regionally-diverse character have emerged mostly in response to the threat of conflict, instability, 
and violation of territorial integrity that Crimea posed after independence. In this way, Crimea 
has played a central role in the successful Ukrainian national rhetorical strategy of defining 
Ukraine as a “state of regions.”  
Furthermore, such diplomatic approaches towards Crimea and its unique circumstances 
have been crucial in the way Ukraine has addressed (and continues to address) the issue of 
Russia’s continued military presence in Crimea, which has been of paramount concern for 
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Jaworsky (1995) notes, “developments in 
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Crimea and the Russian military’s presence there are, first and foremost, perceived as a crucial 
symbol of threats to Ukraine’s territorial integrity” (138). Moreover, because Crimea is so 
heavily militarized, Ukraine immediately recognized the potentially devastating repercussions of 
ethnic or inter-state conflict there. Thus, a regionally-minded approach to state-building that 
takes seriously the need for diplomacy in regards to Crimea and the construction of national 
narratives that place Crimea within a broader Ukrainian “state of nations” has been crucial both 
for protecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and averting potentially disastrous conflict. 
In lieu of a cultural, linguistic, or demographic argument, Ukrainian narratives have 
highlighted Crimea’s vital importance to Ukraine as a “state of regions,” acknowledging 
Crimea’s unique circumstances and treating it accordingly, yet doing so as a tactic of 
ameliorating potentially destabilizing elements in the region and ultimately asserting state 
sovereignty in the region and Ukraine’s territorial integrity at large. While they may have weaker 
historical or cultural foundations than Russian or Crimean Tatar claims, Ukrainian national 
narratives have at least been partially responsible for promoting stability in the region and 
successfully navigating the rocky post-Soviet geopolitical landscape despite its many hurdles and 
potential landmines. 
	  
Summary 
Crimea remains situated within and therefore claimed as an integral part of multiple 
overlapping ethno-cultural territorial traditions. Crimean Tatar, Russian, and Ukrainian national 
narratives each construct Crimea within broader cultural, national, and/or political contexts that 
have shaped Crimea’s history and cultural trajectory. Crimean Tatar narratives emphasize the 
role that the territory of Crimea itself has played in their very emergence as an ethnic community 
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and sense of national identity, the hardships that they have suffered in being exiled from their 
national homeland, and the lengths to which they have gone to reclaim it and reestablish their 
presence in Crimea. Russian narratives highlight deep religious and civilizational linkages 
between Russia and Crimea, the mythological role of Sevastopol and the rest of Crimea in 
defending the Russian motherland, and Crimea’s place in Russian nostalgia for Soviet culture 
and territory. Ukrainian narratives focus on the role of Crimea in state-building efforts that 
define Ukraine discursively as a “state of regions” in which Crimea has played a vital role in 
forming and stabilizing the state polity. In this way, meanings of Crimea are as diverse and 
potentially polarizing as the region’s population itself.  
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Chapter V: Data and Methods 
 
 In order to approach empirically the issues regarding national and regional identity at the 
heart of this study, it was important to hear directly from residents of Crimea about their attitudes 
towards Crimea and other territories and about their own sense of national identity. To this end, I 
developed a questionnaire designed to gauge such perceptions and opinions among Crimean 
residents and used it in a survey conducted in Crimea in the summer of 2011. Once data was 
collected from this survey, I employed a number of statistical techniques to interpret and make 
conclusions regarding their meaning. This chapter provides an outline of the structure of this 
questionnaire, the survey and data collection methods used, the statistical analytical methods 
employed, and a discussion of the limitations of the study both in terms of its methodology and 
of my own positionality vis-à-vis the research topic and my research subjects. 
 
Statement of Positionality 
 As a researcher, it is important to acknowledge and declare any personal background, 
experiences, interests, or biases that may influence the treatment of a research topic or the human 
subjects who are its focus. For example, the researcher’s age, gender, class, or ethnic background 
may shape the way he or she views certain groups or issues (Bennett, 2002). Additionally, the 
personal experiences that a researcher may have from previous research, travel, or personal 
interactions may also impact the way in which he or she approach a given issue. Here, I attempt 
to declare any such background or experiences that may have shaped my own views in the 
course of this research project. 
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 My interest in the regions of Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea is not derived from my own 
ethnic heritage as I have no Russian, Ukrainian, or Crimean Tatar ancestry. Thus, I do not feel 
any sense of personal identity with any of the groups at the center of this study that might 
otherwise influence my perspective in an unbalanced way. Regardless of my personal ancestry, I 
am aware that as an American studying social and political issue in a foreign country, I am likely 
perceived as an outsider by my research subjects and that this perception may have influenced 
the way in which my research subjects interacted with me and may ultimately influence the way 
in which they responded in surveys and interviews. Additionally, as a straight, white, middle-
class male, I acknowledge that I may not be sufficiently sensitive to the ways in which 
differences in race/ethnicity, class, gender, and sexuality may have influenced how my research 
subjects engage with me and with the topic of my research. Also, being the age of 25-26 at the 
time of my fieldwork, I am aware that my age may have affected my research subjects’ 
perceptions of me and of my research.  
 I feel I must also comment upon how my personal experiences and academic interests 
may have impacted my research. I have formally studied both the Russian and Ukrainian 
languages, although I have much more experience with Russian and thus feel much more 
comfortable using it than Ukrainian. As such, Russian was the only language that I used both in 
surveys and in interviews. Because Russian is universally used and understood in Crimea, I do 
not feel that my inability to communicate with Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars in either of their 
native languages negatively impacted my relationship to them, nor did it significantly affect their 
responses. Although my background regarding language study is mainly in Russian, I do not 
believe that I harbor any biases towards other ethnic or linguistic groups within the post-Soviet 
region. My interest in studying Russian has been largely pragmatic, as I am interested in the 
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former Soviet Union and Russian is certainly the single most useful language to know in order to 
study this region. I have traveled extensively throughout the former Soviet Union, visiting all 15 
former Soviet republics and interacting with a wide array of ethnic communities, and I have not 
adopted the plight of any specific groups over any other as my own personal cause célèbre. In 
other words, I do not have any specific political agendas that I wish to advance through my 
research.  
 I also acknowledge that in the course of my research and time spent in the region I have 
developed a personal attachment to and appreciation for Crimea. I feel that this situation is only 
to be expected of someone who spends a great deal of time living in a new place and who 
devotes a large amount of his or her time and efforts to learning about it. However, I am aware 
that my own personal relationship with Crimea may predispose me to thinking about it and 
presenting it in certain terms. I have made every attempt to remain unbiased in my presentation 
of Crimea as being a special place and to let the words and actions of others speak for themselves 
in this regard. However, my own personal sympathies for this understanding of Crimea still 
likely color my work. 
 
Structure and Purpose of Survey  
The survey I conducted in Crimea in May, July, and August 2011 (HSCL# 19373) 
included 798 participants (N=798) (see appendix for English version). In order to examine 
variations in responses according to nationality, the participants were divided into four discrete 
ethnic groups according to their responses to the question, “what is your nationality?”: Russians 
(N=384, 48.1%), Ukrainians (N=199, 24.9%), Crimean Tatars (N=137, 17.2%), and Other 
(N=78, 9.8%). These groupings represent the three largest nationalities in Crimea that together 
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account for 95% of the region’s population (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2001), along 
with an “other” category to account for the members of Crimea’s many ethnic minorities who 
also took part in the survey. This group included mainly Armenians, Belarusians, Jews, and those 
who identified as “Russian/Ukrainian,” as they could not be included into discrete Russian or 
Ukrainian categories. Because I chose to limit the focus of this study to Crimea’s three 
predominant ethnic groups, responses from “Other” nationalities were not included in the data 
analysis. In addition to their nationality, survey participants were also asked to provide other 
demographic information including: age; gender; birthplace; current place of residence; number 
of years they have lived in Crimea; other towns they have lived in; native language; nationality 
and native language of their father and mother; and religious affiliation. Because this study 
focuses specifically on the effect of nationality in identity formation, these additional 
demographic data were excluded from the analysis but may prove useful in future studies. 
In addition to collecting this basic demographic information, the questionnaire used in 
this survey was comprised of six sections with each aimed at gauging different aspects of 
participants’ sense of identity and perceptions of Crimea. The first section asked participants to 
rate the importance of various factors for their self-identification, using a Likert scale with 
ratings from 1 (“not important”) to 5 (“very important”). These factors included four territorially-
based factors (“Living in Their Town or Village;” “Living in Crimea;” “Living in Ukraine;” and 
“Living in Europe”), four factors related to culture and/or ethnicity (“Their Soviet Past;” “Their 
Nationality;” “Their Native Language;” and “Their Religious Beliefs”), and an optional “Other” 
factor.  
Another section of the questionnaire also asked participants to use a Likert scale of 1 to 5 
in order to rate how strongly they identify with groups of people living at various territorial 
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scales. These groups were divided according to nationality (“Members of Their Nationality” and 
“Members of All Nationalities”) at each of the following scales: Their Town or Village, Crimea, 
Ukraine, Europe, the Former Soviet Union, and The World. These questions yielded a total of 12 
groups defined by nationality and territorial scale (for example, “Members of Their Nationality 
Living in Crimea,” and “Members of All Nationalities Living in Crimea”). In this section 
participants were informed that their responses must range from “I do not identify myself with 
this group of people in any way” (a rating of “1”) to “I fully identify myself with this group of 
people” (a rating of “5”). The goal of this section of the questionnaire is to gauge whether 
participants’ senses of group identification are determined more by nationality or territory, and at 
which scales territory is most salient for group identification. 
The third section of the questionnaire presented participants with a list of features that 
have commonly been invoked in discussions of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness (see Chapters 
Three and Four) and asked participants to indicate which features they believe define or 
distinguish Crimea. The directions were to place an “x” next to each of the features that they 
chose, and to underline or otherwise indicate a single feature that they believe most defines or 
distinguishes Crimea. There are a total of 17 features (see Chapter Seven), including an optional 
“other” feature with space to write in their own if desired. The purpose of this section is to 
understand participants’ perceptions of Crimea and how their attitudes towards the region are 
shaped by the tropes that are most often used to depict and describe it. 
The fourth section provided participants with a small amount of blank space and asked 
them to write a few words of their choosing (three to five) that characterize Crimea in their 
opinion. Much like the previous section, this exercise is aimed at revealing participants’ 
perceptions of Crimea, although instead of choosing from a list of provided features they are free 
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to describe or characterize Crimea in any way they chose. The goal of this section is to uncover 
common perceptions and/or beliefs about Crimea that participants may not have been able 
express in other sections of the questionnaire. 
The fifth section of the questionnaire asked participants to indicate what they believe 
Crimea’s political status should be. Participants were presented with six options and asked to 
chose only one: “Remain an Autonomous Republic of Crimea;” “Become an Oblast of Ukraine;” 
“Join the Russian Federation as an Autonomous Republic;” “Join the Russian Federation as an 
Oblast;” Become an Independent State;” and “Other.” The purpose of this section is to gauge 
both participants’ identification with the states of Russia and Ukraine and the degree to which 
they believe Crimea should be self-governing.  
The sixth and final section of the questionnaire is a cognitive mapping exercise, in which 
participants were given a blank space, asked to draw a map of their homeland (Rodina), and to 
label on it the three places that they consider to be the most important to them. The purpose of 
this exercise is to uncover participants’ perceptions of their homeland, more specifically to what 
geographical scale and/or ethnic/national space they attribute the term “homeland.” By asking 
participants to label the three most important places on their maps I hope to identify trends in the 
towns and/or features within the space of “homeland” that may help explain the attachment that 
participants feel to this particular territory. Previous studies that have employed this method have 
found that when presented with a cognitive mapping exercise, “it is possible that respondents 
will be challenged to rationalize a situation which previously had lain in a dormant, even 
subliminal state. Indeed, it is probable that some material will be ‘knitted’ together for the first 
time” (Pocock 1976, 493). In this way, cognitive mapping is useful in revealing people’ 
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perceptions of and relationships to space and territory whether or not they had previously been 
cognizant of these specific relationships. 
 
Sampling Methods 
 In order to have a large number of participants in this survey, I primarily employed the 
“snowball sampling” technique (Sheskin, 1985) that relies on networks of connected individuals 
to identify potential participants and to distribute and collect questionnaires throughout a 
population. The “snowball sampling” method has been shown to be an effective way of 
collecting survey data specifically in Russia due to prevailing suspicious attitudes towards 
foreigners and questions related to social and demographic issues (Rivera, Kozyreva, and 
Sarovskii, 2002). Prior to this fieldwork I spent a year in Crimea in 2008-2009 with support from 
a Fulbright Research Grant doing preliminary research on this topic. During that time, I 
developed a large network of friends, acquaintances, and professional contacts that I relied upon 
heavily during my subsequent fieldwork. Through these networks I distributed a large number of 
surveys to participants in various locations around Crimea, and once they were completed they 
were returned to me through these same networks. Participation was limited to adults over the 
age of 18, but beyond this criterion participation from all individuals was welcomed and 
encouraged. 
 A large portion of the questionnaire distribution and re-collection was done with the help 
of a professor of political sciences at Tavrichesky State University in Simferopol, Natalia 
Kiseleva, with whom I had been in contact since my first trip to Crimea. She distributed a large 
number of questionnaires to students from the university who were then asked to take them to 
their homes in various towns and villages around Crimea and to solicit participation from the 
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residents there. A wide variety of locations was chosen in order to represent both urban and rural 
environments, and students were given explicit instructions to sample evenly between males and 
females and within a wide age range. Professor Kiseleva also trained students to obtain verbal 
consent from survey participants before they completed each survey and to inform participants of 
the purpose and source of the study. In all, 555 questionnaires out of the total 798 (roughly 70%) 
were gathered with the help of Professor Kiseleva and these students, and as a result the survey 
reflects a wide range of ages and a broad geographical distribution. However, there are a 
disproportionate number of survey participants from the city of Simferopol (N=401, or just over 
50%) due to the fact that many students lived in Simferopol and because I based my own 
surveying efforts in this city as well.  
 In addition to the questionnaires distributed with the help of Professor Kiseleva and her 
students and those that I distributed through my own network of friends and acquaintances, I also 
gathered a number of completed questionnaires by soliciting participation from individuals on 
the street or on public transportation. This approach is commonly known as the “convenience 
sampling” method and has been shown to be a useful and easy way of selecting survey 
participants (Bradshaw and Stratford, 2000). Often with the assistance of local friends, I took 
several excursions around Simferopol and to small towns and villages nearby in order to find 
individuals who would agree to participate in the survey. Participants were typically chosen from 
people who did not appear busy, such as those waiting at a bus or train station or sitting in a park, 
for example. Approaching people while they are idle in such a way has been shown to be an 
effective surveying technique (Ryan and Huyton, 2000). One additional method of soliciting 
survey participation that I found particularly effective was to approach people while they were 
riding on elektrichkas (commuter trains) between Simferopol and Sevastopol or Evpatoria. These 
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are relatively slow-moving trains that take approximately two hours to reach their destinations, 
and I found that many people were willing and often eager to participate in the survey because 
they were sitting for a long period with little else to do. These elektrichkas are comprised of 
several train cars that are often full and thus provide for a large potential pool of survey 
participants and a sufficient amount of time to approach many of them. Between the “snowball” 
and “convenience” sampling techniques I was able to collect a large number of completed 
questionnaires (N=798) that represents a wide cross-section of the Crimean population. 
 
Statistical Methods 
In order to analyze the results of the survey, I employed two different statistical methods 
suited to the types of data collected. For the two sections in which participants used a Likert 
scale to rate their answers, a method was required that would determine whether a group’s mean 
ratings for one question displayed a statistically significant difference from their mean rating for 
another question and whether or not mean ratings for each question were statistically significant 
between groups as well. In order to make these assessments, the one-way (univariate) Analysis 
of Variance Test (ANOVA) was most useful as it allowed me to determine whether the 
difference in means between any two questions within or between groups is statistically 
significant and therefore indicative of potential real-world differences in attitudes or opinions 
(Stevens, 1992).  
Although one of the general assumptions of an ANOVA test is a normally distributed 
sample, Rutherford (2012) argues that non-normality becomes less of an issue as sample sizes 
grow large (beginning from 12 and above), and that ultimately variations in normality will have 
little effect upon the robustness of an ANOVA test with large sample sizes (245). Thus, I 
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determined that the sample sizes for each of the national groups at the center of this study are 
large enough to not require the assumption of a normal distribution for a robust statistical 
analysis.  
For the remaining four sections of the survey, the type of data collected is considered to 
be nominal that means that a mean score for any one questions would be impossible to calculate. 
An ANOVA test would therefore be ineffectual for testing for statistically significant differences 
within or between groups. In these cases I instead used a Chi-Squared test, which is used to 
determine whether the observed frequency of a given outcome in a binary (in this case, whether 
the answer to a given question was “yes” or “no”) diverges from the expected frequency at a 
magnitude that is statistically significant and therefore reflective of real-world differences. In 
order to determine whether results from a Chi-Squared test are statistically significant, I 
examined the adjusted residuals derived from a comparison of the observed and expected 
frequencies of any given test. According to Haberman (1973), adjusted residuals of 2 or greater 
(or -2 or lower) may be considered to represent a statistically significant difference in the real 
world observation of a given phenomenon. 
 
Limitations of Study 
 Because the focus of this research project is the effect of national identity on Crimean 
regional identity, a number of other factors that may also have an important effect on identity 
dynamics are not taken into consideration. This study does not account for the ways in which 
age, gender, class, or sexuality – or the ways in which they intersect with each other and with 
nationality – may impact the ways in which residents relate to Crimea vis-à-vis other territorial 
structures. As these factors are all crucial components of identity and perspective (Shurmer-
 120 
Smith, 2002), they should all be taken into consideration if a comprehensive understanding of 
identity dynamics is desired. Further studies are needed in order to account for these factors of 
identity as I make no claim to offer a complete picture of identity in Crimea with this study. For 
the purposes of this project and for the sake of brevity, the focus of this study must remain on the 
role of nationality. 
 Furthermore, it must also be acknowledged that the responses of survey participants may 
not accurately represent actual attitudes and beliefs as responses may have been distorted by the 
methods and structure of the survey. Because identities are spatially and temporally contingent, 
the responses given by survey participants likely depend upon when and where they participated 
in the survey. In this way, it is very difficult to assess and generalize accurately about the 
opinions, attitudes, and beliefs of groups independent of the context in which they are expressed.  
Moreover, data collection methods such as the Likert scale and yes/no answers are 
inherently restrictive as they force participants to conform to a set number of possible responses. 
Such approaches cannot account for all the nuances in the ways people act, think, or feel. 
Statistical methods are also innately restrictive in that they seek to generalize about entire 
populations based upon the responses from a very small portion of that population, and therefore 
certain subsections of the population and their voices may be underrepresented. While statistical 
analyses can be incredibly useful and powerful in inducing generalizations, their limitations must 
always be taken into account. I therefore acknowledge that the results of this study may in no 
way be considered definitive, although I maintain that they are useful in helping us better 
understand the patterns and processes of national and regional identity in Crimea. 
 I also acknowledge that the limitations of my Russian language abilities may have 
influenced both the wording and structure of the questionnaire used in the survey, and my ability 
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to carry out interviews. While I am highly functional as a speaker, reader, and writer of Russian, 
I do not consider myself fluent, and thus my choice of words or syntax may have influenced the 
responses I received from survey participants. For example, it was pointed out to me by a 
regional expert who has conducted similar surveys in Crimea that the Russian term I used for 
“self-identity” on the questionnaire (samoidentifikatsiia) may not have been generally 
understood by some survey participants, and that instead the term samoopredelenie would have 
been preferable. While I feel that my Russian language abilities have been more enabling of this 
research than they have been restrictive, I acknowledge that my limitations may have affected 
the outcome. 
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Chapter VI – Crimea and National Conceptions of Homeland 
  
Before we can examine the role of region in national/territorial identity dynamics among 
Crimean residents, we must first understand the ways in which they view and relate to Crimea 
itself. As I have discussed, Crimea is the site of numerous competing narratives through which 
its meaning and significance have been constructed in diverging ways according to different 
national perspectives. Central to these narratives is the idea of homeland. How do members of 
Crimea’s different national groups conceptualize their homeland, and what role does Crimea 
play in their understanding of homeland? In the post-Soviet context the word “homeland” 
(Rodina) implies certain meanings, as Soviet nationality policy guided the establishment of 
territorially-defined “homelands” for dozens of the state’s ethnic minorities embedded within the 
larger territory of the Soviet Union (Kaiser, 1994). Thus, “Rodina” typically connotes territory to 
which a person is bound first and foremost by nationality, insofar as post-Soviet territory has 
been defined according to nationality. However, this narrow understanding of homeland has been 
challenged by some, including Gradirovsky (1999), who conceives of rodina (which also 
translates as “motherland”) as the small region in which a person lives and with which they are 
most familiar, while the broader national territory with which they identify is more appropriately 
defined as otechestvo (Fatherland). 
 Given that competing senses of national territory overlap and converge in Crimea, how 
does nationality influence conceptions of homeland among its residents? Do various national 
groups view Crimea alone as their homeland or simply as part of a larger homeland? In 
particular, how might Russian perceptions of homeland vis-à-vis Crimea be articulated with the 
term “Crimean-Russian” identity? This chapter addresses these questions by discussing results 
from an exercise in which survey participants express their views of homeland with a cognitive 
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mapping exercise. This exercise helps us understand how identities in Crimea are tied to 
territory, and more specifically the extent to which Crimea itself figures into perceptions of 
homeland. 
 
Cognitive Maps of Homeland  
 In this section of the survey that I conducted in Crimea, participants were asked to draw a 
map of their “homeland” (Rodina), and to mark the three places on it that are most important to 
them. Because territorial identity is strongly associated with the notion of homeland, especially 
within the post-Soviet context (Kaiser, 1994), determining which geographic scales participants 
most closely associate with the term “homeland” and specifically what places they most identify 
with is crucial to understanding spatial components of identity. Free-form cognitive mapping is 
an exercise that allows people to express different aspects of their spatial awareness without 
restrictions or limitations, and is useful in examining the relationships that people have with the 
various spatial scales with which they interact (Pacione, 1978).  
For this and all subsequent sections of the survey, I divided responses according to 
nationality in order to examine the differences in attitudes and opinions between Crimea’s three 
major national groups: Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars. However, I found it prudent to 
further divide Ukrainians into “Russified” and “non-Russified” categories for the sake of this 
analysis. In order to distinguish between these two groups, I considered those who listed Russian 
as their native language to be Russified and those who listed Ukrainian as their native language 
to be non-Russified. Many Ukrainians, especially in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, 
are Russian-speaking and thus considered to be Russified. According to the 2001 Ukrainian 
census, roughly 60% of Ukrainians in Crimea are Russified (State Statistics Committee of 
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Ukraine, 2001). These Russified Ukrainians are likely to have different attitudes towards the 
Ukrainian state than those who consider Ukrainian to be their native language (Laitin, 1998). 
Within the Ukrainian sample from this survey (N=199), 117 participants listed Russian as their 
native language and 74 listed Ukrainian. The remaining eight indicated that their native language 
is “Russian/Ukrainian;” thus they could not be classified into either discrete category and were 
excluded for the purposes of comparing these two groups. Roughly 61% of Ukrainian survey 
participants are Russified, meaning their distribution within the sample is extremely close to that 
of the Ukrainian population of Crimea.  
In order to analyze and interpret the results of this exercise, maps were grouped by 
nationality and subsequently categorized into a number of different binaries according to whether 
or not they met certain requirements. One category of binaries relates to the geographic scale 
(hereafter referred to in this chapter as “scope” in order to avoid confusion with the term “map 
scale”) that participants chose to represent their homeland. For instance, a binary was established 
to express whether or not the scope of homeland on each map is Crimea alone, where a “0” 
means that the scope of a participant’s map includes more than Crimea and a “1” means that it is 
only Crimea. Another category of binaries relates to the cities that participants chose to include 
on their maps while another category relates to whether or not a number of specific physical, 
political, or cultural features were included in participants’ maps. For example, a binary was 
established that expresses whether or not a map includes the city of Yalta, where “0” means that 
Yalta is not included, and “1” means that it is. I then performed a Chi-Squared test within each 
category of binaries in order to determine whether the frequency of any particular map scope or 
feature is significantly higher than the expected frequency. Expected frequencies are determined 
mathematically by multiplying the total number of responses (both “yes” and “no”) to any one 
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set of binaries (in this case equivalent to N) by the total number of “yes” responses for all sets of 
binaries within a test (scope of map, cities included, etc.), then dividing by the total number of 
responses to all sets of binaries within the test (or N times the number of binary sets in these 
cases). 
Table 1: Various spatial scopes used to categorize discretely homeland maps for all 
participants. 
House/Neighborhood Ukraine (including Crimea) Crimea is Excluded 
Town Russia (including Crimea) Scope of Map is Ambiguous 
Part of Crimea Soviet Union (including Crimea)  
Crimea Europe (including Crimea)  
Crimea with Something Else The World  
 
In order to evaluate the significance of difference between observed and expected 
frequencies, I examined the adjusted residual derived from the comparison of observed and 
expected frequencies. According to Haberman (1973), an adjusted residual of 2 or greater should 
be considered an accurate indication of a significant difference between the expected and 
observed frequency within a cross-tabular statistical test such as the Chi-Squared. If the 
differences between the expected and observed frequency of any outcome within a given binary 
construction produces an adjusted residual of 2 or greater we may surmise that the frequency of 
this outcome is significantly high. Similarly, if the adjusted residual is lower than -2 we may 
surmise that the occurrence of this outcome is significantly low. It should be noted that this is a 
less accurate method of determining statistical significance of difference than the ANOVA test 
used in other sections of this study, as it does not produce a p-value and findings therefore cannot 
be discussed in terms of confidence. Rather, it is a useful – however informal – method of 
determining whether or not special attention should be paid to the observed frequency of a given 
outcome. 
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In light of works regarding the meaning of “homeland” (Rodina) in the Soviet and post-
Soviet understanding (Kaiser, 1994), and given my own personal experiences in the region, I 
expected a large number of Russians to indicate that Crimea alone was their homeland, although 
a considerable number would also include at least portions of Russia. I expected that few 
Russians would draw Ukraine to represent their homeland, as Ukrainian civic identity remains 
low among Russians in Crimea (Korostelina, 2003). I also expected that the city of Sevastopol 
would appear significantly more frequently on the maps drawn by Russians as it is the single 
largest symbol of Crimea’s Russian character. Consequently, I expected that Ukrainians would 
be the most likely to draw all of Ukraine as their homeland though many would also display a 
strong regional identity and drawn only Crimea. I also expected that nearly all Crimean Tatars 
would draw only Crimea as their homeland given their national and historic connection to the 
region and the struggle they have endured to return to it. 
 
Scope of Homeland 
Table 2: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 28.5) and the 
observed frequency (OF) of various spatial scopes of homeland in maps drawn by 
Russians, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR)  
(N = 374) 
Significantly More Frequent: Significantly Less Frequent: 
Crimea - 49.5% (OF = 185, AR = 31.7) House/Neighborhood - 0.8% (OF = 3, AR = -5.2) 
Crimea w/ Something Else - 14.2% (OF = 53, AR = 5.0) Part of Crimea - 1.6% (OF = 6, AR = -4.6) 
 Russia - 1.6% (OF = 6, AR = -4.6) 
Frequency Not Statistically Significant: Europe - 0.5% (OF = 2, AR = -5.4) 
Town - 5.3% (OF = 20, AR = -1.7) The World - 3.7% (OF = 14, AR = -2.9) 
Ukraine - 8.0% (OF = 30, AR = 0.3) Crimea is Excluded - 1.6% (OF = 6, AR = -4.6) 
Soviet Union - 8.3% (OF = 31, AR = 0.5) Scope is Ambiguous - 4.0% (OF = 15, AR = -2.7) 
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Figure 3: Homeland map drawn by a 52 year-old Russian woman showing Crimea with the 
cities of Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yalta. 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4: Homeland map drawn by a 50 year-old Russian woman showing Russia with 
Crimea and Sevastopol, with the note that Sevastopol is a "Russian city" both in ethnic and 
civic terms. 
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Figure 5: Homeland map drawn by a 41 year-old Russian man showing Crimea and 
Simferopol along with the Russian cities of Moscow and Kaliningrad. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Homeland map drawn by a 63 year-old Russian woman showing Ukraine with 
the cities of Kiev, Simferopol, and Kerch. The size of Crimea is greatly exaggerated. 
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As I predicted, Crimea by itself proved to be by far the most common spatial scope at 
which Russians placed their homeland as 49.5% of Russian participants drew Crimea  
exclusively. The only other scope to appear significantly more frequently than expected is 
“Crimea with Something Else,” which was drawn by 14.2% of Russian respondents and which, 
in the case of Russians, most often means including a portion of Russia lying adjacent to Crimea. 
Also as predicted, a relatively low number of Russians (8.0%) drew Ukraine as their homeland at 
a frequency that was determined to be not significant. Interestingly, a nearly equal amount of 
Russian respondents drew the Soviet Union as their homeland (8.3%). 
Results among Crimean Tatars were also consistent with my expectations as 78.3% of 
Crimean Tatar respondents drew Crimea exclusively as their homeland. This makes it the only 
scope to be drawn significantly more frequently than the expected frequency. These results are 
certainly consistent with Crimean Tatar narratives about Crimea’s importance to their national 
character. 
Table 3: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 9.9) and the 
observed frequency (OF) of various spatial scopes of homeland in maps drawn by Crimean 
Tatars, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 129). 
Significantly More Frequent: Ukraine - 2.3% (OF = 3, AR = -2.4) 
Crimea - 78.3% (OF = 101, AR = 31.3) Soviet Union - 3.1% (OF = 4, AR = 2.0) 
 House/Neighborhood - 2.3% (OF = 3, AR = -2.4) 
Frequency Not Statistically Significant: Part of Crimea - 0.8% (OF = 1 AR = -3.1) 
Crimea w/ Something Else - 3.9% (OF = 5, AR = -1.7) Russia - 0.8%(OF = 1, AR = -3.1) 
Scope is Ambiguous - 4.7% (OF = 6, AR = -1.3) Europe - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -3.4) 
 The World - 1.6% (OF = 2, AR = -2.7) 
Significantly Less Frequent: Crimea is Excluded - 0.8% (OF = 1, AR = -1.3) 
Town - 1.6% (OF = 2, AR = -2.7)  
 
 Among Ukrainians, both Russified (Russian-speaking) and non-Russified (Ukrainian-
speaking), my predictions also remained consistent with participants’ responses. Between both 
groups of Ukrainians, both Crimea and Ukraine were the only geographic scopes of homeland to 
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be drawn significantly more frequently than any other. However, among Russified Ukrainians 
Crimea was chosen more frequently than Ukraine as homeland (47.4% versus 29.3%), but 
among non-Russified Ukrainians the opposite was true – with 45.7% drawing Ukraine and 30% 
drawing Crimea as their homeland. 
The fact that Crimea appears so frequently as homeland among all national groups is by 
no means groundbreaking, as it has been previously demonstrated that Crimeans of all national 
persuasion tend to understand the term “homeland” at this regional scale (Kiseleva, 1999). 
Furthermore, the concept of homeland as it was institutionalized in the Soviet period generally 
tends to refer to the regional scale as well (Kaiser, 1994). Moreover, it is not surprising that 
Crimean Tatars tend to associate homeland so monolithically with Crimea, nor that non-
Russified Ukrainians display a stronger identification with the Ukrainian state than other groups, 
since in both cases these geographical scopes represent national territory. 
 
Figure 7: Homeland map drawn by a 46 year-old Crimean Tatar man showing Ukraine 
with "my home," Simferopol, and the Black Sea. 
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Figure 8: Homeland map drawn by a 20 year-old Crimean Tatar woman showing Ukraine 
with the cities of Bakhchisarai, Simferopol, and Yalta. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Homeland map drawn by a 71 year-old Crimean Tatar woman showing Crimea 
with the cities of Simferopol and Balaklava and Uzbekistan with the city of Yangiol, both 
located inside the Globe. 
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Figure 10: Homeland map drawn by a 44 year-old Crimean Tatar man showing an 
ambiguous territory with labels for Crimea, Kiev, and Tashkent (Uzbekistan). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 9.6) and the 
observed frequency (OF) of various spatial scopes of homeland in maps drawn by Russified 
Ukrainians, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 
116). 
Significantly More Frequent: Significantly Less Frequent: 
Crimea - 47.4% (OF = 55, AR = 16.0) House/Neighborhood - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -3.4) 
Ukraine - 29.3% (OF = 34, AR = 8.6) Town - 0.9% (OF = 1, AR = -3.0) 
 Part of Crimea - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -3.4) 
Frequency Not Statistically Significant: Russia - 0.9% (OF = 1, AR = -3.0) 
Crimea w/ Something Else - 9.5% (OF = 11, AR = 0.5) Europe - 0.9% (OF = 1, AR = -3.0) 
Soviet Union - 4.3% (OF = 5, AR = 1.6) Crimea is Excluded - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -3.4) 
The World - 6.0% (OF = 7, AR = -0.9) Scope of Map is Ambiguous - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -3.4) 
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Table 5: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 5.8) and the 
observed frequency (OF) of various spatial scopes of homeland in maps drawn by non-
Russified Ukrainians, with resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 70). 
Significantly More Frequent: Significantly Less Frequent: 
Crimea - 30% (OF = 21, AR = 6.9) House/Neighborhood - 1.4% (OF = 1, AR = -2.2) 
Ukraine - 45.7% (OF = 32, AR = 11.8) Part of Crimea - 1.4% (OF = 1, AR = -2.2) 
 Russia - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -2.6) 
Frequency Not Statistically Significant: Europe - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -2.6) 
Crimea w/ Something Else - 7.1% (OF = 5, AR = -0.4) The World - 1.4% (OF = 1, AR = -2.2) 
Scope is Ambiguous - 4.3% (OF = 3, AR = -1.3) Crimea is Excluded - 1.4% (OF = 1, AR = -2.2) 
Soviet Union - 2.9% (OF = 2, AR = 1.7)  
Town - 4.3% (OF = 3, AR = -1.3)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Homeland map drawn by a 23 year-old Ukrainian woman showing Ukraine  
with the cities of Kiev, Simferopol, and Yalta. The size of Crimea is greatly exaggerated. 
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Figure 12: Homeland map drawn by a 23 year-old Ukrainian woman showing Ukraine 
with the cities of Kiev, Simferopol, and Yalta. The size of Crimea is greatly exaggerated. 
	  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Homeland map drawn by a 67 year-old Ukrainian man showing Crimea with 
the cities of Simferopol, Kalinovka, and Kerch. 
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Figure 14: Homeland map drawn by a 64 year-old Ukrainian woman showing Ukraine 
with part of Russia and including the cities of Kiev, Simferopol, and Sochi (Russia). 
 
 
Focusing on responses from Russian participants, perhaps the most interesting aspect of 
these results is the fact that so few Russians (1.6%) drew Russia (i.e., the Russian Federation) as 
their homeland. A larger number drew the Soviet Union (8.3%), although this frequency did not 
differ significantly from the expected frequency. I argue that, more than anything else, this trend 
speaks to the fact that identifying territorially with the Russian nation-state is a difficult concept 
for Russians in Crimea despite their strong national ties to it. Crimea was once a part of Soviet 
territory, and for those who still identify strongly with their Soviet heritage or conflate the Soviet 
Union with Russian national territory there is no difficulty in following the territorial hierarchy 
from Crimea upward within what was once a single politically-bounded space. But Crimeans are 
now excluded from Russia’s national territory in a political sense, and thus many appear to have 
difficulty incorporating it into their own sense of national homeland.  
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Compare these results as well to the number of Russian participants who drew Ukraine, 
which, despite much weaker identification with the Ukrainian state among Russians in Crimea 
(Korostelina, 2003), is five times larger than the number of participants who drew Russia. 
Ukraine is at least an easily identifiable and understandable territorial “container” within which 
Crimean residents live whether or not they identify with Ukraine in national or cultural terms. 
Hence, the low frequency with which Crimean Russians identify Russia as their homeland is 
indicative of discontinuities between their concepts of nation and territory caused by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and not of a weak identity with Russia in national terms. 
 
Cities Included on Maps 
When considering which cities to choose in order to examine the frequency with which 
participants included various places on their maps, it was important to narrow possible choices to 
a select few. Including a large number of cities and/or towns that appear only a small number of 
times would dilute the expected frequency for the entire list and potentially render the Chi-
Squared test inconclusive as a minimum expected frequency of 5 is typically required 
(Haberman, 1973). Thus, I chose to examine most of the larger cities of Crimea that tend to carry 
particular significance for various national groups in the region.  
Simferopol, as the capital and largest city of Crimea, was an obvious choice, although as 
the center of Crimea both culturally and geographically it arguably holds equal significance for 
all groups. It should also be noted that a large proportion of survey participants (54.8%) live in 
Simferopol and are thus more likely to include it in their maps as their hometown. Sevastopol 
and Kerch are both cites of Soviet military glory, and both continue to carry the distinguished 
title of “Hero City” of the Soviet Union for their roles in World War II. Bakhchisarai and 
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Belogorsk are both important historic centers of Crimean Tatar culture, and both have relatively 
large populations of Crimean Tatars today. Yalta, Alushta, and Evpatoria are probably the three 
cities most closely associated with the Crimean tourism industry, and Evpatoria is also home to 
Crimea’s largest mosque and one of the most well-preserved Crimean Tatar old towns. Finally, 
Dzhankoi is the largest city in northern Crimea and includes a relatively large number of both 
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. In this test only the maps of those participants who drew Crimea 
as their homeland were included because the inclusion of other territories in a participant’s map 
would likely influence their choices of Crimean cities to include. 
Table 6: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 39.6) and the 
observed frequency (OF) of various cities included in the homeland maps drawn by 
Russians, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 
185). 
Significantly More Frequently: Significantly Less Frequently: 
Simferopol - 69.2% (OF = 128, AR = 16.8) Evpatoria - 13.5% (OF = 25, AR = -2.8) 
Sevastopol - 51.9% (OF = 96, AR = 10.7) Alushta - 9.7% (OF = 18, AR = -4.1) 
Yalta - 28.6% (OF = 53, AR = 2.6) Kerch - 9.2% (OF = 17, AR = -4.3) 
 Bakhchisarai - 4.3% (OF = 8, AR = -6.0) 
 Dzhankoi - 4.3% (OF = 8, AR = -6.0) 
 Belogorsk - 1.6% (OF = 3, AR = -7.0) 
 
Among Russians, Sevastopol, Simferopol, and Yalta appear significantly more frequently 
while the remaining cities appear significantly less frequently. Simferopol and Sevastopol are the 
only cities to appear significantly more frequently than expected among Ukrainians. While it 
would be useful in this case to examine the difference in responses between Russified and non-
Russified Ukrainians, the number of non-Russified Ukrainians who drew only Crimea for their 
homeland (21) proved too low to yield expected frequencies greater than five as is required in a 
Chi-Squared test. Among Crimean Tatars we observe that Simferopol is the only city to appear 
significantly more frequently than the expected frequency. Although the frequency with which 
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Crimean Tatars include Bakhchisarai on their maps is not significant, it is worth noting that they 
did include it much more frequently than either Russians or Ukrainians both in terms of 
percentage (19.8%) and total numbers (20). 
The fact that Simferopol appears so frequently among all groups is almost certainly 
biased by the large portion of Simferopol residents in the survey sample. As I have discussed, 
Sevastopol is an extremely important symbol of Crimea’s role in Russian and Soviet history and 
culture, and its frequency of appearance among Russians suggests certain correlations between 
their regional and national identities. Sevastopol’s frequency of appearance on maps drawn by 
Ukrainian participants may also suggest a lingering identification with Russian and/or Soviet 
culture among Ukrainians in Crimea, particularly those who are Russified. Meanwhile, Yalta is 
essentially shorthand for the most prestigious and well-known region of Crimea along its 
southern coast and is the indisputable center of Crimean tourism. That Russians included Yalta 
so frequently in their maps further suggests a uniquely Russian perspective of Crimea that may 
be influenced by the region’s status as the premier vacation destination among Russians since the 
Soviet period. The fact that Russians include cities such as Bakhchisarai and Belogorsk on their 
maps so infrequently suggests that these symbolic cities – which help form counter-narratives to 
the dominant Russian narrative of Crimea – are not considered to be very important to the way 
Russians relate to Crimea. Conversely, that Bakhchisarai does appear so much more frequently 
on Crimean Tatars’ maps than on other groups’ is reflective of their own unique attachment to 
Crimea. 
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Table 7: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 16.3) and the 
observed frequency (OF) of various cities included in the homeland maps drawn by 
Ukrainians, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 
77). 
Significantly More Frequently: Kerch - 14.3% (OF = 11, AR = -1.6) 
Simferopol - 76.6% (OF = 59, AR = 12.6)  
Sevastopol - 36.4% (OF = 28, AR = 3.4) Significantly Less Frequently: 
 Alushta - 7.8% (OF = 6, AR = -3.1) 
No Significant Difference: Bakhchisarai - 6.5% (OF = 5, AR = -3.4) 
Yalta - 24.7% (OF = 19, AR = 0.8) Dzhankoi - 6.5% (OF = 5, AR = -3.4) 
Evpatoria - 16.9% (OF = 13, AR = -1.0) Belogorsk - 1.3% (OF = 1, AR = -4.5) 
 
 
Table 8: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 18.6) and the 
observed frequency (OF) of various cities included in the homeland maps drawn by 
Crimean Tatars, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) 
(N = 101). 
Significantly More Frequently: Significantly Less Frequently: 
Simferopol - 71.3% (OF = 72, AR = 14.6) Dzhankoi - 9.9% (OF = 10, AR = -2.3) 
 Alushta - 8.9% (OF = 9, AR = -2.6) 
No Significant Difference: Belogorsk - 8.9% (OF = 9, AR = -2.6) 
Bakhchisarai - 19.8% (OF = 20, AR = 0.4) Sevastopol - 7.9% (OF = 8, AR = -2.9) 
Yalta - 18.8% (OF = 19, AR = 0.1) Kerch - 7.9% (OF = 8, AR = -2.9) 
Evpatoria - 11.8% (OF = 12, AR = -1.8)  
 
Summary 
 This cognitive mapping exercise reveals that while there are important cleavages among 
Crimea’s major national groups in the way they tend to conceive of their homelands, Crimea 
itself figures prominently for each of them. For Crimean Tatars there is an undeniably strong 
tendency to equate the notion of “homeland” solely with Crimea, which is consistent both with 
previous works (Williams, 2001; Uehling, 2004) and with the rhetoric of the Crimean Tatar 
national movement. Crimean Tatars also appear more likely than other national groups to 
emphasize places that hold particular significance for Crimean Tatar history and culture, such as 
the city of Bakhchisarai. Among Ukrainians there appear to be strong tendencies to fix the notion 
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of homeland both at the regional and state scales as large numbers of both Russified and non-
Russified Ukrainians drew either Crimea or Ukraine as their homeland. The difference regarding 
which of these scales Ukrainians more typically privilege as “homeland” appears to reflect 
whether or not they may be considered Russified; Russian speakers are more likely to choose 
Crimea and Ukrainian speakers are more likely to choose Ukraine. This suggests that cultural 
and linguistic affiliations influence the degree to which Ukrainians have come to identify with 
the Ukrainian state at large and to which they are likely to identify with symbols of 
Russian/Soviet culture in Crimea such as the city of Sevastopol. 
 Russians also exhibit a strong tendency to associate their concept of homeland solely 
with Crimea, although they also appear to include territory outside of Crimea or Ukraine in 
general as part of their homeland more often than do Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars. They are 
also more likely than these other groups to identify still with the Soviet Union as their homeland. 
They also tend to consider places like Sevastopol and Yalta to be important places within Crimea 
– both of which hold particular and significant places in the Russian narrative of Crimea. 
Importantly, however, their identification with the Russian nation-state (i.e., the Russian 
Federation) is extremely low. These results appear to reflect an emphasis of a certain “Russian-
ness” about Crimea, which suggests that Crimean Russians’ regional identity is imbued with a 
sense of national identity. Yet this national identity does not appear to inspire a sense of 
identification with Russian national territory as it is institutionalized in the form of the Russian 
Federation.  
Thus, I argue that “Crimean-Russian” identity implies an understanding of and 
identification with Crimea that is heavily influenced by the Russian narrative of the region. In 
other words, the reason Russians in Crimea exhibit a strong regional identity is due primarily to 
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Crimea’s prominent role in broader Russian national narratives and a certain sense of pride in 
being from a region of such national importance. In this way, Russians in Crimea view the region 
– which many consider their homeland – through a certain national lens that emphasizes the 
qualities and factors that lend it a unique significance in Russian national narratives.  
The same may be said for both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, as both groups apply their 
own cultural filters to their view of Crimea that bring out features of different national 
significance. However, the fact that Russians in Crimea do not live simultaneously within their 
regional “homeland” and their broader national territory sets them apart from both Ukrainians 
and Crimean Tatars. I argue that this discontinuous relationship between regional homeland and 
national territory means that for Russians territorial and national identity are decoupled, and a 
distinct “Crimean-Russian” identity has appeared in light of this discontinuity. I explore the 
decoupling of national and regional identity and the meaning of “Crimean-Russian” identity 
more deeply in further chapters. 
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Chapter VII - Distinguishing and Characterizing Crimea 
 
 In the previous chapter I established that a significantly large proportion of each of 
Crimea’s three main national groups view Crimea as their homeland, although their distinct 
national perspectives appear to influence the specific terms in which they each relate to it. 
Crimea plays a particular role in Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar national narratives about 
territory and culture, and the narrative with which a group or individual is most engaged will 
naturally influence their own understandings of the region. How do these narratives play out in 
the attitudes and opinions of Crimea’s residents? Which aspects of Crimea’s history, geography, 
and culture become the most important components of the senses of place felt by members of 
each group in the region, and how do they play into broader national narratives? How do these 
different national perspectives influence opinions about Crimea’s political status? 
 In this chapter I present findings from three sections of the survey that are designed to 
gauge attitudes and opinions about Crimea held by members of its major national groups. 
Responses from these exercises help to better understand which of Crimea’s characteristics its 
residents believe are most distinguishing, how competing national narratives influence these 
beliefs, and how they in turn influence opinions about Crimea’s political status. The findings in 
this chapter lend further credence to the argument that Crimean regional identity is derived in 
different ways from different national perspectives and help form a clearer understanding of the 
implications of a “Crimean-Russian” identity. 
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Crimea’s Defining and Distinguishing Characteristics 
 In this section of the survey participants were presented with a list of 16 characteristics 
that I identified to be common to various narratives related to Crimea and that are often cited to 
distinguish Crimea as being a unique or special place. Participants were prompted to indicate 
characteristics they believe “define or distinguish” Crimea and to choose one characteristic that 
they believe is the single most important. For the sake of simplicity this second category of 
responses was disregarded in the statistical analysis, and instead all characteristics were 
classified into a binary of whether or not the participant considered it a distinguishing or defining 
feature of Crimea. As with the previous section of the survey responses were then grouped 
according to nationality.  
 
Table 9: List of defining or distinguishing characteristics of Crimea. 
Crimea’s Autonomous Status  Presence of Russian Military Facilities in Crimea 
Crimea’s Landscape and Climate Presence of Ukrainian Military Facilities in Crimea 
Shape of the Crimean Peninsula Crimea’s Status as a Place of Relaxation 
Dominance of Russia Among Residence of Crimea Crimea’s role in Past Wars 
Presence of Ukrainians in Crimea Crimea’s Pre-Russian History  
Presence of Crimean Tatars in Crimea Presence of Ancient Civilizations in Crimea 
Presence of Other Ethnic Groups in Crimea Crimea’s Important Archaeological Monuments 
Ethnic Diversity of the Population of Crimea Depiction of Crimea in Famous Art, Literature, etc. 
 
A Chi-Squared test was performed within and between national groups using the program 
SPSS Statistics in order to determine whether or not the observed frequency of “yes” responses 
for each characteristic differed significantly from the mathematically-determined expected 
frequency of responses and whether or not this difference was statistically significant. As with 
the analysis from the cognitive mapping exercise, I examined the adjusted residual derived from 
the comparison of each frequency to determine where there are statistically significant 
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differences. As before, an adjusted residual greater than two indicates that the observed 
frequency is significantly higher than the expected frequency and an adjusted residual less than 
negative two indicates that it is significantly lower than the expected frequency. 
The purpose of this section of the survey is to illuminate the terms in which various 
groups in Crimea relate to or understand the region itself. As the previous chapter demonstrates, 
Crimea is frequently regarded as homeland by members of each national group, although there 
are important differences in the way members of each group view the region that influence their 
sense of place and identification with Crimea. As I am interested primarily in the Russian 
perspective of Crimea, examining the results from Russian participants helps present a more 
complete picture of how national narratives influence Russian attitudes towards Crimea. 
 
Table 10: Differences in expected frequencies (EF = 184.4) and observed frequencies (OF) 
of “yes” responses from Russians to whether or not various characteristics are defining or 
distinguishing of Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted 
residuals (AR) (N=384). 
	  
Significantly More Frequently: No Significant Difference: Significantly Less Frequently: 
Place of Relaxation - 86.7% 
(OF = 333, AR = 15.7) 
Depiction in Art, Literature, etc. -
52.6% (OF = 202, AR = 1.9) 
Presence of Ukrainian Military -  
14.8% (OF = 57, AR = -13.4) 
Landscape and Climate - 84.6% 
(OF = 325, AR = 14.8) 
Ethnic Diversity - 51.8% 
(OF = 199, AR = 1.5) 
Presence of Ukrainians - 16.4% 
(OF = 63, AR = -12.8) 
Archaeological Monuments - 70.3% 
(OF = 270, AR = 9.0) 
Presence of Russian Military - 50% 
(OF = 192, AR = 0.8) 
Presence of Crimean Tatars - 21.6% 
(OF = 83, AR = -10.7) 
Autonomous Status – 63.8% 
(OF = 245, AR = 6.4) 
Ancient Civilizations - 49% 
(OF = 188, AR = 0.4) 
Presence of Other Ethnicities - 
22.9% (OF = 88, AR = -10.2) 
Dominance of Russians - 61.7% 
(OF = 237, AR = 5.6) 
 Pre-Russian History - 32% 
(OF = 123, AR = -6.5) 
Role in Past Wars - 53.9% 
(OF = 207, AR = 2.4) 
 Shape of Peninsula - 35.9% 
(OF = 138, AR = -4.9) 
 
Test results among each national group indicate a clear divide between the characteristics 
that they believe are defining or distinguishing features of Crimea and those that they believe are 
not. However, three characteristics were chosen with significantly high frequency by all groups 
as “defining or distinguishing” of Crimea: its landscape and climate; its status as a place of 
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relaxation; and its archaeological monuments. Additionally, all groups except non-Russified 
Ukrainians cited Crimea’s autonomous status as a defining or distinguishing characteristic with 
significantly high frequency. Russians also indicate with significantly high frequency that the 
dominance of Russians in Crimea and its role in past wars are also defining or distinguishing of 
Crimea. Crimean Tatars also indicate that the presence of Crimean Tatars, its ethnic diversity, 
and its pre-Russian history are defining or distinguishing of Crimea with significantly high 
frequency. 
Examining the differences between the characteristics each group chose with 
significantly less frequency is even more revealing of the divides between national groups. 
Concerning the characteristics chosen significantly less frequently among Russians, nearly all of 
them present a decidedly non-Russian narrative of Crimea, including its pre-Russian history and 
the presence of Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians, other national groups, and the Ukrainian military. 
Russians appear to believe that their presence in Crimea – and not that of any other national 
group – is among its important characteristics. Moreover, as a Ukrainian military presence in the 
region may pose a potential threat to their regional autonomy, Russians clearly do not believe 
this is an important aspect of Crimea’s character.  
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Table 11: Differences in expected frequencies (EF = 53.4) and observed frequencies (OF) of 
“yes” responses from Russified Ukrainian to whether or not various characteristics are 
defining or distinguishing of Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant 
adjusted residuals (AR) (N=117). 
Significantly More Frequently: No Significant Difference: Significantly Less Frequently: 
Landscape and Climate - 88.9% 
(OF = 104, AR = 9.7) 
Ethnic Diversity - 52.1% 
(OF = 61, AR = 1.5) 
Presence of Ukrainians - 19.7% 
(OF = 23, AR = -5.8) 
Place of Relaxation - 81.2% 
(OF = 95, AR = 8.0) 
Role in Past Wars - 49.6% 
(OF = 58, AR = 0.9) 
Presence of Ukrainian Military -  
20.5% (OF = 24, AR = -5.6) 
Archaeological Monuments - 69.2% 
(OF = 81, AR = 5.3) 
Ancient Civilizations - 47.9% 
(OF = 56, AR = 0.2) 
Presence of Crimean Tatars - 20.5% 
(OF = 24, AR = -5.6) 
Autonomous Status - 59% 
(OF =69, AR = 3.0) 
Depiction in Art, Literature, etc. -
45.3% (OF = 53, AR = -0.1) 
Presence of Other Ethnicities - 
27.4% (OF = 32, AR = -4.1) 
 Dominance of Russians - 41% 
(OF = 48, AR = -1.0) 
Shape of Peninsula - 30.8% 
(OF = 36, AR = -3.3) 
 Presence of Russian Military - 
39.3% (OF = 46, AR = -1.4) 
Pre-Russian History - 35.9% 
(OF = 42, AR = -2.2) 
 
 
Table 12: Differences in expected frequencies (EF = 35.1) and observed frequencies (OF) of 
“yes” responses from non-Russified Ukrainian to whether or not various characteristics 
are defining or distinguishing of Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant 
adjusted residuals (AR) (N=74). 
Significantly More Frequently: No Significant Difference: Significantly Less Frequently: 
Place of Relaxation – 79.7% 
(OF = 59, AR = 5.7) 
Presence of Ukrainians – 58.1% 
(OF = 43, AR = 1.9) 
Presence of Russian Military - 
25.7% (OF = 19, AR = -3.9) 
Landscape and Climate - 73% 
(OF = 54, AR = 4.5) 
Depiction in Art, Literature, etc. -
58.1% (OF = 43, AR = 1.9) 
Shape of Peninsula - 27% 
(OF = 20, AR = -3.6) 
Archaeological Monuments - 68.9% 
(OF = 51, AR = 3.8) 
Autonomous Status – 52.7% 
(OF =39, AR = 0.9) 
Dominance of Russians - 28.4% 
(OF = 21, AR = -3.4) 
 Ancient Civilizations – 52.7% 
(OF = 39, AR = 0.9) 
Presence of Other Ethnicities - 
29.7% (OF = 22, AR = -3.2) 
 Role in Past Wars - 51.4% 
(OF = 38, AR = 0.7) 
Pre-Russian History - 32.4% 
(OF = 24, AR = -2.7) 
 Ethnic Diversity - 47.3% 
(OF = 35, AR = 0) 
Presence of Ukrainian Military -  
35.1% (OF = 26, AR = -2.2) 
 Presence of Crimean Tatars – 39.2% 
(OF = 29, AR = -1.5) 
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Table 13: Differences in expected frequencies (EF = 54.9) and observed frequencies (OF)  
of “yes” responses from Crimean Tatars to whether or not various characteristics are 
defining or distinguishing of Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant 
adjusted residuals (AR) (N=137). 
	  
Significantly More Frequently: No Significant Difference: Significantly Less Frequently: 
Presence of Crimean Tatars - 80.3% 
(OF = 110, AR = 9.9) 
Depiction in Art, Literature, etc. -
43.1% (OF = 59, AR = 0.7) 
Dominance of Russians - 5.1%% 
(OF = 7, AR = -8.6) 
Landscape and Climate - 72.3% 
(OF = 99, AR = 7.9) 
Ancient Civilizations - 40.9% 
(OF = 56, AR = 0.2) 
Presence of Russian Military - 8.8% 
(OF = 12, AR = -7.7) 
Place of Relaxation - 62.8% 
(OF = 86, AR = 5.6) 
Role in Past Wars - 33.6% 
(OF = 46, AR = -1.6) 
Presence of Ukrainians - 14.6% 
(OF = 13, AR = -7.6) 
Autonomous Status - 61.3% 
(OF = 84, AR = 5.2) 
 Presence of Ukrainian Military -  
14.8% (OF = 20, AR = -6.3) 
Archaeological Monuments - 51.8% 
(OF = 71, AR = 2.9) 
 Shape of Peninsula - 26.3% 
(OF = 36, AR = -3.4) 
Ethnic Diversity - 51.1% 
(OF = 70, AR = 2.7) 
 Presence of Other Ethnicities - 
32.1% (OF = 44, AR = -2.0) 
Pre-Russian History - 48.2% 
(OF = 66, AR = 2.0) 
  
 
The same lack of emphasis of attributes unrelated to one’s own nationality is observed 
among responses from Crimean Tatars as well, who chose all factors related to Russians, 
Ukrainians, and other nationalities in Crimea with significantly less frequency. They did, 
however, choose Crimea’s ethnic diversity as a distinguishing characteristic with significantly 
high frequency. Russification appears to make an important difference in attitudes among 
Ukrainians. Russified Ukrainians de-emphasize all the same characteristics as do Russians, 
including those related to Crimea’s Ukrainian attributes, while non-Russified Ukrainians de-
emphasize its Russian attributes without significantly emphasizing its Ukrainian attributes. These 
results clearly speak to the notion that members of each group view Crimea through their own 
distinct national lens that bring forward the region’s various national characteristics. 
The differences in responses among each national group are further highlighted by 
comparing them to each other in a separate Chi-Squared test. In this test expected frequencies are 
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determined for each characteristic by multiplying the total number of “yes” and “no” responses 
from each group by the total number “yes” responses from all groups, then dividing by the total 
number of “yes” and “no” responses from all groups. While within-group Chi-Squared tests 
allow us to see how frequently each group chose a given characteristic relative to other 
characteristics, this between-group test allows us to see how frequently each group chose a given 
characteristic relative to the frequency with which other groups chose the same characteristic. 
This method allows us to see which groups feel more or less strongly that a given characteristic 
is defining or distinguishing of Crimea. It should be noted that the nationality group “other” was 
included in this test but are excluded from this discussion in the interest of focusing on how 
different national narratives influence attitudes towards Crimea. 
While all groups strongly indicated that Crimea’s status as a place of relaxation, its 
landscape and climate, and its archaeological monuments are defining or distinguishing of the 
region, we see that Russians chose all of these characteristics with significantly higher frequency 
compared to all other groups. Furthermore, we see that all of the characteristics chosen by 
Russians with significantly high frequency were also chosen with significantly higher frequency 
compared to all national groups. Meanwhile, non-Russified Ukrainians chose only the presence  
of Ukrainians and of the Ukrainian military with significantly high frequency compared to other 
groups, and Crimean Tatars chose only the presence of Crimean Tatars and Crimea’s pre-
Russian history with significantly high frequency compared to other groups. These findings 
further corroborate the notion that each national group tends to emphasize its own characteristics 
of Crimea, but suggest that Russians are more likely to also emphasize a number of other 
characteristics that are not necessarily “Russian” by nature. However, when we consider a 
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number of these characteristics’ significance in broader Russian national narratives about 
Crimea, their relevance to Russians become clearer. 
 
Table 14: Difference in observed and expected frequencies (OF / EF) of “yes” responses 
between all national groups to whether or not various characteristics are defining or 
distinguishing of Crimea, with resultant adjusted frequencies. 
 
Russians 
Russified 
Ukrainians 
Non-Russified 
Ukrainians 
Crimean 
Tatars 
Autonomy 
245 / 228.9 
2.3 
69 / 69.8 
-0.2 
39 / 44.1 
-1.3 
84 / 81.7 
0.4 
Landscape/Climate 
325 / 312.5 
2.3 
104 / 95.2 
2.3 
54 / 60.2 
-2.0 
99 / 111.5 
-3.0 
Shape of Peninsula 
138 / 123 
2.3 
36 / 37.5 
-0.3 
20 / 23.7 
-1.0 
36 / 43.9 
-1.6 
Dominance of 
Russians 
237 / 162.8 
10.7 
48 / 49.6 
-0.3 
21 / 31.4 
-2.6 
7 / 58.1 
-9.7 
Presence of 
Ukrainians 
63 / 72.4 
-1.7 
23 / 22.1 
0.2 
43 / 14 
9.1 
13 / 25.8 
-3.1 
Presence of Crimean 
Tatars 
83 / 126.4 
-6.6 
24 / 38.5 
-3.1 
29 / 24.4 
1.2 
110 / 45.1 
13.0 
Presence of other 
Groups 
88 / 98.2 
-1.7 
32 / 29.9 
0.5 
22 / 18.9 
0.9 
44 / 35 
1.9 
Ethnic Diversity 
199 / 201.7 
-0.4 
61 / 61.5 
-0.1 
35 / 38.9 
-0.9 
70 / 72 
-0.4 
Presence of Russian 
Military 
192 / 140.5 
7.6 
46 / 42.8 
0.7 
19 / 27.1 
-2.0 
12 / 50.1 
-7.4 
Presence of 
Ukrainian Military 
57 / 65.6 
-1.6 
24 / 20 
1.1 
26 / 12.6 
4.3 
20 / 23.4 
-0.9 
Status as a Place of 
Relaxation 
333 / 308.7 
4.4 
95 / 94 
0.2 
59 / 59.5 
-0.1 
86 / 110.1 
-5.7 
Role in Past Wars 
207 / 182.8 
3.5 
58 / 55.7 
0.5 
38 / 35.2 
0.7 
46 / 65.2 
-3.6 
Pre-Russian History 
123/133.2 
-1.5 
42 / 40.6 
0.3 
24 / 25.7 
-0.4 
66 / 47.5 
3.6 
Presence of Ancient 
Civilizations 
188 / 181.8 
0.9 
58 / 55.4 
0.5 
39 / 35 
1.0 
56 / 64.9 
-1.7 
Archaeological 
Monuments 
270 / 254.2 
2.4 
81 / 77.5 
0.8 
51 / 49 
0.5 
71 / 90.7 
-3.9 
Depiction in Art, 
Literature, etc. 
202 / 190.5 
1.6 
53 / 58.1 
-1.0 
43 / 36.7 
1.5 
59 / 68 
-0.9 
Bold Text and sold-line boxes indicate that the characteristic in the row was chosen significantly 
more frequently by the national group in the column compared to all national groups. 
Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the characteristic in the row was chosen 
significantly less frequently by the national group in the column compared to all national groups. 
 
At least three of the characteristics chosen significantly more frequently by Russians than 
other groups – the dominance of Russians, the presence of the Russian military, and Crimea’s 
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role in past wars – are quickly identifiable for their significance to Russian national identity. 
Because of its central role in the Crimean War and World War II, Crimea has become a site of 
Russian and Soviet military glory, which is among the reasons why many in Russia have had 
difficulty accepting its loss to Ukraine following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Mochalov, 
2007). Much of Crimea, particularly the city of Sevastopol, has become a living monument to 
Russia and the Soviet Union’s storied military exploits (Qualls, 2009), and the Russian Navy 
famously maintains the port of Sevastopol as the base of its Black Sea Fleet.  
Crimea’s autonomy was hard-fought by regional politicians during the 1990s, and most 
Russians view autonomy as a guarantor and protector of the region’s distinct Russian qualities 
against Ukrainian nationalizing processes (Sasse, 2007). Although all groups chose autonomy 
with significantly high frequency, the fact that autonomy was won largely due to the concerns 
and efforts of ethnic Russians would account for the frequency with which Russians chose this 
characteristic compared to other groups.  
A strong belief among all groups that Crimea’s landscape and climate are among its most 
defining and distinguishing characteristics, which is not surprising considering that landscape is 
an important aspect of identity with space and territory at any scale (Tuan, 1974). However, as I 
have discussed previously, landscape and climate were among the most important characteristics 
that made Crimea appear exotic and for which it became a highly coveted region at the time of 
its annexation into the Russian empire. Comparisons to the “Garden of Eden” (Schonle, 2001) 
and observations about the stark contrast between Crimea and the Russian core (Seymour, 1855) 
were common tropes throughout this period, and the peninsula’s physical beauty became the 
subject of countless works of Russian poetry and prose. Crimea’s mountainous landscape and 
sub-tropical climate certainly hold a particular significance in Russian culture as Crimea was the 
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first region of such exotic and “Oriental” beauty to be incorporated into the Russian Empire 
(Dickinson, 2002). 
Related to the landscape and climate is Crimea’s status as a place of relaxation, which 
began in earnest in the Soviet era due to the region’s landscape and climate. To the average 
Russian living anywhere in the post-Soviet space, tourism, relaxation, and recreation are 
probably the single most associable characteristics with Crimea since most have likely 
vacationed in the region at some point in their life. Despite the fact that they call this tourist 
destination their home, Russians in Crimea rated its status as a place of relaxation as its single 
most important characteristic, and to a much higher degree compared to all other national groups. 
I contend that this observation, among all results from this section of the survey, speaks most 
convincingly to the notion that Russians’ attitudes towards Crimea are shaped by a broader 
Russian perspective of the region, as they appear to relate to it much in the same way a Russian 
from outside of Crimea would.  
I find the high rating among all groups of Crimea’s archaeological monuments as a 
defining and distinguishing characteristic of the region surprising considering that archaeology in 
Crimea has been used predominantly as a Russian and Soviet political tool. In the case of 
Russians I surmise that these results may likely be related to the archaeological work done in 
places such as Chersoneses during the Tsarist and Soviet periods, which sought early evidence of 
Greeks, Slavs, and Christianity in Crimea in order to bolster Russian and Soviet narratives of 
dominance in Crimea from an early period (Kozelsky, 2010). On the other hand, it may be 
unrelated to any particular national narrative and simply reflect an interest among all national 
groups in the history of their surrounding region. However, the fact that Russians chose it with 
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significantly higher frequency compared to all other groups suggests that they do exhibit a 
greater interest in Crimea’s archaeology that may be related to these broader national narratives. 
Crimea’s depiction in art and literature is certainly related to larger Russian narratives 
about Crimea, which is why its relative infrequency among these characteristics is surprising. 
Crimea’s beauty and legend have been built up through Russian art and literature for centuries, 
and has been the subject of works by many of Russia’s great masters. This relatively low 
response rate may be the result of unfamiliarity of such works to younger generations of 
Russians, which make up a large portion of the survey sample. It should be noted that this 
characteristic was chosen with no particular significant frequency by any national group, 
although Russians did chose it somewhat more frequently when compared to responses from all 
national groups.  
Lastly, as the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol has been an extremely 
important issue for Crimea’s more nationalistic Russians, it is surprising that it did not rank 
higher among the characteristics chosen by Russian survey participants. Many Russians in 
Crimea view the Fleet’s presence as a statement of Russia’s legitimate claims to the region, and 
have made its prolonged presence a cause célèbre of their political activism (Mochalov, 2007). 
Its relatively low rating may be explained by the fact that fervor over this issue has diminished 
considerably among Russians following Ukrainian President Yanukovich’s decision in 2010 to 
extend Russia’s lease on the port of Sevastopol through at least 2042. Importantly, however, 
Russians certainly did chose this factor significantly more frequently than all other national 
groups to a very high degree, which appears to be more a reflection of non-Russians’ de-
emphasis of this characteristic than of Russians’ particular emphasis of it. 
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Together, the results of this section of the survey support my argument that regional 
identity among residents of Crimea is derived in different ways from different national 
perspectives that are informed by competing national narratives about Crimea. For Russians, 
Crimean identity comes primarily from a sense of pride in being from a region of great 
significance to the Russian nation, and therefore to their own sense of national identity as well. 
Crimean Russians appear to view Crimea and assess its distinguishing characteristics much in 
the same way a Russian with strong national identity would from outside Crimea, emphasizing 
its role in Russian history and culture and de-emphasizing those characteristics that depict 
Crimea as being non-Russian. Other national groups also de=emphasize those characteristics that 
are unrelated to their own nationality’s place in Crimea, reflecting their own national narratives 
about the region. However, when we compare responses from each group against one another, 
we see that Russians significantly more frequently emphasize a number of characteristics that 
can be understood to carry particular significance in Russian national narratives about Crimea, 
suggesting that a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity is especially salient among various forms 
of Crimean regional identity. We observe similar differences in the way members of each 
national group view Crimea in the next section of the survey. 
 
Characterizing Words about Crimea 
 This section of the survey simply asked participants to write three to five words that, in 
their view, “characterize Crimea.” The results of this exercise unsurprisingly produced a large 
number of individual words and phrases. In order to determine which words appeared most 
frequently among the responses of all participants I entered the entire set of responses into an 
online application that produces “word clouds” from bodies of text. Word clouds provide a  
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visualized summary of the words that appear most frequently within a given body of text by 
arranging them into a unique pattern where the size of each word is adjusted relative to its 
frequency of use within the text, with the most common words appearing the largest. By doing 
this I was easily able to identify the most common words that participants chose to write as being 
characteristic of Crimea. In discerning which words appeared most frequently, I was careful to 
consider the fact that Russian words may appear in a number of different conjugations or 
declensions, meaning a specific word may appear with a number of different spellings. 
Therefore, when tabulating the actual frequency of each word I was sure to do so according to 
the word’s root or to multiple roots with the same general meaning. This way collections of 
differently spelled words with shared meaning are grouped together. 
 
Figure 15: Word cloud of all the words given by survey participants that they believe 
“characterize Crimea.” 
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Table 15: Fifty most frequently used words to characterize Crimea among all survey 
participants, with Russian translations where appropriate. Asterisks denote the ten most 
frequent words and those which appear most prominently in the word cloud. 
Air (vozdukh) Health (zdorov-/zdrav-) Nature (prirod-)* Summer (let-) 
Amazing (udivit-) History (istori-) Pearl (zhemchuzhin-) Sun (solnts-/solnich-)* 
Autonomy (avtonom-) Home (dom)* Peninsula (poluostrov) Tatar 
Beach (pliazh) Homeland (rodin-/rodn-)* Resort (kurort-)* Tourism (turi-) 
Beauty (kras-)* Hospitable (gostepri-) Relaxation (otdykh)* Ukrainian (ukr-) 
Climate (klimat)* Hot (zhark-) Rich (bogat-) Unique (unik-) 
Diverse (raznoobraz-) Interesting (interes-) Russian (russ-/ross-) Warm (tepl-) 
Ethnic (Etni-) Landscape (landshaft) Scenic (zhivopis-) Wine (vino/vina) 
Fleet (flot) Love/Favorite (liub-) Sea (mor-)* Work (rabot-) 
Forest (les)  Miracle (chud-) Sevastopol Yalta 
Friend (drug-/druzh-) Monument (pamiat-) Simferopol Youth (uiut-) 
Fruit (frukt) Mountain (gor-)* Singular (nepovtorim-)  
Green (zel-) Multinational (mnogonats-) Steppe (step-)  
 
After compiling a list of the most frequent words from all participants, I grouped the 
results according to nationality and performed a Chi-Squared test on each of the words, 
measuring their observed frequency against their expected frequency. For this test I established a 
binary system for examining each word in which a participant either “did not” write a given 
word or “did” write it. To test for significance I used the same method of examining adjusted 
residuals as I did in the previous section, where an adjusted residual greater than 2 or less than -2 
is considered to reflect a significant difference between the observed and expected frequencies.  
Similarly to the previous section, this exercise is intended to elucidate participants’ 
perceptions of Crimea, albeit in a more freeform and less restrictive framework. This section 
allows survey participants to describe or depict Crimea in any way they may choose as opposed 
to the more limited framework of the previous section that asks participants to choose from a 
given set of characteristics. If we observe that any single word appears significantly more 
frequently than others, then we may surmise that this is indicative of a commonly held 
perception or understanding of Crimea among members of a particular group. 
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Table 16: Words whose observed frequencies (OF) were significantly higher than the 
expected frequency (EF = 19.1) among responses from Russians prompted to write words 
that characterize Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted 
residuals (AR) (N=369). 
Sea (mor-) – 49.3% (OF = 182, AR = 38.6) 
Mountain (gor-) – 19.8% (OF = 73, AR = 12.8) 
Resort (kurort-) –16.5% (OF = 61, AR = 9.9) 
Relaxation (otdykh) – 15.7% (OF = 58, AR = 9.2) 
Sun (solnts-/solnich-) – 15.5% (OF = 57, AR = 9.0) 
Nature (prirod-) – 12.5% (OF = 46, AR = 6.4) 
Homeland (rodin-/rodn-) – 9.8% (OF = 36, AR = 4.0) 
Beauty (kras-) – 9.2% (OF = 34, AR = 3.5) 
Climate (klimat) – 8.9% (OF = 33, AR = 3.3) 
 
 
Table 17: Words whose observed frequencies (OF) were significantly higher than the 
expected frequency (EF = 10.8) among responses from Ukrainians prompted to write 
words that characterize Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted 
residuals (AR) (N=188). 
Sea (mor-) – 50% (OF = 94, AR = 26.3) 
Mountain (gor-) – 21.8% (OF = 41, AR = 9.6) 
Relaxation (otdykh) – 18.1% (OF = 34, AR = 7.3) 
Sun (solnts-/solnich-) – 17.6% (OF = 33, AR = 7.0) 
Beauty (kras-) – 16.5% (OF = 31, AR = 6.4) 
Nature (priroda) – 16% (OF = 30, AR = 6.1) 
Resort (kurort) – 14.9% (OF = 28, AR = 5.4) 
 
 
Table 18: Words whose observed frequencies (OF) were significantly higher than the 
expected frequency (EF = 6.0) among responses from Crimean Tatars prompted to write 
words that characterize Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted 
residuals (AR) (N=120). 
Sea (mor-) – 45% (OF = 54, AR = 20.3) 
Homeland (rodin-/rodn-) – 29.2% (OF = 35, AR = 12.3) 
Mountain (gor-) – 19.2% (OF = 23, AR = 7.2) 
Beauty (kras-) – 15% (OF = 18, AR = 5.1) 
Home (dom) – 14.2% (OF = 17, AR = 4.7) 
Relaxation (otdykh) – 12.5% (OF = 15, AR = 3.8) 
 
Unfortunately, due to the relatively small number of non-Russified Ukrainian survey 
participants, dividing the Ukrainians into separate Russified and non-Russified categories was 
not feasible for this test as it would produce expected frequencies lower than 5 for most words 
among non-Russified Ukrainians. Instead, Ukrainians are included here as a single group. As 
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these tables illustrate, only a small number of words appear significantly more frequently among 
responses from each group compared to the expected frequency, with the remaining words 
appearing significantly less frequently or with no significant difference to the expected 
frequency.  
Observing the words given significantly more often among responses from all groups we 
see many similarities, and most relate to Crimea’s landscape, climate, and status as a vacation 
destination. These include the words “beauty,” “mountain,” “nature,” “sea,” “sun,” “relaxation,” 
and “resort.” The high frequencies of these types of words suggest that most people think about 
Crimea first and foremost in terms of its physical and natural characteristics. “Sea,” for example, 
is by far the most commonly chosen word among all groups. In addition, “Homeland” was given 
with significantly high frequency by Russians and Crimean Tatars, while only Russians wrote 
the word “climate” with significantly high frequency.  
As with the previous survey section, here it is helpful to examine the differences among 
responses from each group using a separate Chi-Squared test. Because of the large number of 
words included in this test only a handful met the requirement of having expected frequencies 
greater than five for each group when compared to each other, and fewer still yielded adjusted 
frequencies greater than two or less than negative two indicating a significant difference. Also, as 
before, “other” nationalities were included in this test but are omitted from discussion here. 
Here we see that Russians are significantly more likely than other groups to give the 
words “resort” and “health,” although “health” is not one of the words that they chose 
significantly more frequently than other words. Russians also wrote “beauty” and “homeland” 
significantly less frequently than others. We also see that Crimean Tatars are significantly more 
likely to give the words “home” and “homeland” than other groups, and less likely to give 
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“nature” and “resort.” Ukrainians, on the other hand, are no more or less likely than other groups 
to write any of the given words. 
 
Table 19: Difference in observed and expected frequencies (OF / EF) between all national 
groups of words that characterize Crimea, with resultant adjusted frequencies (Including 
only those words for which at least one adjusted residual had an absolute value greater 
than two, and for which all groups had an expected frequency greater than 5). 
 Russians 
(N=369) 
Ukrainians 
(N=188) 
Crimean Tatars 
(N=120) 
Beauty (kras-) 34 / 46.7 -2.8 
31 / 23.8 
1.8 
18 / 15.2 
0.8 
Nature (priroda) 46 / 45.8 0.1 
30 / 23.3 
1.7 
8 / 14.9 
-2.1 
Home (dom) 15 / 20.7 -1.8 
6 / 10.5 
-1.7 
17 / 6.7 
4.5 
Health (zdorov-/zdrav-) 22 / 16.3 2.0 
8 / 8.3 
-0.1 
2 / 5.3 
-1.6 
Resort (kurort) 61 / 51.7 2.0 
28 / 26.3 
0.4 
9 / 16.8 
-2.2 
Homeland (rodina/rodn-) 36 / 48.3 -2.7 
17 / 24.6 
-1.9 
35 / 15.6 
5.7 
Bold Text and sold-line boxes indicate that the word in the row was given significantly more 
frequently by the national group in the column compared to all national groups. 
Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the word in the row was given significantly less 
frequently by the national group in the column compared to all national groups. 
 
From these results, we can clearly surmise that Crimean residents of all national 
persuasion relate strongly to Crimea’s natural and aesthetic characteristics. Such elements of the 
physical landscape and aesthetic appearance of a given place constitute a fundamental 
component of spatial identity (Tuan, 1974). The fact that Crimean Tatars more frequently wrote 
the words “home” and “homeland” further strengthens the argument that Crimean Tatars’ 
association of the term “homeland” is much more singularly tied to Crimea than other groups, as 
I demonstrated in the previous chapter. Meanwhile, the fact that Russians more frequently wrote 
the words “resort” and “health” provides further support for my argument that Russians view 
Crimea through a distinct national lens that emphasizes the characteristics of the region that are 
most significant in Russian national narratives. It must be noted that the root for “health” appears 
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most often among these words in the word for “health resort” (zdravnitsa), referring to Crimea’s 
many sanatoria that are a major draw for vacationers. As discussed, Crimea is most famous 
among non-Crimean Russians as a vacation destination, yet those who live there also appear to 
think of Crimea in these same terms. In this sense, Russians both within and outside of Crimea 
cherish it largely for its status as the Russian/Soviet vacation destination of choice, just as it is 
often presented within Russian national narratives at large. 
Results from these last two sections of the survey compliment each other well in their 
presentation of perceptions of Crimea among its Russian population specifically. Both when 
given a list of characteristics to choose from and when asked to produce their own characteristic 
descriptions about the region, Russians tend to highlight the same aspects of Crimea that make it 
important within a larger national context. In this way, their sense of regional identity is filtered 
through their own national lens to produce a distinct sense of regional identity largely informed 
by their sense of national identity. How, though, does this sense of layered regional-national 
identity translate to attitudes about Crimea’s political status? This is the subject of the next 
section of the survey. 
 
Crimea’s Political Status 
 This section of the survey asked participants to choose what they believe Crimea’s 
political status should be from a list of six options:  
• Remain an Autonomous Republic of Ukraine  
• Become an Oblast (non-autonomous region) of Ukraine  
• Join Russia as an Autonomous Republic  
• Join Russia as an Oblast  
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• Become an Independent State  
• Other, with space provided to describe their ideal option.  
In order to evaluate opinions expressed by each national group about Crimea’s political status, a 
simple breakdown of the percentages of each option chosen within each groups is sufficient. In 
this way, this section of the survey resembles more of an opinion poll than a sociological survey, 
and thus I feel that a more sophisticated statistical analysis is not required to gauge the 
differences in opinion between each group. 
This question is designed to uncover nuances in how participants think about Crimea in 
political terms. I am interested both in attitudes towards Ukraine and Russia and in the role of 
autonomy in their opinions about Crimea’s political status. The first section of this chapter 
revealed that most residents of Crimea of various national backgrounds consider the region’s 
autonomous status to be one of its most important characteristics, but how are their views on 
autonomy considered alongside their opinions towards Ukraine or Russia? As autonomy can be 
an important aspect of territorial identity in regions like Crimea (Safran and Maiz, 2000), it is 
important to consider the role of autonomy in shaping geopolitical opinions among residents of 
Crimea.  
I expected that most Russians would opt to have Crimea join Russia instead of remaining 
a part of Ukraine, although I also anticipated that autonomy would be favored over non-
autonomy within either state. I also expected that both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars would 
strongly favor Crimea remaining in Ukraine over becoming part of Russia, but autonomy would 
be very important to them as well. I expected that Russified Ukrainians would be more likely to 
opt for joining Russia than non-Russified Ukrainians, with or without autonomous status. I also 
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expected that Crimean Tatars would be more likely to opt for Crimean independence than any 
other group. 
 
Figure 16: Responses to the question, “what should Crimea’s political status be?” 
expressed as the percentages of each option chosen out of the total responses within each 
national group. 
	  
 
Answers to this question show a clear divide in opinions along national lines. As 
expected, Russians clearly show a much stronger preference for Crimea to join Russia compared 
to every other group, with 60.8% choosing to join Russia either with or without autonomy and 
only 24.9% choosing to remain in Ukraine with or without autonomy. Meanwhile, both Russified 
and non-Russified Ukrainians strongly prefer that Crimea remain a part of Ukraine to joining 
Russia with or without autonomy. A total of 53.9% of Russified Ukrainians chose to remain in 
Ukraine while only 34.2% chose to join Russia with or without autonomy. Non-Russified 
Ukrainians favor remaining in Ukraine even more strongly, with 80.8% choosing to remain in 
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Ukraine and only 15.1% choosing to join Russia. 56% of Crimean Tatars chose to remain in 
Ukraine with a mere 3% choosing to join Russia. Also as expected, Crimean Tatars are the most 
likely to favor independence for Crimea, with 32.8% of participants choosing this option.  
These results clearly suggest a sense of national identity inherent in Crimean residents’ 
attitudes towards regional geopolitics. Given their recent history of political struggle and the 
amount of pro-Russian political activism in the region, it is unsurprising that so many Russian 
participants would prefer for Crimea to join Russia if given the choice. As Ukrainians 
demonstrably identify more strongly with the Ukrainian state, their preference regardless of 
Russification to remain a part of Ukraine is also unsurprising. Because of their tribulations 
during the Soviet period and fear of Russian chauvinism in Crimea, Crimean Tatars 
understandably look to Kiev for protection of their political rights and indigenous status in their 
native region, and thus overwhelmingly favor remaining in Ukraine to joining Russia. Moreover, 
because Crimean Tatars identify nearly unanimously with Crimea as their national homeland, the 
fact that many also prefer independence for Crimea reflects a fairly strong sense of Crimean 
Tatar nationalism, of which territory and independence are intrinsic components (Gottman, 1973; 
Gellner, 1983). 
 More interesting, then, are the opinions expressed here within each group regarding 
regional autonomy. Regardless of opinion over which state Crimea belongs in, all groups 
overwhelmingly believe that it should remain autonomous. Only 11.9% of Russians would chose 
for Crimea to rejoin Russia as an oblast – that is, without autonomous status – which is more 
than four times fewer than the number who would opt for Crimea to join Russia while retaining 
its autonomy. More striking, we see that nearly twice as many Russians would opt for Crimea to 
remain an autonomous region of Ukraine (20.9%) rather than surrender its autonomy to be 
 163 
reunited with Russia (11.9%). Viewed another way, a combined total of 69.8% of Russians favor 
autonomy for Crimea, either within Ukraine or Russia, while only 15.9% would see it lose its 
autonomy under any circumstances.  
Similarly, one-fifth as many Russified Ukrainians chose to join Russia as an oblast (6%) 
than those who chose to join it as an autonomous republic (28.2%). Among those who chose to 
remain a part of Ukraine over four times more would have Crimea retain its autonomy (43.6%) 
than lose it (10.3%). In other words, 71.8% of Russified Ukrainians favor autonomy in either 
circumstance, while 16.3% favor a loss of Crimea’s autonomy. Among both non-Russified 
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars not a single participant chose to join Russia as an oblast, while 
small numbers of each did choose to join Russia as an autonomous republic. Non-Russified 
Ukrainians, despite their strong identity with the Ukrainian state, chose to keep Crimea’s 
autonomy within Ukraine over losing it by a greater than two-to-one ratio (54.8% versus 26%). 
Meanwhile, nearly five times as many Crimean Tatars chose autonomy over oblast status within 
Ukraine (47% to 9%). 
We may therefore conclude that all national groups uphold retention of regional 
autonomy as Crimea’s most important geopolitical objective among the given options, although 
opinions regarding which state autonomy should be upheld within differ according to national 
perspectives. To Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, who both look more to Kiev for protection of 
their cultural and linguistic rights than to the Russian-dominated Crimean government, autonomy 
does not appear to be an institution through which the achievement of national political goals 
may be facilitated. Crimea’s autonomy must therefore represent to them the political 
acknowledgement and institutionalization of the region’s distinct characteristics – as each group 
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understands and identifies with them – without the loss of cultural, linguistic, and political 
protection that the larger state offers them.  
For Russians Crimea’s autonomy has different meanings. On the one hand, it is the 
institution that provides political protection of their ethnic/national interests both in the region 
and within Ukraine at large, and so Russians would likely uphold regional autonomy more for 
political reasons than Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars. However, results of this section of the 
survey show that they would continue to uphold Crimea’s autonomous status if it were to 
become a part of Russia, where their ethnic/national interests would be essentially no different 
from those of the state. In other words, if Crimea were to become a part of Russia there would be 
no need for autonomy to safeguard Russian culture, language, and political interests against the 
nationalizing processes of a nation-state with which the region’s Russians weakly identify as 
Crimea’s autonomy does now within Ukraine. 
That Russians would uphold Crimea’s autonomy within Russia and would prefer 
autonomy within Ukraine to non-autonomy within Russia may initially seem to contradict the 
argument that they view the region from a broader Russian perspective. Their strong national 
identity should arguably drive a desire to be included in the Russian state over other geopolitical 
goals, in which case regional autonomy would no longer be required to protect the “Russian-
ness” of Crimea. I therefore argue that like Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, Russians in Crimea 
view regional autonomy primarily as the political acknowledgment and institutionalization of 
Crimea’s unique and distinctive characteristics as viewed from their own particular national 
perspective, as this chapter has demonstrated.  
As I have maintained, Crimean Russians take pride in a number of factors that are distinct 
to the region, but their understanding of these distinctions is filtered through a uniquely Russian 
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lens that leads them to cherish Crimea for the same reasons it is cherished within the broader 
Russian popular imagination. Their strong regional identity is a reflection of this understanding 
of Crimea and of the sense of pride they feel for being from a region of great importance in 
Russian history and culture more broadly. Crimean Russians thus view autonomy as the political 
expression of the region’s distinguishing characteristics as expressed through Russian national 
narratives. In this sense, Crimean Russians may feel privileged to call themselves Crimean 
among their fellow Russians. Autonomy within the Russian state, I argue, would continue to 
uphold this privileged distinction in the hearts and minds of Russians in Crimea. Even more 
telling is the fact that most Russians in Crimea would prefer that this distinction be upheld 
through regional autonomy even if it meant remaining within the Ukrainian state. For Russians, 
Crimea’s autonomy is an important aspect of regional identity because it reinforces their belief 
that their region is special within a greater national context. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter demonstrates that while Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars all appear 
to identify strongly with Crimea, national perspective largely determines which of its 
characteristics people choose to emphasize. In other words, perceptions of Crimea are shaped by 
larger national narratives that attribute different meaning and significance to Crimea from 
different national viewpoints. While all survey participants identify strongly with Crimea’s 
physical and aesthetic attributes, most also choose to emphasize the role of their own national 
group and de-emphasize the role of other national groups in their characterization of Crimea. 
Looking at Russians in Crimea specifically we see a tendency to also emphasize regional 
characteristics that, while not related to nationality per se, nevertheless imbue Crimea with a 
 166 
certain Russian character and endear it to the Russian nation as a whole. By choosing specifically 
to emphasize Crimea’s historic and contemporary role as the vacation destination of choice 
among Soviet/Russian holidaymakers, Russians in Crimea appear to relate to the region much in 
the same way that their co-nationals from outside the region would as well.  
 We also see that Crimea’s status as an autonomous republic – which is a political 
institution born of the need to protect the rights of ethnic/national minorities – is largely 
understood by Crimeans of all national background to represent and protect the region’s 
distinctive characteristics within larger territorial structures. While nationality influences belief 
in what these distinctive characteristics are, autonomy appears to be universally understood as an 
effective way to acknowledge and institutionalize these beliefs. Despite their national identity 
and a strong affinity for the Russian state, Russians in Crimea exhibit a pronounced attachment 
to the region and largely believe that autonomy should be in place to uphold its distinctive 
characteristics whether it is a part of Russia or Ukraine. In the remaining chapters I explore in 
detail the relationship between national and regional identity among Russians in Crimea and how 
they come together to form a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity. 
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Chapter VIII- Factors of Identity 
	  
Being a member of one’s nationality and living in Crimea both appear to be important 
aspects of identity among those who live in the region. As I demonstrated in previous chapters, 
many in Crimea feel a strong affinity for the region and consider it their “homeland.” However, 
nationality appears to be the lens through which most people in the region view and relate to 
Crimea, which implies a preeminence of national identity over regional/territorial identity. What 
is the nature of the relationship between nationality and territory in identity formation among 
residents of Crimea? How do residents relate to Crimea vis-à-vis other geographical and 
territorial scales that they live within? This chapter explores the dynamics among these various 
factors in identity formation for members of Crimea’s different national groups. 
This section of the survey presented participants with a list of eight identity factors and 
asked them to rate the importance of each one to their own sense of self-identity on a scale of 
one to five. Participants were asked to rate the following factors: 
 • Living in Their Town 
• Living in Crimea 
• Living in Ukraine 
• Living in Europe 
• Their Soviet Past 
• Their Nationality 
• Their Native Language 
• Their Religious Beliefs  
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Mean scores for each factor were calculated within each national group and a one-way analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) test was performed using the program SPSS Statistics in order to identify 
statistically significant differences between the mean scores both within each ethnic group and 
between them. For the purposes of this study, a level of 95% (α = .05) was chosen as the measure 
of statistical significance, as this is the most common and conventional confidence interval used 
in most analyses (Stevens, 1992). This means that if the ANOVA test between any two mean 
scores reveals a p-value that is less than or equal to the alpha (α) value of .05 we can assume 
with 95% confidence that the difference between the two mean values is representative of some 
real-world difference in attitudes towards this factor/question and not simply coincidental within 
the sample. In such a case we would fail to accept the null hypothesis of the ANOVA test that 
states that there is no significant difference between the two scores. The greater the number of 
null hypotheses that we are able to reject the more conclusions we are able to draw with at least 
95% confidence about the identity dynamics of survey participants.  
I expected “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” to be the most salient factors of 
identity among survey participants from all national backgrounds, while “Their Native 
Language” and “Their Religious Beliefs” would be of secondary importance. I expected “Living 
in Their Town,” “Living in Ukraine,” “Living in Europe,” and “Their Soviet Past” to be the least 
salient factors among all groups on average, although I expected that “Their Soviet Past” would 
rate higher among Russians and Russified Ukrainians and “Living in Ukraine” would rate higher 
among non-Russified Ukrainians. For the purposes of this study I am most interested in how the 
mean scores for the factors “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” varied compared to each 
other and to other factors. If the mean score for any one factor is determined to be higher at a 
statistically significant level (p-value ≤ .05) than another factor within a given group, then we 
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can logically conclude with at least 95% confidence that members of this group consider the first 
factor to be more important than the second. If the mean scores for a given factor vary at a 
statistically significant level between groups, then we can also conclude with at least 95% 
confidence that one group feels more strongly than the other that this factor is important to their 
identity.  
 
Results from Russians 
While Russians did rate the factors “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” highly as 
expected, these did not prove to be the most salient factors of identity for them. “Their Native 
Language” proved to be the most salient factor at a statistically significant level compared to all 
other factors, with a p-value of .003 compared to “Living in Crimea,” and .000 compared to all 
other factors. “Living in Crimea” ranked second among all factors, while “Their Nationality” 
ranked third. In other words, we can conclude with more than 99% confidence that Russian 
survey participants consider their native language to be the most salient factor of their identity 
among the factors listed in the survey. With a mean score of 4.44, this means that Russians rate 
their native language to be “quite important” to “very important” for their self-identification 
according the parameters of the likert scale used in this section. 
 
Mean scores for the factors “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” exhibit a 
difference of .10, which was determined to be not statistically significant. While both of these 
factors rate higher than “Living in Their Town” and “Their Religious Beliefs,” neither was 
determined to be significantly higher. In fact, none of these four factors was determined to be 
significantly higher than the other. We may conclude that Russians consider the importance of 
both living in their town and living in Crimea – as well as their nationality and religious beliefs – 
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to be roughly equivalent in importance to their self-identification. Each of these mean scores 
may be rounded to the nearest integer of 4, which means that Russians consider these factors to 
be “quite important” to one degree or another. 
 
Figure 17: Mean scores provided by Russians when rating the importance of various 
factors to their self-identification. 
 
 
“Living in Ukraine” and “Living in Europe” are by far the weakest factors of identity, 
both exhibiting p-values of .000 when compared to every other factor and therefore representing 
a significance level greater than 99.9%. With mean scores of 2.49 and 2.70 respectively there is 
no significant difference between these two factors, and both scores represent an evaluation of 
these factors as being somewhere between “somewhat important” and “important” for the 
identity of Russians in Crimea. While “Their Soviet Past” proved to be significantly more 
important than “Living in Ukraine” and “Living in Europe” (p = .000 in both cases), it is 
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significantly less important than every other factor (p = .000 in all cases). With a mean score of 
3.19 Russians consider it to be slightly more than “important” to their identity.  
 
Table 20: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores 
provided by Russians when rating the importance of various factors to their self-
identification. 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•Bold text and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Strikethrough text indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor 
in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value. 
 
From these results we are able to make some broad observations. When considering 
spatial/territorial components of their identity Russians appear to privilege the regional (Crimea) 
and local (their town) scales. Territorial identity at the scales of the nation-state (Ukraine) and 
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Living in 
Their Town  .052 .000 .000 .000 .521 .000 .581 
Living in 
Crimea .052  .000 .000 .000 .962 .003 .944 
Living in 
Ukraine .000 .000  .294 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Living in 
Europe .000 .000 .294  .000 .000 .000 .000 
Their 
Soviet Past .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
Their 
Nationality .521 .962 .000 .000 .000  .000 1.000 
Their 
Native 
Language .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
Their 
Religious 
Beliefs .581 .944 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000  
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the supra-state (Europe) are considerably lower among Russians in Crimea, which is consistent 
with previous findings (Efimov, 2008). Insofar as we can consider the factor “Their Soviet Past” 
to be reflective of an attachment to the territory of the former Soviet Union, identity at this scale 
is also considerably lower than at the regional and local scales among Russians in Crimea, 
though significantly higher than their identification with Ukraine and Europe. As I expected, we 
observe that territorial identity among Russians in Crimea is most salient at the regional scale. 
However, the local scale proved to be unexpectedly salient as well with no significant difference 
between the factors “Living in Their Town” and “Living in Crimea.”  
Nationality also proved to be a highly salient factor of identity for Russians in Crimea, as 
I expected. However, native language – which over 98% of Russian participants listed as being 
exclusively “Russian” – proved to be a much more important component of their identity than I 
anticipated, as it is by far the most highly rated factor. This tendency may be a reflection of the 
fact that many Russians in Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine believe that the Russian language is 
threatened there by Ukrainian state-building processes (Sasse, 2007). Religion also rates higher 
than I expected, although these results are consistent with previous studies (Korostelina, 2008b). 
It should be noted that 92.6% of Russian participants identified their religion as “Christian” or 
“Orthodox,” with 4.8% identifying as atheists and 2.4% divided among a number of other 
religions. 
Considered together, nationality, native language, and religion can all be understood as 
components of national identity (Eriksen, 2002). Although territory is also an important 
component of national identity that distinguishes one national group from another, for Russians 
at the regional scale (i.e.. within Crimea) the territorial component of identity must be considered 
separately from the national component because Crimea constitutes only a very small portion of 
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what is considered to be “Russian territory” in an ethnic and cultural sense, and lies outside of it 
in a geopolitical sense. In this way, identifying strongly with Crimea in and of itself does not 
necessarily reflect a strong national identity among Russians. For Russians living in Crimea, 
their nationality, native language, and religion can easily be contrasted with those of other non-
Russian national groups among which they live, but the mere fact that they live in Crimea does 
not distinguish them from these other groups.  
Thus, I interpret the high mean scores for the factors “Their Native Language,” “Their 
Nationality,” and “Their Religion” all to be indicative of strong national identity among Russians 
in Crimea, while high mean scores for “Living in Crimea” and “Living in Their Town” represent 
a territorial identity that is decoupled from national identity. To better understand the unique 
characteristics of these observations we must examine responses from other national groups 
included in the survey. 
 
Results for Ukrainians 
Since Crimea is included in the Ukrainian nation-state, Ukrainians living in Crimea may 
consider themselves to be “in place” at least at the state scale, despite the fact that they are a 
minority regionally. Because of their status as the “titular” people of their nation-state, I expected 
that Ukrainian participants would generally rate the factor “Living in Ukraine” higher than other 
national groups, with non-Russified Ukrainians rating it higher than Russified Ukrainians. 
However, I also expected that “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” would rate highly 
with Ukrainians as I expected it would with other national groups. The difference between 
Russified and non-Russified Ukrainians is crucial here, particularly because the factors “Their 
Nationality” and “Their Native Language” among Russified (Russian-speaking) Ukrainians are 
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not bound within a single national tradition as they are for non-Russified (Ukrainian-speaking) 
Ukrainians. Given the role that language has played in Ukrainian nation-building projects in the 
Soviet and post-Soviet periods, this disconnect between nationality and native language should 
presumably dilute Russified Ukrainians’ sense of national identity compared to those Ukrainians 
who indicate Ukrainian as their native language. 
As with Russians, we see that Russified Ukrainians rate “Living in Crimea” (mean = 
3.92) and “Their Native Language” (mean = 3.89) as the two most important factors of their 
identity. However, unlike with Russians, we see no significant difference between the mean 
scores for these two factors (p = 1.000), and in fact “Living in Crimea” rates slightly higher. 
Surprisingly, Russified Ukrainians rate “Living in Ukraine” rather low. With a mean score of 
3.18, it is significantly lower than both “Living in Crimea” (p = .001) and “Their Native 
Language” (p = .002). Interestingly, Russified Ukrainians did rate “Their Nationality” (mean = 
3.41) higher than the rated “Living in Ukraine,” but this difference is not significant (p = .907). 
In fact, the mean score for “Their Nationality” is not significantly higher or lower than that of 
any other factor of identity. Mean scores for both “Living in Their Town” (mean = 3.57) and 
“Their Religious Beliefs” (mean = 3.62) are significantly higher than “Living in Europe” (mean 
= 2.87) and “Their Soviet Past” (2.93) and not significantly lower than any other factor. “Living 
in Europe” and “Their Soviet Past” are not significantly different from each other (p = 1.000), 
but are significantly lower than every other factor except for “Living in Ukraine” and “Their 
Nationality.” 
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Figure 18: Mean scores provided by Russified Ukrainians when rating the importance of 
various factors to their self-identification. 
 
 
Among Russified Ukrainians territorial identity appears to be strongest at the regional 
scale (i.e., Crimea), though it is not significantly higher than the local scale (i.e., their town). 
While Russified Ukrainians do rate regional identity higher than identity with their nationality, 
native language, and religion, the difference is not significant in any case. Generally, the 
disconnect between nationality and native language seems to have created a weakened sense of 
both Ukrainian national and civic identity among Russified Ukrainians compared to non-
Russified Ukrainians (see below) and a heightened sense of regional identity in lieu of 
national/state identity. In this sense, Russified Ukrainians appear to relate to Crimea in a manner 
more similar to Russians than to non-Russified Ukrainians. The fact that Ukrainian nation-
building efforts have involved the heavy promotion and official use of the Ukrainian language 
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over Russian may account for a sense of alienation from the Ukrainian state among Russified 
Ukrainians similar to that of ethnic Russians in regions of Ukraine where Russian is more 
predominantly spoken, such as Crimea. 
 
Table 21: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores 
provided by Russified Ukrainians when rating the importance of various factors to their 
self-identification. 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•Bold text and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Strikethrough text indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor 
in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value. 
 
Looking at results from non-Russified Ukrainians, we see immediately that “Living in 
Europe” (mean = 2.97) and “Their Soviet Past” (mean = 2.72) are by far the two lowest-rated 
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Living in 
Their Town  .510 .345 .002 .008 .982 .643 1.000 
Living in 
Crimea .510  .001 .000 .000 .075 1.000 .696 
Living in 
Ukraine .343 .001  .686 .874 .907 .002 .206 
Living in 
Europe .002 .000 .686  1.000 .058 .000 .001 
Their 
Soviet Past .008 .000 .874 1.000  .140 .000 .003 
Their 
Nationality .982 .075 .907 .058 .140  .124 .930 
Their 
Native 
Language .643 1.000 .002 .000 .000 .124  .810 
Their 
Religious 
Beliefs 1.000 .696 .206 .001 .003 .930 .810  
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factors. With the one exception of “Living in Europe” versus “Living in Their Town” (p = .084), 
these two lowest-rated factors are significantly lower than every other factor and have no 
significant difference between them (p = .956). While non-Russified Ukrainians in Crimea  
appear largely to disassociate themselves from the Soviet Union and/or Russia, they do not 
appear to look to Europe as much as Ukrainians from other regions of Ukraine (Shulman, 1998). 
Instead, as I expected, we find that Ukrainian civic identity rates much higher, with the 
factor “Living in Ukraine” tying “Their Native Language” for the highest rated factor with a 
mean score of 4.13. The other factors that may be considered related to one’s nationality – “Their 
Nationality” and “Their Religious Belief” – also rated highly with mean scores of 4.01 and 3.76 
respectively. Meanwhile, the two sub-state territorial factors – “Living in Crimea” and “Living in 
Their Town” – also rated highly, although slightly lower than the national components with 
mean scores of 3.74 and 3.62 respectively.  
Figure 19: Mean scores provided by non-Russified Ukrainians when rating the importance 
of various factors to their self-identification. 
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Table 22: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores 
provided by non-Russified Ukrainians when rating the importance of various factors to 
their self-identification. 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•Bold text and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Strikethrough text indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor 
in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value. 
 
The results of the ANOVA test indicate that there are no significant differences between 
mean scores for each of the territorial factors at the local, regional, or state scale, and all factors 
related to nationality. In other words, there is no significant difference between any of the 
following factors: “Living in Their Town;” “Living in Crimea;” “Living in Ukraine;” “Their 
Nationality,” “Their Native Language;” and “”Their Religious Beliefs.” But for the one 
exception previously mentioned, all of these factors also rated significantly higher than “Living 
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Living in 
Their Town  .999 .321 .084 .002 .646 .321 .998 
Living in 
Crimea .999  .686 .016 .000 .927 .682 1.000 
Living in 
Ukraine .321 .682  .000 .000 1.000 1.000 .753 
Living in 
Europe .084 .016 .000  .956 .000 .000 .012 
Their 
Soviet Past .002 .000 .000 .956  .000 .000 .000 
Their 
Nationality .646 .927 1.000 .000 .000  1.000 .956 
Their 
Native 
Language .321 .682 1.000 .000 .000 1.000  .753 
Their 
Religious 
Beliefs .998 1.000 .753 .012 .000 .956 .753  
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in Europe” and “Their Soviet Past.” These results therefore suggest a strong sense of national 
identity among non-Russified Ukrainians because identity with both the Ukrainian state and with 
other trappings of nationality rate particularly high. As I have argued previously, for Ukrainians 
the local and regional scales are both nested within the Ukrainian nation-state and may therefore 
be considered a part of Ukrainians’ national territory. In this sense, the fact that non-Russified 
Ukrainians also rate “Living in Their Town” and “Living in Crimea” highly presents no conflict 
to their prevailing sense of national identity. Rather, Crimean regional identity is merely one 
aspect of an overriding national identity for these Ukrainians, which includes a strong attachment 
to their specific region of Ukraine as well as the entire state itself. 
Performing a one-way ANOVA test between mean scores of Ukrainian-speaking and 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians reveals a statistically significant difference only between the 
factors “Living in Ukraine” and “Their Nationality.” With a mean score of 4.13 versus 3.18, non-
Russified Ukrainians unsurprisingly rate the importance of “Living in Ukraine” significantly 
higher than Russified Ukrainians (p = .000). Moreover, “Their Nationality” also rates 
significantly higher (p = .003) among non-Russified Ukrainians (mean = 4.10) than Russified 
Ukrainians (mean = 3.41). Interestingly, while Russified Ukrainians do rate “Living in Crimea” 
to be more important than non-Russified Ukrainians (means = 3.93 and 3.74 respectively), this 
difference is not statistically significant (p = .290). This is also true for the factor “Their Native 
Language,” as the difference in mean scores between Russian speakers (mean = 3.89) and 
Ukrainian speakers (mean = 4.13) is not statistically significant (p = .215). 
The fact that there is no significant difference in attitudes towards native language 
between these groups suggests a high level of Russification among Ukrainians who speak 
Russian, as language appears to be no less important to their identity than it is to that of 
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Ukrainian speakers who, by all accounts, identify strongly with the Ukrainian nation, state, and 
language. Furthermore, regional identity appears to be fairly strong among both Russian and 
Ukrainian speakers despite their different attitudes towards state and nation, as both rate the fact 
that they live in Crimea as being closer to “quite important” than to “important.” However, I 
argue that survey results point to the notion that, for non-Russified Ukrainians, Crimean regional 
identity is a component of a broader sense of national identity in which Crimea represents their 
home region within the larger nation-state with which they identify strongly both in terms of 
nationality and territory. For Russified Ukrainians on the other hand, Crimea has become the 
primary scale at which they tend to identify in lieu of a broader national/state identity, as 
Russification has led to a relatively weak attachment both to their Ukrainian nationality and to 
the Ukrainian state. Thus, while strength of identification with Crimea appears fairly consistent 
between Russified and non-Russified Ukrainians, there are clear cultural and linguistic cleavages 
that affect the meaning of Crimea for both of these groups. 
 
Results for Crimean Tatars 
Because of their unique history and ethnogenesis, Crimean Tatars tend to view the 
relationship between nationality and territory very differently from other national groups in 
Crimea. The idea that Crimea alone constitutes their homeland has been the central component 
of Crimean Tatar identity and the Crimean Tatar national movement since at least the beginning 
of the Soviet period. In light of this, I expected Crimean Tatars to rate both “Living in Crimea” 
and “Their Nationality” extremely high, while identification at other geographic scales and 
especially with the factor “Their Soviet Past” would rate much lower given the oppression that 
Crimean Tatars experienced during the Soviet era.  
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Figure 20: Mean scores provided by Crimean Tatars when rating the importance of 
various factors to their self-identification. 
	  
 
 
 As expected, both “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” rated very highly among 
Crimean Tatars. Moreover, not only is there no statistically significant difference between the 
mean scores for these two factors, but there is no difference whatsoever; both factors received 
the same mean score of 4.49, which translates to a rating of halfway between “quite important” 
and “very important.” Further still, this mean score is nearly identical to both mean scores for the 
factors “Their Native Language” (mean = 4.57) and “Their Religious Beliefs” (mean = 4.55), 
meaning that the differences in mean between any two of these four factors did not receive a p-
value of less than .999. In other words, it appears rather conclusively that these four factors of 
identity are equally salient among Crimean Tatars. 
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Table 23: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores 
provided by Crimean Tatars when rating the importance of various factors to their self-
identification. 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•Bold text and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Strikethrough text indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor 
in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value. 
 
The four remaining factors each easily rated significantly lower than “Living in Crimea,” 
“Their Nationality,” “Their Native Language,” and “Their Religious Beliefs,” with p-values of 
.000 when compared to the mean scores of each of the four most salient factors. Among the four 
least salient factors, however, “Living in Their Town” easily rated the highest with a mean of 
3.74 and a p-value of .000 compared to each of the other three. “Living in Ukraine” and “Living 
in Europe” both came next with means of 3.10 and 3.02 respectively, which means the difference 
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Living in 
Their Town  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Living in 
Crimea .000  .000 .000 .000 1.000 .999 1.000 
Living in 
Ukraine .000 .000  .999 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Living in 
Europe .000 .000 .999  .000 .000 .000 .000 
Their 
Soviet Past .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
Their 
Nationality .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000  .999 1.000 
Their 
Native 
Language .000 .999 .000 .000 .000 .999  1.00 
Their 
Religious 
Beliefs .000 .999 .000 .000 .000 .999 1.000  
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between them is not statistically significant (p = .999), although they are both significantly 
higher than the least salient factor, “Their Soviet Past.” With a mean score of 2.35 the 
importance of the factor “Their Soviet Past” among Crimean Tatars proved to be significantly 
lower than every other factor with a p-value of .000 in every single case. 
The portrait painted by these results is rather striking as it depicts a clear hierarchy of 
identity factors among Crimean Tatars. As I expected, “Living in Crimea” and “Their 
Nationality” ranked extremely high, and the fact that “Their Native Language” and “Their 
Religious Beliefs” proved to be equally as salient speaks to the fundamental differences between 
Crimean Tatars and other national groups in Crimea. The Crimean Tatar concept of national 
territory is coterminous with the Crimean Peninsula and therefore not merely one region nested 
within a larger nation-state as it is for Ukrainians, or within a broad ethno-cultural or ethno-
linguistic region as it is for Russians. Therefore, unlike Ukrainians and Russians, living in and 
being from Crimea is an intrinsic component of national identity for Crimean Tatars that is 
inextricable from other components such as language and religion. Crimean Tatars feel that they 
are “in place” only in Crimea, as they made clear during their Soviet-era campaign for 
repatriation.  
Concerning the ratings given to the other four factors of identity, the most striking 
outcome is the low mean score given to “Their Soviet Past,” which follows my prediction. 
Because the Soviet regime was unduly oppressive towards the Crimean Tatars and, most 
importantly, robbed them of their national territory, the Soviet years are not remembered fondly 
by the Crimean Tatars. I interpret the fact that Crimean Tatars rated “Living in Ukraine” and 
“Living in Europe” so significantly higher than “Their Soviet Past” not to be a reflection of a 
particularly strong sense of civic Ukrainian or European identity, but rather an extremely 
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negative view of the Soviet Union and a desire among Crimean Tatars to disassociate from their 
tumultuous past. However, the mean scores given to the factors “Living in Ukraine” and “Living 
in Europe” do translate as “important” according to the Likert scale used, and may reflect the 
fact that Crimean Tatars have looked to Kiev and to various European organizations for support 
in their campaign to be recognized as the indigenous people of Crimea.  
The fact that “Living in Their Town” rated significantly higher than “Living in Ukraine” 
and “Living in Europe” appears to reflect a general trend among all national groups that 
participated in the survey of exhibiting a relatively high level of attachment to the local 
geographic scale, which is consistent with Tuan (1974). Regardless, the most important message 
to take away from these results is that, as their very ethnonym indicates, national and territorial 
identity for Crimean Tatars are both extremely and equally important to each other. At the scale 
of Crimea, nationality and territory are not decoupled for Crimean Tatars as they are for 
Russians, but are instead fused into a single indistinguishable facet of identity. 
 
Summary 
 In order to summarize the differences between responses given by Russians and other 
national groups to this section of the survey it is helpful to examine how the responses varied 
statistically. For this, I performed a one-way ANOVA test for each factor of identity between 
each group rather than within. This allows us to see whether ratings from group to group for each 
factor differ significantly from each other. For the sake of this study, I present only how ratings 
differ between Russians and each the other national groups. 
 As this table illustrates, Russians’ ratings of the factors “Living in Their Town” and 
“Living in Europe” do not significantly differ from any other group. This may be explained by 
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the fact that neither of these geographic scales – i.e., the local and the supra-state – can be 
considered the “national territory” of any of these groups, nor are they generally spaces through 
or within which their national identities can be expressed territorially. Thus, no one national 
group is more likely than the others to identify strongly at these geographic scales. 
 
Table 24: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test comparing mean scores 
provided by Russians to those provided by other groups when rating the importance of 
various factors to their self-identification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•Bold text and solid-line boxes indicate that the mean score for Russians is significantly higher 
than the mean score for the group listed in the column at the given p-value. 
•Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the mean score for Russians is significantly lower 
than the mean score for the group listed in the column at the given p-value. 
•Strikethrough text indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the mean 
score for Russians and the group listed in the column, with the given p-value. 
 
Russians rated the factor “Living in Crimea” significantly higher than non-Russified 
Ukrainians though significantly lower than Crimean Tatars and not significantly different from 
Russified Ukrainians. This may be accounted for by the fact that non-Russified Ukrainians more 
often identify with the Ukrainian state as a territorial component of their national identity, while 
Crimean Tatars identify exclusively with Crimea as the territorial component of their national 
identity. Russified Ukrainians, on the other hand, appear to associate less strongly with the 
Ukrainian state than their non-Russified co-nationals, and more strongly with Crimea much like 
Russians versus → 
Russified 
Ukrainians 
Non-
Russified 
Ukrainians 
Crimean 
Tatars 
Living in Their Town .189 .472 .961 
Living in Crimea .375 .046 .002 
Living in Ukraine .000 .000 .000 
Living in Europe .504 .288 .120 
Their Soviet Past .280 .058 .000 
Their Nationality .000 .980 .000 
Their Native Language .000 .317 .646 
Their Religious Beliefs .040 .456 .000 
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ethnic Russians. However, Russified Ukrainians do identify significantly more strongly with 
Ukraine than do Russians, as do both non-Russified Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. These 
results indicate that, regardless of their degree of Russification, Ukrainians more often identify 
with the Ukrainian state than do Russians, as Russians have generally found it difficult to accept 
and embrace the fact that they are citizens of Ukraine rather than Russia (Sasse, 2007). 
Furthermore, Crimean Tatars generally view the Ukrainian state as a guarantor of their 
indigenous rights and safeguard against potential Russian chauvinism, and thus consider living in 
Ukraine to be more important than do Russians. 
 Interestingly, only Crimean Tatars consider their Soviet past to be significantly less 
important to their identity than Russians, which makes sense considering their experiences in the 
Soviet era. Insofar as they may identify culturally and linguistically in a manner similar to 
Russians, some Russified Ukrainians may also view the Soviet period as a time when they were 
part of a dominant and privileged nation. I find it most surprising that non-Russified Ukrainians 
do not feel significantly differently towards their Soviet past than do Russians, though this may 
simply reflect the fact that they live in a region of Ukraine that clings to its Soviet heritage more 
tenaciously than other regions (Sasse, 2007). It is worth noting, though, that the p-value for the 
difference between mean scores of Russian and Non-Russified Ukrainian ratings of the factor 
“Their Soviet Past” is not significant by only a very small margin at .056. 
 Looking at the factors related to national identity (“Their Nationality,” “Their Native 
Language,” and “Their Religious Beliefs”), we find no significant differences between ratings 
from Russians and those from non-Russified Ukrainians. Compared to Russified Ukrainians, 
however, we see that Russians rated these factors significantly higher in every case. These results 
reflects the idea that identity for Russified Ukrainians combines elements of their “Ukrainian-
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ness” and their “Russian-ness,” which, these results suggest, has made the concepts of nation, 
native language, and religion more ambiguous in terms of personal identity when compared to 
ethnic Russians and non-Russified Ukrainians in Crimea. As for Crimean Tatars, they rate “Their 
Nationality” and “Their Religious Beliefs” as significantly more important than do Russians, 
though we see no significant difference when it comes to “Their Native Language.” As a 
regional minority group that has struggled against discrimination and political obstacles to 
reclaim its place in Crimea, these elements of national identity have proved vital to the Crimean 
Tatars’ resilience.  
However, concerning native language, all three of Crimea’s predominant national groups 
may view theirs as a minority language in one way or another. For Russians, theirs is a minority 
(i.e., unofficial) language at the state scale, and many feel that the Russian language is often 
threatened by Ukrainian laws regarding language education and official usage (Sasse, 2007). For 
non-Russified (Ukrainian-speaking) Ukrainians, theirs is a minority language at the regional 
scale (i.e., Crimea) since Russian is by far the most predominate language used in Crimea. And 
for Crimean Tatars, theirs is a minority language both regionally and state-wide. Hence, 
members of each group may feel that their language is threatened within a certain spatial and/or 
cultural context, and thus each equally consider it an extremely important aspect of their 
identities. Additionally, it is important to remember that the mean score for “Their Native 
Language” is the single highest among all factors for every national group. 
Together, these results further suggest that how members of different national groups 
view Crimea is closely related to the meaning of Crimea from their own national perspective. 
Because territory is an integral component of what defines a nation (Gottman, 1973), territory 
becomes an integral component of national identity. Crimean Tatars consider Crimea alone to be 
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their national territory and thus an inseparable component of their national identity as these 
survey results have shown. Because Crimea now lies within the boundaries of Ukrainian national 
territory, for ethnic Ukrainians to identify strongly with the Ukrainian state does not preclude 
identifying strongly with Crimea as well. Because Crimea and Ukraine lie within an ordered 
territorial hierarchy, identity for ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea – especially those who are non-
Russified – may conveniently follow the model of a “hierarchy of geographically based 
identities” (Kaplan, 1999). In other words, for ethnic Ukrainians living in Crimea and living 
within their larger nation-state are simultaneous and not mutually exclusive processes, and so 
having a strong regional identity does not necessarily contradict a strong national identity. 
Russians, on the other hand, must relate to Crimea in much different terms. While Crimea 
does hold great significance for the Russian nation at large and thus may foster an attachment to 
the region based on national sentiment, Russians must contend with the fact that, since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, to live in Crimea is to live outside of their national territory in 
political terms. Although Russians may view Crimea as part of their national territory it is only 
in a cultural and linguistic sense today, as Crimea no longer lies nested within a territorial 
hierarchy bound politically within a Russian or Russian-dominated nation-state. Within its 
current (Ukrainian) territorial hierarchy, Crimea remains the primary territory that Russians may 
consider a vestige of their own national territory, i.e., the best territorial expression of “Russian-
ness” within Ukraine or any larger scale. For these Russians, Crimea is the only territory within a 
politically-organized territorial hierarchy where their national culture and language may be 
considered dominant and where Russian heritage is most deeply ingrained and palpable. 
Therefore, in lieu of inclusion in their nation’s broader national territory (i.e., the Russian 
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Federation), Crimea is the closest thing they have to a space within which their nationality can 
find territorial expression. 
While Russians and other groups do relate to Crimea in other non-national terms, the 
results of this section of the survey indicate that nationality accounts for important differences in 
perceptions of Crimea. Regional identity is clearly strong for all national groups, but for different 
reasons related to Crimea’s meaning to different national groups. However, these results do not 
give us a complete sense of the roles that nationality and territory play across various scales. At 
which territorial scales do members of each of these groups most identify with their co-
nationals? At which scales is nationality less important for group identity than simply a 
recognition of shared territory? These questions are explored in the following chapter. 
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Chapter IX - Nationality and Scale in Group Identities 
  
In previous chapters I established the significance of nationality and territory in identity 
formation among Crimea’s various national groups. As I demonstrated, factors related to 
nationality appear to be the most salient aspects of identity among members of each national 
group, and a strong regional identity is thus derived in different ways according to different 
national perspectives and narratives of Crimea. However, these observations do not fully address 
the dynamics between nationality and territory at play in identity formation in Crimea. Because 
of its geopolitical history and ethnic diversity, Crimea is situated within a number of different 
territorial structures, each with contested meanings for members of its various national groups. 
Furthermore, there are spatial scales below the regional that also appear important according to 
survey results. Because nationality is such an important aspect of identity, then at which spatial 
scales do various groups in Crimea believe that their nationality is most clearly expressed and 
embodied? Moreover, are there any spatial scales at which a sense of community and/or shared 
space – and not nationality – constitute the most salient aspect of group identity? In other words, 
does national identity begin to break down at any particular spatial scale? These questions help 
us arrive at an understanding of how nationality and territory may be either convergent or 
divergent as key elements of individual and group identity within the former Soviet Union and 
beyond. 
This section of the survey was designed to compare and contrast the salience of national 
and territorial identity across the hierarchy of spatial scales within which residents of Crimea 
live. Participants were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 how strongly they identify with the 
groups “Members of Their Nationality” and “Members of All Nationalities” at each of the 
following spatial scales: Their Town, Crimea, Ukraine, Europe, the Former USSR, and 
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Worldwide. A rating of “1” indicates that that the participant “does not identify with this group 
of people to any degree,” while a rating of “5” indicates that they “completely identify with this 
group of people.” As with the previous section of the survey, mean scores were calculated from 
the responses for each ethnic group and a one-way ANOVA test was applied in order to 
determine whether there are statistically significant differences within and between the responses 
of each group. 
 I expected participants from all groups to rate that they identify more strongly with 
members of their own nationality than with members of all nationalities at every scale. I also 
expected ratings of either group to be highest at the regional scale (i.e., in Crimea), followed by 
the local scale (i.e., their town), and to taper off as the spatial scales grew larger. These 
expectations are based on the assumption that all groups exhibit both strong regional and national 
identity. The purpose of this section of the survey, however, is to examine how both national and 
territorial identity become stronger or weaker across spatial scales. How strongly one identifies 
with members of their own nationality is an indication of national identity at a given scale, while 
the strength of their identity with members of all nationalities is an indication of territorial 
identity at a given scale, as territory, not nationality, is the common factor for all those within 
this category. If, for example, survey participants were to rate their identity with members of all 
nationalities higher than with members of their own nationality at a given scale, we could 
surmise that territorial identity is more salient at this scale than national identity. This approach 
gives us a more nuanced understanding of how Russians and other national groups perceive 
Crimea and its role in identity dynamics. 
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Results for Russians 
 As I expected, Russians rated their identification with members of their own nationality 
higher than with members of all nationalities at every spatial scale. Furthermore, the difference 
in mean scores between “Members of Their Nationality” and “Members of All Nationalities” is 
statistically significant at every scale, with p-values of .000 in every case except for 
“Worldwide,” which returned a p-value of .041. Among the ratings for “Members of All 
Nationalities” at each scale only the “Former Soviet Union” and “Worldwide” proved 
significantly higher than the others; the rest were not significantly different from each other with 
a rating of approximately ”3,” meaning they “identify with this group in general.” These results 
defied my expectations regarding identity at larger scales, as “Worldwide” appears to be the 
single most salient scale at which Russians identify with people of all nationalities, suggesting a 
somewhat well-developed sense of cosmopolitanism among Russians in Crimea. 
Examining the responses for “Members of Their Nationality” at each scale reveals a 
much different picture. “Their Town” is the single highest rated scale, though its mean score of 
4.02 barely surpasses “Crimea’s” mean score of 4.01. Moreover, there is no significant 
difference between the mean scores of “Their Town,” “Crimea,” “Ukraine,” or the “Former 
USSR.” “Worldwide” (mean = 3.58) and “Europe” (mean = 3.46) proved to be the lowest rated 
factors, each with a p-value of .000 compared to “Their Town” and “Crimea,” however 
“Worldwide” was not significantly different from “Ukraine.”  
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Figure 21: Mean scores provided by Russians when rating their identification with 
members of their own nationality and members of all nationalities at various spatial scales. 
Black bars represent mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” at each given scale, and 
grey bars represent mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities” at each given scale. 
 
These results suggest that among Russians in Crimea, national identity remains relatively 
constant across scales both below and above the regional scale despite my expectations that they 
would be strongest within Crimea and “Their Town.” Considering the four scales at which 
Russians identify most strongly with other Russians – their town, Crimea, Ukraine, and the  
former Soviet Union – we may observe that the common thread among them is that they all have 
sizeable Russian populations. We may assume given the overall ethnic makeup of Crimea that 
most towns in which survey participants live have a majority Russian population. Crimea is of 
course dominated by Russians, and both Ukraine and the region of the former Soviet Union 
include large Russian populations throughout. Even though I determined in the previous chapter 
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that Russians do not identify particularly strongly with Ukraine or their “Soviet past,” national 
identity remains strong within these territorial structures for Russians in Crimea. Europe, on the 
other hand, appears to be a space in which Russian national identity is too abstract of a concept, 
since the previous section demonstrates that Russians in Crimea do not display a strong 
European identity in the first place. The fact that Russians do not identify strongly with all 
Russians worldwide may suggest a sense of disassociation with Russian diaspora communities 
outside of the former Soviet Union.  
 
Table 25: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores 
provided by Russians when rating their identification with groups of people at various 
spatial scales. 
Their Nationality Their Town Crimea Ukraine Europe 
Former 
USSR Worldwide 
Their Town  1.00 .664 .000 .156 .000 
Crimea 1.000  .739 .000 .204 .000 
Ukraine .664 .739  .007 1.000 .282 
Europe .000 .000 .007  .103 .985 
Former USSR .156 .204 1.000 .103  .833 
Worldwide .000 .000 .282 .985 .833  
       
All Nationalities Their Town Crimea Ukraine Europe 
Former 
USSR Worldwide 
Their Town  1.000 .993 .886 .996 .288 
Crimea 1.000  .979 .805 .999 .395 
Ukraine .993 .979  1.000 .558 .012 
Europe .886 .805 1.00  .220 .001 
Former USSR .996 .999 .558 .220  .929 
Worldwide .288 .395 .012 .001 .929  
 
•Bold text and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Strikethrough text indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor 
in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value. 
 
If we consider the results from this section of the survey and the previous one, then an 
image begins to emerge about the nature of a “Crimean-Russian” sense of identity. While 
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regional and national identity both appear to be important components of identity among 
Russians in Crimea, there does not appear to be a strong sense of a Russian community at the 
regional scale, as their identification with Russians in Crimea is not significantly stronger than 
with Russians in their town, in Ukraine, or in the former Soviet Union. In other words, the space 
within which they most identify with other Russians transcends the territory with which they 
most strongly identify. Furthermore, Crimean regional identity among Russians does not appear 
to mean a stronger identification with people of all nationalities living in Crimea than at any 
other spatial scale. In this sense, they do not appear to feel that they are a member of a 
multinational community in Crimea any more so than they are of such a community within their 
town, Ukraine, Europe, the former Soviet Union, or the entire world.  
These observations present a complicated relationship between national and regional 
identity for Russians living in Crimea. Although nationality is clearly a crucial element of their 
identity, living in and identifying strongly with Crimea appears on the one hand to be decoupled 
from their national identity, while being closely correlated to it in many ways on the other. How, 
then, are these two correlated aspects of identity reconciled into something that we might call a 
sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity? I argue that Russians’ regional/Crimean identity is 
primarily a derivation of their national identity, in that they view it and relate to it from a 
uniquely Russian perspective. More so than other national groups in Crimea, Russians have 
internalized Crimea’s meaning and significance within a broader Russian context, and their 
strong identification with the region can be interpreted as a sense of pride in the fact that they are 
from a place of great importance to the Russian nation in its broadest sense. In other words, the 
term “Crimean-Russian” identity should not be understood as an articulated sense of community 
among Russians specifically at this regional scale, but rather as an expression of their attachment 
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to Crimea derived from the internalization of its particular meaning and significance for their 
broader national identity.  
 
Results for Ukrainians 
 The dynamic between nationality and territory in identity formation among Russified 
Ukrainians appears to be very different from that of ethnic Russians in Crimea. In particular, 
mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” are not significantly higher than mean scores 
for “Members of All Nationality” at every scale as they are among Russians. We see a 
statistically significant difference between mean scores only at the following scales: town (p = 
.004); Crimea (p = .012); and Ukraine (p = .003). At the scales of Europe (p = .478), the Former 
Soviet Union (p = .211), and worldwide (p = 1.000), we see no significant difference between 
the salience of Russified Ukrainians’ identification with other Ukrainians and with members of 
all nationalities within a given territory. In fact, among responses from Russified Ukrainians we 
find the only instance in the entire study where the mean score for “Members of All 
Nationalities” is higher than the mean score for “Members of Their Nationality” at a given scale 
(worldwide), although with a difference of .04 and a p-value of 1.000, this difference is hardly 
significant. This could reflect both a sense of cosmopolitanism and the diluted sense of 
Ukrainian national identity among Russified Ukrainians that I identified in the previous chapter. 
Between mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” we find statistically significant 
differences only between “Their Town” and “Europe” (p = .013) and “Ukraine” and “Europe” (p 
= .036). Furthermore, p-values between the three highest-rated scales for “Members of Their 
Nationality” (Town, Crimea, Ukraine) all proved to be 1.000 and are therefore rather 
conclusively not significant. Between mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities,” we see a 
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statistically significant difference only between the scales of “Europe” and “worldwide” (p = 
.010). In other words, while “worldwide” ranks highest among all these scales – again indicating 
a somewhat developed sense of cosmopolitanism – it is not significantly higher than the sense of 
identification with all people at the scale of the town, Crimea, Ukraine, or the Former Soviet 
Union. Looking at these results both for “Members of Their Nationality” and “Members of All 
Nationalities” in a different way, we can conclude that Russified Ukrainians’ identification both 
with other Ukrainians and with members of all national groups is no more salient at the regional 
scale (i.e., in Crimea) than it is at any other scale. In other words, identifying with Crimea does 
not appear to mean a stronger identification with others who also live in Crimea. This 
observation suggests that trends of identity among Russified Ukrainians follow those of Russians 
in Crimea in that, in both cases, salience of territorial identity does not appear to be congruent 
with group identity bounded by the same territory.   
This generally narrow dichotomy between identity with other Ukrainians and members of 
all nationalities living at each of the spatial scales in question parallels the relative weakness with 
which Russified Ukrainians identify with their nationality, as described in Chapter Eight. The 
very fact that they have been Russified – that is, that they consider Russian to be their native 
language rather than Ukrainian – indicates a lack of engagement with and attachment to a 
Ukrainian heritage. We see this disengagement reflected in the relative weakness of Russified 
Ukrainians’ identification with other Ukrainians at scales larger than the nation-state (Ukraine). 
Their Ukrainian nationality appears to be strong enough to serve as a rallying point for group 
identity at the local, regional, and state scales, but beyond that the notion of Ukrainian national 
identity begins to weaken vis-à-vis group identification defined by territory but not by 
nationality. 
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Figure 22: Mean scores provided by Russified Ukrainians when rating their identification 
with members of their own nationality and members of all nationalities at various spatial 
scales. 
Black bars represent mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” at each given scale, and 
grey bars represent mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities” at each given scale. 
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Table 26: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores 
provided by Russified Ukrainians when rating their identification with groups of people at 
various spatial scales. 
Their Nationality Their Town Crimea Ukraine Europe 
Former 
USSR Worldwide 
Their Town  1.000 1.000 .013 .289 .378 
Crimea 1.000  1.000 .059 .600 .702 
Ukraine 1.000 1.000  .036 .482 .587 
Europe .013 .059 .036  .995 .986 
Former USSR .289 .600 .482 .995  1.000 
Worldwide .378 .702 .587 .986 1.000  
       
All Nationalities Their Town Crimea Ukraine Europe 
Former 
USSR Worldwide 
Their Town  1.000 1.000 .673 .970 .835 
Crimea 1.000  1.000 .779 .989 .741 
Ukraine 1.000 1.000  .891 .998 .595 
Europe .673 .779 .891  1.000 .010 
Former USSR .970 .989 .998 1.000  .081 
Worldwide .835 .741 .595 .010 .081  
 
•Bold text and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Strikethrough text indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor 
in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value. 
 
 Among non-Russified Ukrainians the picture is somewhat similar. As is the case of 
Russified Ukrainians, we see a significant difference between the salience of identity with other 
Ukrainians and with members of all nationalities only at the scales of town (p = .000), Crimea (p 
= .000), and Ukraine (p = .000). Although “Members of Their Nationality” did rate higher than 
“Members of All Nationalities” at all scales, the difference is not significant at the scales of 
Europe (p = .356), the former Soviet Union (p = .479), and worldwide (p = .497). Between 
responses for “Members of Their Nationality” at each scale we see that the lowest-rated scale 
(Europe) is significantly lower than the three highest scales of town (p = .006), Crimea (p = 
.028), and Ukraine (p = .002). The second lowest-rated scale (worldwide) is only significantly 
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lower than the highest-rated (Ukraine, p = .044). With these exceptions we see no significant 
differences between mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” at any scale. Additionally, 
we see no significant differences whatsoever between any mean scores for “Members of All 
Nationalities” at any scale. 
Figure 23: Mean scores provided by non-Russified Ukrainians when rating their 
identification with members of their own nationality and members of all nationalities at 
various spatial scales. 
Black bars represent mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” at each given scale, and 
grey bars represent mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities” at each given scale. 
  
Focusing on responses to the scale of Crimea we may ascertain that non-Russified 
Ukrainians do conceive of and identify with a Ukrainian community of Crimea more so than 
they do of such a community at the scales of Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the entire 
world, but no more or less than they do at the scales of their town and Ukraine. Moreover, non-
Russified Ukrainians do not appear to have developed a sense of non-national, territorially-
 201 
defined group identification with all residents of Crimea any more or less than they have at any 
other scale.  
Table 27: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores 
provided by non-Russified Ukrainians when rating their identification with groups of 
people at various spatial scales. 
Their Nationality Their Town Crimea Ukraine Europe 
Former 
USSR Worldwide 
Their Town  1.000 1.000 .006 .233 .093 
Crimea 1.000  1.000 .028 .524 .277 
Ukraine 1.000 1.000  .002 .127 .044 
Europe .006 .028 .002  .988 1.000 
Former USSR .233 .524 .127 .988  1.000 
Worldwide .093 .277 .044 1.000 1.000  
       
All Nationalities Their Town Crimea Ukraine Europe 
Former 
USSR Worldwide 
Their Town  1.000 .979 .765 1.000 1.000 
Crimea 1.000  1.000 .986 1.000 1.000 
Ukraine .979 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 
Europe .765 .986 1.000  .969 .997 
Former USSR 1.000 1.000 1.000 .969  1.000 
Worldwide 1.000 1.000 1.000 .997 1.000  
 
•Bold text and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Strikethrough text indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor 
in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value. 
 
In general, we may gather from these survey results that for Ukrainians, whether or not 
they have been Russified, nationality is an important basis for group identification only at those 
scales that may be considered part of Ukrainian national territory. In other words, only at the 
scales of their town, Crimea, and Ukraine do Ukrainians identify significantly more strongly 
with their fellow Ukrainians than they do with all people who inhabit the same territory 
regardless of nationality. The salience of national identity at these scales does appear to be 
stronger among non-Russified Ukrainians than Russified Ukrainians, however both groups do 
 202 
identify significantly more strongly with other Ukrainians than members of all nationalities 
living at these scales. At larger scales where Ukrainian national territory constitutes only a small 
portion of the total territory (Europe, former Soviet Union, and the world), Ukrainian nationality 
does not appear to be any more potent of a basis for group identification than simply a sense of 
mutually-inhabited territory.  
These findings lend further credence to my argument that Crimean residents’ attitudes 
towards the region are shaped by the prevailing national narratives to which they ascribe. As 
Ukrainian national narratives about Crimea emphasize the region’s role in Ukrainian nation- and 
state-building processes, Ukrainians in Crimea tend to view it as only a portion of the space in 
which their national culture and community may prosper and flourish, i.e., their national territory 
(the state of Ukraine). This view of Crimea would explain why, among both Russified and non-
Russified Ukrainians, the strength of identification with other Ukrainians is significantly higher 
than the strength of identification with members of all national groups at those scales at and 
below the nation-state (town, Crimea, and Ukraine), but not at larger scales beyond the 
boundaries of Ukrainian national territory. Although Russification has diluted national identity 
among some Ukrainians in Crimea, it does not appear to impair the primary sense of national 
identity bound by Ukrainian national space. While Ukrainians generally do tend to identify 
strongly with Crimea as their home region, they appear to relate to it as merely a piece of the 
larger territory that is the spatial expression of their national identity, i.e., the state of Ukraine.  
 
Results for Crimean Tatars 
 Much like survey results from Russians, we see that Crimean Tatars identify significantly 
more strongly with members of their own nationality than with members of all national groups at 
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every scale with a p-value of .000 in each case. Comparing only the ratings for “Members of 
Their Nationality,” we see that “Crimea” is the single highest rated scale but find no significant 
differences between mean scores for any of the scales “Their Town,” “Crimea,” and “Ukraine.”  
We also find no significant differences between any of the scales “Europe,” “Former Soviet 
Union,” and “Worldwide.” However, mean scores for both “Their Town” and “Crimea” are 
significantly higher than those for “Europe,” “Former Soviet Union,” and “Worldwide” with a p-
value of .001 or lower in each case, while the mean score for “Ukraine” is only significantly 
higher than that of “Europe” (p = .020). Examining ratings for “Members of All Nationalities,” 
significant differences emerge only when we compare the mean score for “Europe” against the 
mean scores of “Their Town” (p = .010) and “Crimea” (p = .021), where “Europe” rates 
significantly lower. 
 These results are reflective of the national solidarity felt among Crimean Tatars that has 
been galvanized by their struggle for recognition, rights, and territory. This solidarity is most 
clearly expressed in the starkly significant divide between the salience of Crimean Tatars’ 
identification with other Crimean Tatars and with members of all nationalities at all spatial 
scales. Moreover, the Crimean Tatars’ attachment to Crimea and their contention that Crimea 
alone constitutes their homeland and national territory are also apparent within these survey 
results. Identification with other Crimean Tatars in Crimea is indeed the single highest-rated 
nationally- and spatially-defined group among Crimean Tatar survey participants, which reflects 
the inextricable relationship between Crimean Tatar national identity and the territory of Crimea 
itself.  
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Figure 24: Mean scores provided by Crimean Tatars when rating their identification with 
members of their own nationality and members of all nationalities at various spatial scales. 
 
Black bars represent mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” at each given scale, and 
grey bars represent mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities” at each given scale. 
 
However, the mean score for identification with other Crimean Tatars in Crimea is not 
significantly higher than those for identification with other Crimea Tatars within survey 
participants’ towns, or within Ukraine. I argue that this is due to the fact that these three scales 
represent those where Crimean Tatars make up a significant minority of the population, where 
they may gain effective political and social influence, and hence where they may hope to affect 
real change in line with their national goals and agenda. Of the three national groups that are the 
focus of this study (Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars), Crimean Tatars are the only 
group that is a minority at every spatial scale examined, and thus the struggle for minority rights 
has become a central component of their national movement and of their national narratives. 
Because Crimean Tatars have a voice in local, regional, and state political and social institutions, 
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these have become the most important spatial scales at which Crimean Tatars express their 
national solidarity (see Chapter Three).  
Table 28: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores 
provided by Crimean Tatars when rating their identification with groups of people at 
various spatial scales. 
Their Nationality Their Town Crimea Ukraine Europe 
Former 
USSR Worldwide 
Their Town  1.000 .637 .000 .001 .000 
Crimea 1.000  .156 .000 .000 .000 
Ukraine .637 .156  .020 .488 .254 
Europe .000 .000 .020  .983 .999 
Former USSR .001 .000 .488 .983  1.000 
Worldwide .000 .000 .254 .999 1.000  
       
All Nationalities Their Town Crimea Ukraine Europe 
Former 
USSR Worldwide 
Their Town  1.000 .908 .010 .600 .867 
Crimea 1.000  .964 .021 .740 .940 
Ukraine .908 .964  .597 1.000 1.000 
Europe .010 .021 .597  .907 .706 
Former USSR .600 .740 1.000 .907  1.000 
Worldwide .867 .940 1.000 .706 1.000  
 
•Bold text and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Italic text and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the 
factor in the column at the given p-value. 
•Strikethrough text indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor 
in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value. 
 
We therefore see that the strength of Crimean Tatar national identity does in fact 
transcend the territorial bounds of Crimea, despite their tenacious attachment to this territory as 
demonstrated in previous chapters. I contend that these findings further suggest that, among all 
national groups in Crimea, territorial identities are informed and shaped by the prevailing 
national narratives about a given territory to which a group or individual ascribes. Crimean 
Tatars may identify significantly more strongly with Crimea than with any other territory, but 
where national solidarity and the pursuit of national goals are concerned they do not appear to 
 206 
identify significantly more strongly with the Crimean Tatar community of Crimea than with that 
of any other territorial scale where their voices have a chance of being heard.  
 
Summary 
 Among all groups examined in this study we see some clear similarities in the ways 
nationality and territory shape group identification. Broadly speaking, nationality is a greater 
unifying factor than a sense of mutually-inhabited territory in the formation of group 
identification, as all groups identify significantly more strongly with members of their own 
nationality than with members of other nationalities in the majority of cases and scales. We also 
see very few cases within each group of statistically significant differences between 
identification with members of all nationalities at various spatial scales. In other words, senses of 
non-nationality-based, spatially-defined communities are typically no stronger at any one scale 
than another among members of each national group examined, with some exceptions. 
 Where we see the most variability in group identification across spatial scales, then, is 
within the responses to the category of “Members of Their Nationality.” In general, a sense of 
one’s national community appears to be least salient at supra-state scales – in particular within 
Europe, and to a lesser extent within the former Soviet Union and worldwide depending on the 
national group. Interestingly, within responses from all groups we find no significant differences 
between the strength of identity with members of one’s own national group at any state or sub-
state scale. In other words, the strength of survey participants’ senses of national community is 
statistically consistent within their town, Crimea, and Ukraine, regardless of their nationality. 
I argue that these findings dispel any notion of there being a particularly salient sense of 
various national communities within Crimea specifically. Russians, for example, do not appear 
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to feel that they are a part of a community of ethnic Russians in Crimea any more strongly than 
they feel they are a part of a community of ethnic Russians in their own town, in Ukraine, or 
within the former Soviet Union. The same is true for Crimea’s Ukrainians (both Russified and 
non-Russified) and Crimean Tatars, at least in regard to their towns and Ukraine. We know from 
previous chapters, though, that Crimean identity (i.e., the importance of living in Crimea to one’s 
identity) is particularly strong among all national groups. We may therefore surmise that national 
and territorial identity constitute separate but related processes, where national identity is not 
simultaneously “contained” spatially by an expressed sense of territorial identity at a given scale. 
I maintain that the relationship between national and territorial identification processes lies in the 
fact that national perspective shapes the ways in which groups and individuals perceive and 
relate to a given territory. 
 Returning to the central focus of this study, the results of this chapter lend further support 
to my argument that a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity does not denote an articulated sense 
of community among ethnic Russians in Crimea to the exclusion of such national communities 
existing at other territorial scales. Rather, as I have argued, “Crimean-Russian” identity must be 
understood as an attachment to and identification with Crimea that is shaped by the 
internalization of Russian national narratives about Crimea’s role in Russian history and culture, 
and its significance in the Russian national psyche. While Crimean identity does not appear to 
inspire any particular sense of Russian national community that is regionally confined, Russian 
national identity certainly inspires a particular kind of attachment to and identification with 
Crimea itself. 
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Chapter X - Conclusions 
  
By examining these survey results, I have illuminated the attitudes and perceptions of 
Crimea’s three primary national groups regarding their own senses of national and regional 
identity and how the two are interrelated. Chapter Six demonstrates through an analysis of a 
cognitive mapping exercise that Russian, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars alike tend to view 
Crimea as their “homeland,” although to varying degrees. The Crimean cities that residents deem 
to be the most important also appears to vary depending on nationality, as Russians are more 
likely than Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars to include on their cognitive maps the cities of 
Sevastopol and Yalta, which, as I have demonstrated, hold special meaning in Russian and 
Soviet national narratives.  
Chapter Seven reveals that while all national groups relate strongly to Crimea’s physical 
and natural characteristics, Russians are more likely than others to emphasize the region’s role in 
past wars and its status as a tourist center among Crimea’s primary distinguishing characteristic, 
reflecting the role that Crimea has played in broader Russian national narratives. Also revealed 
in Chapter Seven is the fact that members of all national groups support and uphold Crimea’s 
autonomous status as the recognition and institutionalization of its unique characteristics. Most 
importantly, while Russians in Crimea would generally prefer that Crimea be a part of Russia 
and not of Ukraine, they favor autonomy for Crimea regardless to which state it belongs. 
Furthermore, more Russians would prefer that Crimea remain an autonomous republic of 
Ukraine than would prefer that it join the Russian Federation as an oblast (non-autonomous 
territory). This trend indicates that many Russians in Crimea view the retention of autonomy as a 
more important political objective than reunification with Russia, which suggests that nationalist 
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or revanchist sentiments among the Russian population of Crimea may be less potent than is 
often assumed. 
Chapter Eight demonstrates that factors relating to national identity (i.e., “Their 
Nationality,” “Their Native Language,” and “Their Religious Beliefs”) are among the most 
salient factors of identity in general among all national groups in Crimea. Among the spatial 
components of identity, non-Russified Ukrainians identify most strongly with the Ukrainian state 
while Russians, Crimean Tatars, and Russified-Ukrainians identify most strongly with Crimea, 
although identity with one’s town or village is nearly as strong among all groups except Crimean 
Tatars. Overall, this chapter demonstrates the primacy of nationality among different factors of 
identity among all of Crimea’s national groups. This pattern lends credence to the notion that 
regional identity is derived from and expressed through terms of national identity.  
Finally, Chapter Nine reveals that members of each national group identify more strongly 
with other members of their own nationality than with members of all nationalities at every scale 
in nearly every case. This trend suggests that national group identity is stronger than neighborly 
relations or other forms of group identity. Moreover, among all national groups there are no 
statistically significant differences between the strength of identity with other members of one’s 
nationality living at any scales at or below the nation state. This means that there is no greater 
sense of a community of Russians, Ukrainians, or Crimean Tatars specifically within Crimea 
than there is within one’s town or within Ukraine as a whole. In regards to Russians, this trend 
shows that a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity does not mean a stronger sense of identity with 
other Russians in Crimea than at other geographic scales. Rather, a sense of national identity 
transcends the boundaries of the region in its territorial expression further supporting the notion 
that Crimean regional identity is derived from a broader sense of national identity. 
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By presenting these survey results, I have demonstrated how we must understand the 
concept of a “Crimean-Russian” sense of identity as one informed by Russian national narratives 
about Crimea. While nation and region are both clearly important components of identity for 
Russians in Crimea, the fact that Crimea is no longer a part of Russian national territory creates a 
discontinuity between these two components. The dynamic between nation and region in identity 
formation among Crimean Russians therefore requires qualification and explanation. Based on 
the results of this survey, I present the term “Crimean-Russian” identity not to mean the 
coexistence of separate and discrete territorial and national elements of identity, nor a heightened 
sense of identity among Russians who live at the Crimean regional scale specifically. Instead, I 
argue that “Crimean-Russian” identity denotes a special attachment to Crimea expressed by its 
Russians residents that is derived from and shaped by broader Russian narratives about Crimea 
and its place in the Russian national psyche as a symbol of Russian and Soviet imperial glory, 
deep cultural roots, national sacrifice, military prowess, and an idealized past. Crimean Russians’ 
attitudes towards and opinions about Crimea are viewed through a Russian national lens, and 
their strong regional identity emerges primarily from the sense of pride associated with the 
privilege of living in a region of special significance to the Russian nation. 
 Neither Crimean Tatars nor Ukrainians experience the same discontinuity that Russians 
do when reconciling territory and region in their senses of identity. Crimean Tatars consider 
Crimea alone to be their national territory. Thus, for Crimean Tatars, living in Crimea is an 
indistinguishable and inseparable component of their national identity. While many Ukrainians 
in Crimea express a strong sense of regional identity as well, the fact that they simultaneously 
live within Crimea and within their own national territory presents no internal conflict to their 
territorial-national identity dynamics. Russians, on the other hand, face a complex dynamic 
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between nation and territory in Crimea as the two have not been congruous since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Therefore, a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity has emerged that allows 
Russians to cherish and celebrate their regional homeland in a distinctly Russian way in lieu of 
their broader national homeland, from which they have been politically severed. Because Crimea 
has been viewed as a potential “flashpoint” of interethnic and interstate violence (Kuzio, 2010), 
it is therefore imperative to consider more critically the ways in which each of its primary 
national groups relate to Crimea and other territorial structures. As this study demonstrates, the 
relationship between national and regional identity among residents of Crimea is nuanced and 
complex, and thus before we make any alarmist characterizations about the region as one ripe for 
conflict we must thoroughly consider the attitudes and opinions of those who live there. 
 It is important to examine the ways in which identities are constructed through a 
multiplicity of factors and relationships and not merely a set of mutually exclusive components. 
While it is certainly important to also consider factors such as gender, sexuality, class, 
occupation, and education in the construction of identities, nationality and territory are two 
particularly salient concepts around which group identities coalesce. Because territory is a basic 
component of national identity and of nationalism, it is important to examine the nuanced 
relationship between nationality and territory and how they are intimately entwined. In order to 
move beyond the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994) and its masking of important multiscalar issues 
it is also crucial to consider the relationships between territory and identity at geographic scales 
other than the nation-state. Indeed, as this study has demonstrated, nationality plays a decisive 
role in the formation of regional identity at scales below the nation-state.  
 As this project is only a case study, the question remains of how a more thorough 
consideration of the dynamics between nationality and territory may help us better understand 
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regional identity in other regions around the world and particularly in the former Soviet Union. 
How does national identity inform a sense of regional identity (or vice-versa) in regions with 
different demographics and historical contexts? How might the interplay between national and 
regional identities create centripetal or centrifugal forces at regional, state, or suprastate scales? 
How are perceptions of regional distinctiveness informed through different senses of national 
identity in different regions? What role does autonomy play in institutionalizing perceptions of 
regional distinctiveness, and how do different national groups understand autonomy? All of these 
questions merit further study, and the theoretical and methodological framework presented in 
this work can provide a useful guideline for approaching these issues and interpreting their 
meaning.  
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Appendix 
	  
Questionnaire used in survey 
Your nationality:  ___________________________ 
Your age:  ___________________________ 
Your gender: ___________________________ 
Your place of birth: ___________________________ 
The town or region in which you live: ___________________________ 
How long you’ve lived there: ___________________________ 
Your native language: ___________________________ 
Your father’s nationality: ___________________________ 
Your father’s native language: ___________________________ 
Your mother’s nationality: ___________________________ 
Your mother’s native language ___________________________ 
Your religious affiliation: ___________________________ 
 
Rate the following factors according to their importance to your personal identity (1 = completely unimportant, 2 = a 
little important, 3 = somewhat important, 4 = important, 5 = very important): 
 
Living in your town or region……………………….1 2 3 4 5 
Living in Crimea………..…………………………...1 2 3 4 5 
Living in Ukraine…………..……………………..…1 2 3 4 5 
Citizenship in the Soviet Union……………………..1 2 3 4 5 
Your nationality………………….………………….1 2 3 4 5 
Your native language………………………….…….1 2 3 4 5 
Your religious affiliation…………………...……….1 2 3 4 5 
Other (please write: ______________________)…..1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
To what extent do you include the following groups as members of "your people?" (1= not included, 2 = generally 
not included, 3 = somewhat included, 4 = generally included, 5 = completely included) 
 
People of your nationality living in your town or region………………1      2 3 4 5 
People of a different nationality living in your town or region…….......1      2 3 4 5 
People of your nationality living in Crimea……………………………1      2 3 4 5 
People of a different nationality living in Crimea……………………...1      2 3 4 5 
People of your nationality living in Ukraine…………………………...1      2 3 4 5 
People of a different nationality living in Ukraine………………..……1      2 3 4 5 
People of your nationality living in the countries of the former USSR...1 2 3 4 5 
People of a different nationality living anywhere in the former USSR...1 2 3 4 5 
People of your nationality living anywhere in the world……………….1 2 3 4 5 
People of a different nationality living anywhere in the world……...….1 2 3 4 5 
 
Below, Please write 3-5 words that characterize Crimea to you: 
 
 
 
In your opinion, what should be the political status of Crimea? Please choose one of the following: 
 
_ Crimea should remain an autonomous republic of Ukraine 
_ Crimea should become an oblast of Ukraine 
_ Crimea should join the Russian Federation as an autonomous republic 
_ Crimea should join the Russian Federation as an oblast 
_ Crimea should become an independent country 
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Do you consider Crimea to be a unique region because of any of the following factors? Place an “x” next to all that 
apply, and indicate what you consider to be the single most important reason by circling that question. 
 
_  Its autonomous status 
_  Its physical landscape and/or climate 
_  Its shape / physical boundaries 
_  The majority of its population is Russian 
_  It is home to Ukrainians 
_  It is home to Crimean Tatars 
_  It is home to other ethnic minorities 
_  Its ethnically diverse population 
_  It is the locations of Russian military facilities 
_  It is the location of Ukrainian military facilities 
_  Its status as a vacation destination 
_  Its role in past military conflicts (i.e., Crimean War, Russian Civil War, WWII, etc.) 
_  Its pre-Tsarist history of independence (i.e., Crimean khanate) 
_  It was home to various ancient civilizations (i.e., Scythians, Khazars, etc.) 
_  It is the location of many important archeological sites 
_  It is the subject of famous poems, songs, films, artwork, etc. 
_  Other (please write:____________________________________________________) 
 
 
 
In the space below, please draw your homeland and mark the three places that you consider the most important: 
 
 
